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FOREWORD

This Revised Anthology is about the future of military
operations in the opening decades of the 21st Century. Its
purpose is not to predict the future, but to speculate on the
conduct of military operations as an instrument of national
policy in a world absent massive thermonuclear and
conventional superpower confrontation characteristic of the
Cold War. Also absent are indirect constraints imposed by
that confrontation on virtually all political-military
relationships, not solely those between superpower
principals.
It is likely not possible to predict the future. Its
uncertainties increase the number of assumptions that
need to be made and taken as fact in order to think ahead.
So, all futures investigations are really speculation.
Further, looking ahead, it is necessary to accommodate
the past. For the present is the leading edge of the past, as
well as the line of departure to the future. With us are
legacies of the past; we struggle with them daily in problems
of the present. Dialectically, accommodating the past
inhibits free thinking about the future; but ignoring, or
assuming away the past, foredooms thinking about the
future to the trash bin of non-credibility.
This foreword is not to critique General Bob Scales’
essays. It is rather to illuminate perceptions about past and
present to help evaluate the intellectual strength and
relevance of speculations about the future.
What’s in the baggage? What legacies need be
accommodated? Our military heritage reflects three first
order legacies: Napoleon, the Industrial Revolution, and
Modern Technology. Our Napoleonic heritage, observations
from Jomini and Clausewitz, amended by our own unique
post-Napoleonic experience, provided a set of military
concepts embracing mass conscript military forces in time of
emergency. Forces whose primary modus would be
v

destruction of enemy armed forces and infrastructures,
largely by overwhelming numbers—of soldiers, of units, of
weapons systems.
Secondly, the systemic processes of the Industrial
Revolution have reinforced and facilitated our convictions
about mass armies and the nation in arms, and provided the
material means for the ultimate battle—annihilation and
unconditional surrender.
Thirdly, Modern Technology enabled these concepts,
beginning with rifled shoulder weapons in the 19th
Century, advancing to thermo-nuclear weapons aboard
intercontinental ballistic missiles in the 20th Century.
Realities of post-World War II Soviet conventional
power, overlain with thermo-nuclear weapons, made
apparent that no longer could we plan to win by mass forces
and fire power—numbers alone, even with the aid of allies,
were insufficient. Then thermo-nuclear weapons aboard
intercontinental ballistic missiles extended the battle of
annihilation to a potential Armageddon, from which there
would be few survivors, and no winners. Thus the concept of
Limited Warsomething short of Armageddonemerged
during Korea and Vietnam.
Limited War raised inevitable questions: what political
goals are sought by the use of arms; what does it mean to
win; how is winning to be accomplished; what price are we
willing to pay? Political collapse of the Soviet Union, an end
to the Cold War, ensuing uncertainties about Russian
political and military futures, and the growth of
militarization of conflict (with modern weapons) in the
Third World, especially in the Middle East—all made the
suite of Limited War questions more acute. For, absent Cold
War superpower confrontation, there were far fewer
political constraints bearing on Limited War
confrontations. This was a clear call to revisit primary
national political-military policies in a vastly changed
world.
It was Secretary of War John C. Calhoun who, circa
1818, laid down the basic underpinnings of a military policy
whose implementing processes and structures provide most
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of the inhibiting legacies confronting us as we speculate
about the future from the vantage point of the present.
Secretary Calhoun’s policy saw the Navy as our first line of
defense. There would be a very small regular Army,
expanded by volunteer militia when required. Conscripts
replaced volunteer militia in the Root reforms of the early
20th Century; and structurally, forces were denominated
into regulars, National Guard and Reserves; nonetheless
the Calhoun “Expansible Army” idea, now the Mobilization
System, survives. Present and recent past experience
suggests that most processes of the Calhoun system are
anachronisms—Second Wave systems in a Third Wave
World. In particular: the individual replacement system;
Service and Joint logistics systems; the Defense Department materiel research, development and acquisition
system; command and control systems that are now overwhelmed by burgeoning information technology; and the
continuing search for relevant strategic and operational
level doctrine.
Meantime the national security policy of the United
States has changed. Required by the National Defense
Reform Act of 1986, there is now an annual published
statement of national security policy by the incumbent
administration. The current statement, circa 1999, sets
forth an interventionist policy. Secretary Calhoun’s policy
was one of protection of the United States from foreign
aggression. The 1999 policy statement sees the United
States as the keeper of world order, peace, health, stability,
and a host of other conditions whose relationship to U.S.
national security interests, vital or not, is in most cases
obscure, and in too many cases nonexistent.
Most of General Bob Scales’ essays are attempts to
define military operational concepts that might be
employed to execute such an engagement strategy. All the
Limited War questions cited above are obviously relevant:
what are the political goals, what does it mean to win; how is
winning to be accomplished; what price are we willing to
pay?
These are tough questions; there are others. For unless
we are willing to address ourselves to fundamental changes
vii

required in obviously dysfunctional processes of the old
mobilization system, is anything like what General Scales
suggests even possible? Among many examples, just one: if
we are unwilling to look for effective alternatives to the
individual replacement system, alternatives which will
field effective units, then is it even possible to consider the
operational concepts suggested within these essays? The
effectiveness of units is driven largely by budget. Combatant forces are ever overstructured and understrength. If we
are unwilling to provide enough end-strength (budget) to fill
all the structure, then is it even reasonable to speculate on
full-up units, well-trained, ready to deploy quickly, without
providing fill-up personnel and equipment, and adequate
time for training units to effectiveness?
Finally, one ultimate tough question. Is it an
appropriate policy for the United States to undertake to
regulate world affairs? Meddle in other nations’ business?
Keep everyone in every nation quiet, stable, happy,
prosperous, healthy? If that is considered an appropriate
role for the United States, then do we have, and are we
willing to sacrifice ourselves in order to expend on others,
the resources—requisite time, energy, money? But most
importantly, can we find the wisdom to comprehend
problems we are likely to encounter, the intellectual power
to know for certain what to do, and the leadership capability
to literally save the world from itself?

DONN A. STARRY,
General, USA, Retired
Cavalry Hill, Fairfax Station, Virginia
August 2000
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PROLOGUE

As I complete my third year as the Commandant of the
Army War College, it is a great pleasure to introduce this
new version of Future Warfare. The first Future Warfare
Anthology, published in May 1999, received much greater
distribution than anyone expected. Now in its second
printing, it continues to be in great demand among readers
both at home and abroad. Future Warfare has also proven to
be popular among the Internet users who surf our
homepage. Because of easy Internet access, it has been
translated into two versions of Chinese and published as a
text in both Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China.

This revised edition republishes the complete content
that appeared within the 1999 edition. Additionally, six
new chapters have been developed during this past year
and, subsequently, are included within this new edition. I
am also grateful to General (R) Donn A. Starry for
graciously consenting to write a new Foreword for this
revised edition.

Each essay was developed and tailored for a specific
reading audience. The collection presents a heuristic
argument that has been refined after many wargames,
simulations, symposia and extensive overseas travel,
dialogue and study. The consistent thesis that pervades all
of the articles, however, is simply that ten years after the
end of the Cold War, we are beginning to see the faint
outlines of an emerging and entirely new transformation of
warfare. It is my hope that this new book will contribute
some insights into the ongoing and healthy “battle of ideas”
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within our national security community. The conclusions
from this debate will have a lasting impact upon how our
military forces will be shaped to accommodate the new
realities of precision age warfare.

ROBERT H. SCALES, JR.
Major General, U.S.A.
Commandant
U.S. Army War College
July 28, 2000
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REVISED ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This revised anthology assembles a collection of essays
that have been developed and published over a period of
almost four years. The chapters are presented in the same
sequence that would be used during a staff briefing. Each
essay represents a reflection of my evolving thoughts
regarding future warfare and the urgent need to explore the
development of a new generation of military capabilities.
The thesis within each article was tailored for a specific
reading audience, but, in a broader sense, each message also
represents my attempt to make a professional contribution
to our national defense debate. During the next five years,
without question, the emerging conclusions from this
“battle of ideas” will shape the formulation of U.S. National
Security Strategy for the next two decades. These maturing
concepts, moreover, will define the research and
developmental boundaries that will create the next generation of defense capabilities.
To be sure, there is a holistic pattern of thought that has
stimulated and refined the overall content within each
essay. We must develop a long-range vision of America’s
Army beyond 2010 that will communicate both a realistic
outline of future warfare and the broad organizational
concepts that will underscore future capabilities. I believe
the next decade will find the Army emerging as the most
important member of future Joint Task Forces because the
U.S. will not be able to collapse an opponent’s national will
to fight without orchestrating both lethal firepower and
agile ground maneuver. Without question, there will be a
dramatic increase in future landpower responsibilities
because of the Way we will commit our military Means to
achieve our political Ends.
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INTRODUCTION
TO THE FIRST EDITION

We stand at the brink of a new century as well as a new
millennium. The pace of technological change is steadily
accelerating, while the strategic environment remains
opaque and uncertain. Once again the United States is
between major wars. Yet, the current period is not the first
time the American military have confronted an inter-war
period. Between 1919 and 1941 the services developed a
wide range of capabilities from carrier aviation and
amphibious warfare to combined arms tactics that stood the
country well in the terrible conflict that followed the
bombing of Pearl Harbor. Similarly, in the inter-war periods
between 1953 and 1965, and 1973 and 1991, the American
military confronted a wide disparity of challenges. Again,
the development of airmobile and then air-land battle
underlined the importance of peacetime innovation to
battlefield performance.
But unlike these earlier inter-war periods, the U.S.
military faces no clear threats at present. Thus, the
problems of innovation and adaptation that have beset
military organizations over the past two centuries present
even greater uncertainties and ambiguities. Unlike the
American military of the 1930s which confronted threats in
the Pacific as well as in Europe against which the services
could design solid concepts of operation, today’s armed
forces do not know against whom they will fight, when they
will fight, and even where they will fight.
Throughout U.S. history the American military services
have had an unfortunate penchant for not being ready for
the next war. Part of the problem has had to do with factors
beyond their control: the American polity has been
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notoriously slow to respond to the challenges posed by
dangerous enemies. On the other hand, American military
institutions have been surprisingly optimistic in weighing
their preparedness as they embarked on the nation’s wars.
The first battles involving American military forces hardly
give reason for optimism. The initial defeats in the War of
1812, Bull Run, Belleau Woods, Savo Island, Kasserine
Pass, Task Force Smith, and Landing Zone Albany hardly
suggest unalloyed success by America’s military in
preparing for the next war. Admittedly, in each of its major
wars the United States did enjoy the luxury of time to repair
the deficiencies that showed up so glaringly in the country’s
first battles. Unfortunately, in the twenty-first century the
United States may not have that luxury of time.
The Gulf War does stand out as an anomaly in America’s
wars. In that conflict, service leaders were profoundly
pessimistic about the losses their forces might suffer were
war to occur. In the end, the armed forces of the United
States smashed the Iraqis in a blitzkrieg campaign, the
ground portion of which lasted barely 100 hours. But the
very ease of that victory may carry with it dangerous seeds.
The current belief that technology alone and the capabilities
of distant strike will allow American military forces to fight
simple, decisive campaigns with few casualties flies in the
face of 3,000 years of accumulated military history. Such
idle hopes are the direct result of the “victory disease” that
broke out in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War. If the
American military are to innovate in an intelligent and
effective fashion, they cannot afford to believe their own
press releases from that conflict.
Military institutions have always had considerable
problems in adapting and innovating during inter-war
periods, particularly during periods of technological change.
The catastrophe of the First World War is a particularly
good example. It took three long years of interminable
slaughter before Europe’s armies began to understand and
adapt to the complexities of combined-arms warfare. Even
then, the operational solutions took another twenty years of
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peacetime innovation to work out. Unfortunately for
everyone, it was the Germans who worked out the equation
of tactics, doctrinal change, and technology to its fullest in
the operational successes of blitzkrieg war that won such
devastating victories between 1939 and 1941.
The requirements for successful innovation, as well as
the ingredients for unsuccessful innovation, have begun to
emerge from the work of military historians over the past
several decades. Successful innovation in times of rapid
technological change possesses a number of characteristics,
the least important of which is technology. The German
Blitzkrieg resulted from a sophisticated historically based
analysis of what had happened on the battlefields of 1918, a
solidly grounded system of professionalism that judged
officers on the basis of their intellectual attainment as well
as their tactical proficiency, and a careful, ruthlessly honest
analysis of what was really happening in exercises and
combat. Technology was no more than an enabler that
allowed the Germans to realize the potential of successful
innovation in combined arms. And it is well to remember
that French artillery and armored fighting vehicles were
superior to those possessed by the Wehrmacht in May 1940.
It was the tactical and doctrinal concepts that the French
got wrong, and the result was military catastrophe. But it
was not the Germans alone who successfully innovated in
the inter-war period. The American military in most
respects equaled the Germans and in some respects
outshone their future opponents in their willingness to
examine doctrinal concepts in the harsh light of actual
capabilities.
Unfortunately, there is an emerging belief in the current
American defense community that capabilities and
platforms represent the essential component in how the
United States needs to design its forces for war in the next
century. To put it bluntly, this approach, no matter how
much easier it may make defense planning, will not do.
Capabilities, no matter how impressive to the engineer or
technologist, may prove irrelevant in the next war. In fact,
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they may prove worse than irrelevant, because
technological capabilities that are irrelevant to the war at
hand will have involved the expenditure of sums better
spent on other systems and capabilities. As with so much of
the art of war, the best may be the enemy of the good. In the
end technology is no more than an enabler—helpful in
extending coherent, intelligent concepts of operations, but
useless in forces without training or intellectual
preparation. Vision and serious thinking about the future of
war in the next century are the crucial components to insure
vibrant military innovation in the next century.
Whatever approaches the American military take to
innovation, war will occur. And it will provide a harsh audit.
Almost certainly the next war will take the United States by
surprise. U.S. military institutions may well have prepared
for some other form of warfare, in some other location. To
paraphrase Omar Bradley: it may well be the wrong war, in
the wrong place, at the wrong time. But there it will be, and
the American military will have to fight that conflict on its
terms rather than their own. Unfortunately, military
history is replete with examples of military institutions that
have refused to adapt to the real conditions of war, but
rather have attempted to impose their own paradigm—no
matter how irrelevant or illsuited to the actual conditions.
If we cannot predict where the next war will occur or
what form it will take, there are some things for which the
American military can prepare as they enter the next
millennium. Obviously, the services have to prepare the
physical condition and training of soldiers, marines, sailors,
and airmen. But equally important, they must prepare the
minds of the next generation of military leaders to handle
the challenges of the battlefield. And that mental
preparation will be more important than all the
technological wizardry U.S. forces can bring to bear in
combat. Most important in that intellectual preparation
must be a recognition of what will not change: the
fundamental nature of war, the fact that fog, friction,
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ambiguity, and uncertainty will dominate the battlefields of
the future just as they have those of the past.
There are at present many who are arguing that
technology offers America’s military forces an easy route to
solving the intractable tactical and operational problems
that will be raised by war in the next century. They believe
that technology, computers, and other information systems
will allow the United States a complete transparency over
not only the enemy’s forces but his intentions as well. The
problem with such views is that America’s opponents in the
next war are already at work studying how the U.S. military
works. As the services discovered in the Vietnam War,
military organizations are human and therefore adaptive
and creative, even though they may not possess
sophisticated technology. They may also have the
motivation of religion or ideology to back up their capacity to
adapt to the battlefield. Nevertheless, those who argue for a
technological view of future war clearly believe that history
is irrelevant and that the new technologies will allow
American forces to exist in a frictionless environment, one
in which our opponents cannot adapt. However, 3,000 years
of history underline that fog, friction, ambiguity, and
uncertainty have always formed the underlying typography
of war. Furthermore, modern science has underlined that
the ambiguities and uncertainties of war only reflect the
actual state of the universe. Thus, the view that technology
will allow absolute knowledge and predictability is one that
requires a dismissal understanding of not only history, but
science as well.
When the next war occurs, the United States may well
face opponents who will have prepared themselves to fight
on their home ground. Wars in the next century will not look
like the Gulf War, where an inept and unmotivated
opponent collapsed almost as soon as the fighting began.
Americans should not forget what the North Koreans, the
Chinese, and the North Vietnamese were able to do against
technologically superior American forces in the 1950s and
1960s. The ambiguous nature, however, of future
xvii

challenges (the who, what, and where of the equation)
demands serious intellectual preparation for war. As Sir
Michael Howard has suggested on a number of occasions,
war is not only the most physically demanding of
professions, it is also the most intellectually demanding of
professions. To make the next century “an American
Century,” U.S. military organizations must engage in
serious debate. They must examine the past with something
more than idle curiosity. They must understand that
technology is only an enabler. And they must tie the world of
conceptualization and technology to a solid understanding
of the fundamental nature of war and the harsh reality of
muddy boots.
Major General Robert Scales has been a willing
participant in this debate. He has been one of the few to
stand up and question the easy assumptions that
characterize so much of what passes for thinking at the
present moment. The articles that this book has brought
together represent the work of a scholar-soldier who has
devoted his life to thinking long and hard about the
fundamental business of his profession, the profession of
arms. It is a book that army, marines, air force, and naval
officers must read. And if they do not agree with everything
that General Scales suggests, at least they will begin the
process of debate within their own minds. And that is where
those who wish to think seriously about preparing for war in
the next century must begin.

Williamson Murray
Harold K. Johnson Professor
of Military History
U.S. Army Military History Institute
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
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PREFACE

TO THE FIRST EDITION

Between the Fall of 1995 and the Summer of 1997, I led a
remarkable organization charged by the Army Chief of Staff
to delve into the distant future in order to postulate the
course of warfare beyond the year 2010. The Army After
Next (AAN) investigation has stimulated a rich intellectual
debate within the defense community. What follows is a
collection of essays and articles either written by me or
co-authored with a small band of trusted colleagues who
sought to meet the intent of the Army leadership.
The AAN project remains controversial today due in part
because it differs considerably in scope, period, methodology
and focus from similar future gazing efforts by the Army
and other services during the past few years. Controversy
began with the time period of our observation. We chose a
far more distant perch, the years 2020-2025, so as to move
comfortably beyond the acrimony usually associated with
debates over existing or near term programs and budgets.
We did not anticipate that a real revolution in military
affairs could be even a remote possibility in less than half a
generation. Also, with few exceptions, we felt that for at
least the next decade the nation would be able to achieve its
security goals with the materiel and structures on hand
today. Some time after 2010, however, the huge mountain
of Cold War equipment accumulated during the past
quarter century will begin to wear out and need
replacement or refurbishment. Thus a focus comfortably
beyond 2010 would give us the perspective necessary to
forecast what new structures and materiel the Army will
need “next.”
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Initially, AAN studies and gaming focused on the
strategic level of war. This proved to be an enormous
cultural shift for a service which takes great pride in having
brought about a renaissance in the art of war at the
operational level with the development of Airland Battle
doctrine during the waning days of the Cold War. But the
secure strategic anchors of the Cold War as manifested by
the great global war plans had been wrenched from their
moorings by the time the Berlin Wall fell. To our minds the
Post Cold War Army needed to reset its strategic moorings
and derive a clear understanding of its strategic relevance
to America’s future national policy before it could
reasonably be expected to devise a new operational method
for fighting on land.
We created some nervousness when we committed
ourselves to testing our hypotheses about the future in a
rigorous synthetic environment of force-on-force, free play
war games. These were enormously elaborate and complex
affairs conducted at the Army War College and elsewhere
that often involved hundreds of players, gamers, and
observers as well as some of the most sophisticated gaming
and simulations models and facilities available in the world.
We made sure that our “virtual” enemy was competent and
credible. He was free to engage us using any style of war
consistent with his own culture, means and national
strategic ends. Often our AAN battle force did not do well
against such competent opposition but the experience
convinced us that we were pursuing a meaningful course
whenever we beat him cleanly and fairly.
Each exercise would be followed by a period of validation
and reassessment by a cadre of scientists and operational
artists charged with refining our hypotheses and
developing a new set of structural and doctrinal parameters
for the next yearly gaming cycle. The process was iterative
and dialectical. We began the gaming virtually
unconstrained. For instance, during the first war game we
assumed that in 2020 we would have the capability to
deploy a close combat battle force directly from the
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Continental United States into a distant theater of war
ready to fight. While such a capability fit the requirements
of our national strategy, scientists in our group determined
that such a capability was neither affordable nor technically
practicable by 2020. Therefore, for the next game we were
obliged to shorten the operational reach of our force by
inserting an intermediate staging base with a jump-off
point between the Continental United States and the battle
area.
Technical changes demanded doctrinal changes. Adding
an intermediate base to our strategic deployment scheme
slowed our rate of strategic closure and opened the prospect
of exposing our intermediate bases to the enemy’s weapons
of mass destruction delivered by long-range cruise and
ballistic missiles. These realities in turn demanded a
substantial change in our postulated warfighting doctrine
and caused us to search out other imaginative technical
solutions to these new and unforeseen variables in our
warfighting equation. Thus, over time and with due
deliberation our AAN study group derived a credible
strategic environment for a war in the next century.
Subsequently, we postulated a concept for fighting the
conflict and refined structural and materiel requirements
to allow this new style of war to be prosecuted successfully
on some future battlefield.
The knowledge gained from four rich years of AAN
experimentation allows us now to begin to move from the
esoteric to the concrete, from the general to the specific,
from strategic to operational and from the distant future to
a period closer to the present. Granted, many of our ideas
are as yet indistinct. Some will require major technological
advances to become wholly feasible. Others will require
time and additional gaming before they can be considered
mature enough for experimentation in an operational
environment. Yet with time to reflect I have come to the
conclusion that many of the concepts derived by the AAN
effort for the distant future increasingly seem to have
remarkable currency today. Some examples may illustrate
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this point. In the articles that follow we postulate the rise of
a “Major Competitor,” a nation or nation-like opponent that
could well have the means and the will to present a serious
strategic challenge in a region of vital interest to the United
States some time beyond 2010. However, recent events in
the Middle East, the Balkans and elsewhere make a
convincing argument that legitimate strategic challenges
may not wait until the end of the next decade to mature into
a real challenge to our national security interests.
Another insight: Throughout the AAN study process we
took as an article of faith that a true revolution in maneuver
warfare could not occur until certain leaps ahead in
technology were made in military science necessary to
operationalize most of our warfighting concepts. However,
there is much that we can do now to make the Army’s
structures and doctrine more receptive to the opportunities
offered by technologies already at hand or just over the
horizon. Any military revolution that we expect to mature
beyond the end of the next decade must set its azimuth
firmly in place today or in the near future. It takes half a
generation to educate a battalion commander or train a
platoon sergeant. At least that long is needed to produce a
new weapon, even one derived from today’s technology.
Taken together, from today’s headlines or from insights
gained from our intensive and introspective look into the
future of warfare, I am convinced that the argument is
compelling for us to accelerate our research. We must
examine some of the critical areas that demand attention
now rather than in the years beyond 2010–especially those
areas related to the shape and purpose of our national
defense structures and our landpower structures.
If the Army is to remain relevant to the security needs of
the nation we must begin now to accelerate the speed with
which we can project legitimate, powerful and balanced
forces to threatened regions overseas. There are two near
term alternatives for achieving this goal. First, we can
continue to maintain and exploit overseas bases currently
in our possession. Bases, particularly those within or close
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to areas whose stability is vital to our national interests,
offer a launch platform as well as an observation post very
close to a potential theater of war. Second, we can reduce the
time it takes for units stationed in the U.S. and overseas to
arrive on the scene of conflict prepared to fight. Experience
in recent wars tells us that maximum strategic speed can
best be achieved by projecting units organized into the
smallest self-contained entities of all arms capable of
sustained combat. Today we possess units that can arrive
quickly but have very little capacity to fight sustained
combat against significant opposition. Or, we can project
units capable of sustained combat but which cannot arrive
quickly enough to prevent an enemy force from achieving
his initial wartime operational objectives.
We must commit ourselves to repackaging our combat
forces into the smallest discrete entities of all arms capable
of sustained, autonomous operations. Recent experience
tells us that we habitually organize our ground and air units
into packages of about five thousand. We have learned that
anything less becomes unsustainable or leaves out an
important combat function and anything much larger
becomes too cumbersome and inflexible for rapid projection.
We must learn to leverage the information age to permit us
to leave behind either in the U.S. or in a forward base
overseas much of the impedimenta that slows us down and
prevents us from intervening in a theater of war quickly and
decisively. During the Gulf War it took us nearly six months
to build up a theater of war mainly because we had to bring
all of the manpower and materiel to construct a structural
analog of one of our stateside logistical and support
facilities. For that reason and others an American armored
division weighted over a hundred thousand tons and the
materiel to keep it in the field for the length of a campaign
weighed almost as much. We transported, mainly by sea,
over six hundred thousand tons of ammunition to the Gulf
and brought most of it back unexpended. Likewise, we
transported tens of thousands of shipping containers into
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the theater and had to open most of them on the docks to find
out what was in them.
The image of the air campaign is one of power projected
quickly and efficiently into the Gulf. In fact, however, air
power was just as constrained by the realities of our
logistical umbilical cord as that of the ground force.
Practically every weapon delivered by air began its journey
to Iraq by sea from a U.S. port. Over forty tons of aviation
fuel were burned to drop one ton of bombs within the
theater.
So a force tailored for strategic projection must be as lean
as possible consistent with the need also to possess the
combat power to dominate an enemy force with
overwhelming lethality and agility. To achieve this goal a
strategic force must leave behind those structures that do
not contribute directly to success on the battlefield. Today
information age technologies allow finance, personnel,
intelligence, communications, and some supply functions to
be performed outside the immediate confines of the close
battle area.
The precision revolution allows much of the munitions
train that traditionally accompanies ground units to be
shrunk considerably. Air power can provide much of the
distant supporting fires a ground force will need to maintain
firepower dominance without demanding a mass of
munitions to be carried along with the intervening force.
But as recent experience has shown, air delivered
munitions are heavy, expensive and rare. Plus, our
experience has demonstrated dramatically that the more
expensive the munitions and the more distant the source of
delivery the less responsive the source of firepower will be to
soldiers on the ground. Fortunately technology is available
today to make precision cheaper, smaller and more
available to ground forces. This capability becomes all the
more desirable as our future enemies learn to disperse and
go to ground in an effort to lessen the destructive effects of
precision delivered from the air.
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Once in the presence of the enemy these early arriving
forces will have to face the reality of close combat on land.
As the article “A Sword With Two Edges” contends, the
introduction of ground forces into combat does not need to
imply that the cost of the operation in terms of human life
now becomes prohibitively expensive. First, it must be
obvious after recent experience that the time it takes to
bring a campaign to closure is, in itself, a cause of friction
and a producer of casualties. An air campaign takes time
because it is an instrument of attrition and attrition
demands a protracted period to kill and destroy enough of
the enemy force to break his will and force him to capitulate.
A thinking enemy with a will to resist will use the gift of
time to his own advantage. Also, air attacks are not free. To
be sure, today we are ahead in the technological contest to
protect pilots with radar jamming and stealth. But, again,
we must expect that given time, ingenuity, and the
necessity driven by a will to survive our enemies will be
induced to develop the technical and tactical means to
prevail under air attack while making the cost of a
prolonged air campaign more and more expensive to our
side.
Yet the image still exists of the helicopter pilots being
dragged through the streets of Mogadishu or, more
contemporaneously, the image of the horrific opening scene
in “Saving Private Ryan” where the true horror of
face-to-face ground combat is driven into the psyche of the
movie goer. I am increasingly convinced, however, that the
technologies and structures available today, suitably
modified, offer the potential for ground forces to interpose
themselves into the midst of an enemy’s ground force,
isolate him and collapse his will very quickly with an
absolutely minimal loss of life.
How would such a force differ from forces today? First,
the force would be balanced. It would possess the means
both to strike the enemy with great precision but also to
maneuver throughout the enemy’s area of operations with
equal competence and precision. Balanced forces are always
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joint, that is, they possess the flexibility and means to
confront the enemy with a variety of capabilities from all
dimensions of combat: air, sea, land, and space. Second, the
force must have the ability to apply all dimensions nearly
simultaneously so as to deny the enemy the opportunity to
confront us sequentially, one dimension at a time.
A force balanced between firepower and maneuver
prevents an adaptive enemy from optimizing his force to
prevail against American firepower alone. Centuries of
experience in war tells us that an enemy arrayed to absorb
firepower is immediately vulnerable to a force optimized for
maneuver. As an enemy scatters and goes to ground he
becomes paralyzed, incapable of maneuver and thus a
vulnerable target for small mobile forces capable of
interposing themselves amongst and between an immobile
enemy. Simultaneously, continuous and balanced pressure
gives the enemy two unacceptable alternatives. He can
attack our forces deposed in his midst and suffer defeat by
precision fires or he can remain static only to wither in place
or be systematically found, fixed and overwhelmed by
decisive and balanced ground and air attack.
The articles that follow make the case for a balanced
force in future war. Our thesis is reinforced by Joint Vision
2010 which echoes the nearer term case for a balance
between the two active offensive components of joint
warfighting, “precision strike” and “dominant maneuver.”
However, if one looks at what we are doing rather than
saying the issue of balance is much in doubt. Today we can
strike with precision as evidenced by our performance in the
Gulf War and thereafter. But we cannot maneuver with
equal precision, or with the speed necessitated by the
demands of a greatly expanded and infinitely more lethal
battlefield. More troubling is the realization that we most
certainly cannot maneuver with the assurance that we have
done all that we can to lessen the cost of human life. Thus
we are continually faced with two conflicting alternatives:
attack by precision from the air and achieve no decision or
introduce ground troops to ensure a decision but risk
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unnecessary casualties. This assertion is all the more
disturbing when one looks out into the programmatic future
and sees that firepower programs, particularly aircraft and
platforms to support aerial combat, dominate our future
hardware acquisition programs.
Granted, there is much that we in the Army can do to
make our existing landpower forces more suitable to the
future conflict environment. We must begin soon to lighten
our force. We must repackage our combat forces into more
projectable and more tactically mobile entities. We must
increase the proportion of our close combat force that
maneuvers by air. We must better exploit information
technologies so that we will be able to see the enemy about
us with greater clarity and immediacy. We must improve
our system of battle command and our method for
inoculating our leaders to deal with the shock, confusion
and complexity of modern close combat so they will be better
able to use the instruments within their command.
But if we are to provide our national leaders in the future
with the instruments necessary to prosecute our national
military strategy we must ultimately refocus our
intellectual and fiscal resources in a concerted effort to
rebalance our fighting forces. It is important to remember
in this high-tech-era that certain timeless principles still
govern the course of conflict. The first among these is that
war will be ultimately and foremost a test of will. History
tells us repeatedly that a military that can only attack by
fire alone is a military capable of achieving only fleeting
advantage. A balanced force, on the other hand, capable of
paralyzing by fire and gaining and holding ground by
maneuver, can translate temporary into lasting advantage
by collapsing the enemy’s will to resist. A damaged enemy
with his territory intact will continue to resist. The same
enemy ejected from or dislocated within his territory will
fall victim to the paralysis that always must precede defeat.
Only when paralysis occurs can our side gain the
overwhelming decision we seek at minimum cost in life. As
the fourth essay in this anthology contends, our future
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arsenal must include a 21st Century sword with two edges:
one side—precision firepower; and the other—equally
precise maneuver. Unless we apply both in balance and
harmony future wars might well devolve into massive wars
of attrition.
Current events only serve to reinforce and add an
element of urgency to what we have learned from our AAN
studies. These events now tell us that we may not have until
2020 to implement the strategic and operational AAN
tenets. In fact, the future is now and we must begin
immediately to make today’s weapons and structures as
suitable as possible to fit our newly emerging image of
future warfare.

ROBERT H. SCALES, JR.
Major General, U.S.A.
Commandant
U.S. Army War College
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SPEED AND POWER: PRIMAL FORCES
IN THE NEW AMERICAN STYLE OF WAR

The nature of war is changing and the rate of change is
more rapid than any similar period of modern history.
Evidence of how profoundly contemporary events have
affected America’s style of war is clearly documented within
the historical record of American conflict since the end of the
Second World War. For almost forty years we planned for a
return to a total war with the Soviets—a war that never
came—while we evolved, through bloody practical
experience, a new style of limited liability wars fought for
ends not necessarily vital to our national interests at the
time. Only recently, thanks to our experience in Kosovo,
have we just begun to associate our years of experience in
limited wars as perhaps the most relevant analog for
understanding the nature and character of wars we will
continue to fight for generations to come.
Our bloody education began in Korea. We started this
war in the European style with division level operations
supported by concentrations of air and surface delivered
firepower established by norms developed from our war
against the Germans. By the winter of 1951, the contours of
a future stalemate were already discernable. Our opponent
had become an adaptive enemy capable of absorbing
doctrinal doses of killing power while remaining effective on
the battlefield. Back in the states, the American populace
increasingly became unwilling to tolerate unlimited
expenditures of life in order to achieve unclear ends. The
combination of these two realities compelled military
leaders in the field to radically reverse the established
doctrinal relationships between fire and maneuver.
Subsequently, attacks were lead by infantry platoons
supported by hundreds of guns and aircraft whose killing
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effects were orchestrated by an increasingly complex and
cumbersome firepower system that was uniquely American.
In The Future, A Thinking, Adaptive Aggressor Will
Occupy Quickly, Gain Control Of The Ground To
Subdue The Population And Disperse To Avoid
Destruction By Fire.

The lessons of Korea, unfortunately, did not endure
thanks to our preoccupation with fighting the big war in
Europe. So we were reeducated, often tragically, in
Vietnam. In time, the Army shifted away from the wasteful
large-scale search and destroy operations to the use of
smaller platoon sized units to find and fix the enemy
followed by copious doses of air and artillery to finish him.
But, as in Korea, the process took too long. Given the gift of
time, a dedicated enemy with the will to endure and absorb
punishment by fire eventually learned to maneuver at will
without the benefit of a firepower advantage.
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First Phase:
Establish An “Unblinking Eye,” With Continuous
C4ISR Coverage

Our successful performance in Just Cause and Desert
Storm shows that by the end of the Cold War we had begun
to learn the lessons for winning limited liability wars. The
first lesson was to win quickly by the application of
overwhelming combat power. The object was to collapse the
enemy’s will to resist before his soldiers became inured to
the psychological trauma induced by firepower and before
he could learn of our weaknesses and adapt his method of
war on the battlefield to offset our firepower advantage.
Kosovo reinforced the need to win quickly by applying
overwhelming power in the shortest time. But this conflict
also demonstrated that our enemies are beginning to
relearn the lessons taught by successful enemies during
past wars of limited liability. As we have become more
proficient in finding, tracking and striking the enemy, the
enemy has also learned how to mitigate the effects of
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superior firepower by adapting the tenets taught to them by
the Chinese, Vietnamese, Afghans, Iraqis and others.
Our potential opponents have learned to gain and use
the advantage of time. They will seek to win by avoiding
loss, to hold on until the Americans tire of the conflict first.
The surest way to accelerate this process, they all have
learned, is to kill Americans —- quickly. Time can be gained
by shifting from a traditional European style of linear war to
a non-linear style based upon the control of territory rather
than the command of key terrain and critical nodes, all of
which are prime targets for destruction from above by
precision weaponry. The enemy can stretch out the conflict
by going to ground, dispersing, hiding, and occupying
complex terrain such as mountains and cities and by
deceiving the Americans through the use of camouflage and
information deception.
If done correctly, an adaptive enemy can turn a one-sided
conflict into a close contest as we saw in Kosovo. So, how do
we insure that we will continue to win and win cheaply
against such an opponent? We must be able to deprive the
enemy of his time advantage and make the most of our
firepower advantage by robbing the enemy of his ability to
deceive, disperse and go to ground.
The surest way to gain the advantage of time is to arrive
within the battle area quickly, armed with overwhelming
force. Speed of arrival will allow us to literally catch the
enemy in the open before he is able to capture his
operational objectives and go to ground in terrain
advantageous to the defensive. The paralytic effect of
precision strikes will serve to freeze his forces in place and
then force him to disperse.
Our past wars have taught us that as an enemy
disperses to absorb firepower, he becomes vulnerable to
quick destruction in detail by ground forces. Once enemy
forces are sufficiently weakened by fire and find themselves
unable to mass, friendly maneuver forces must be inserted
quickly across the entire span of his operational area to
6

Second Phase:
Strategic Strike Campaign To Paralyze The Enemy
And Force Him To Disperse . . .
Check

ensure the immediate disintegration of his force and the
ultimate collapse of his will to resist. The inter-disposition
of forces in the enemy’s midst ensures that we control the
clock, not him.
Enemy units gone to ground can now be found and fixed
by maneuver forces. Exposed, cut off and unable to move or
mass, each enemy pocket can be destroyed in detail with
minimum loss to the intervening force. As long as we hold
the initiative by occupying his territory, time is on our side.
We now have the luxury of taking him down using a
balanced application of firepower and maneuver. The
enemy is faced with a deadly paradox. If he remains
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dispersed our forces will destroy him at leisure. If he
attempts to mass he summons the full wrath of American
precision strike. Check and checkmate.
Kosovo serves as just another compelling data point
along a remarkably clear continuum of American
experience in contemporary wars of limited liability. The
lessons are strikingly clear. To win cheaply we must win
quickly. Future victories will only come if we are possessed
with the speed to arrive quickly and the power to end the
conflict decisively by overwhelming the enemy with a
balance of precision firepower and maneuver.

Third Phase:
Strategic Maneuver to Occupy and Culminate . . .
Checkmate
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CYCLES OF WAR

Speed Of Maneuver Will Be The Essential Ingredient Of An
Information-Age Army

The nature of warfare, like other forms of collective,
complex human behavior, changes slowly. Cycles of change
in warfare are particularly difficult to comprehend and even
more difficult to anticipate because, unlike endeavors in
finance, medicine, or law, active experience in war is,
thankfully, infrequent. Because warfare cannot be
practiced often, soldiers are obliged to rely on the laboratory
of past experiences to gain vicarious experience in war.
CYCLES AND PATTERNS
Before the advent of the industrial age, study in the
laboratory of past wars served soldiers well. Cycles of
change were centuries long, and factors that generated
change, such as demographics, politics, and relative power
among contenders, while not necessarily predictable, were
at least constant and familiar enough to give soldiers
confidence that data derived from past campaigns would
remain relevant and useful as signposts into the future.
Since the beginning of the Industrial age, technological
warfare—the applied science of killing—has eclipsed all
other dynamics of change. For many, this magnitude and
newness of science threatens the reliability of precedent as a
useful mechanism for predicting the future course of war.
To be sure, the frenetic pace of technological change in
the modern world has served to compress the interval and
stretch the amplitude of the cycles of change. Nonetheless,
identifiable cycles remain. If our historical laboratory
serves us, we should be able to search the recent past to
identify new cycles driven principally by technology. Should
we find a common pattern in technological cycles, and if we
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accept the premise that technology will continue to drive
future change, then we should be able to use the recent past
to fix the central axis aligning those cycles and project it into
the future.
Technology began to dominate patterns of change with
the rise of industrial production and the appearance of
precision warmaking machinery like rifled weapons in the
mid-19th century. The small bore repeating rifle, the
machine gun, and quick-firing field artillery extended the
deadly zone, or the distance that soldiers had to cross to turn
a defender out of his position, from 150 meters in Napoleon’s
day to a thousand meters or more by the end of the American
Civil War. As the deadly zone increased by nearly a factor of
10, the risks of crossing it were further multiplied by the
lethality induced through the precision and volume from
the massive proliferation of repeating arms. Thus,
technology favored the defender. Images of the terrible
slaughter of World War I remain as testimony to the cost in
blood exacted by an operational method that relied
principally on killing effect to achieve decisive results.
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Before the slaughter ended, military professionals on
both sides of no-man’s land sought to solve the tactical and
operational dilemmas imposed by dominance of firepower
on the battlefield. The tactical problem simply was to cross
the killing zone alive. The operational problem was to make
a successful crossing militarily decisive. Once across, a force
had to reach deep, concentrate, and strike to dislocate and
eventually disintegrate the order and cohesion of an
opposing force.
The conceptual solution came first to the Germans in
1918, and it was deceptively simple: short, highly intense
doses of firepower to prepare the assault; small units to
exploit the shock effect of firepower in order to infiltrate and
bypass centers of resistance; and operational formations to
move through exposed points of weakness to push deep into
the enemy’s rear. While the Germans had the method, they
lacked the means to translate theory into effective action.
After the war, the development of the internal combustion
engine provided the means. The graft of practical science to
an innovation born in war turned the cycle of war a second
time and restored dominance to the offensive. Motorized
armored vehicles allowed soldiers to cross the deadly zone
protected and at enormously greater speed. Large units
could now dash great distances into the enemy’s rear to
strike at his brain and avoid his powerful extremities. The
object of Blitzkrieg became the collapse of an enemy’s will to
resist. Victory was gained through psychological paralysis
induced by movement, rather than through butchery
induced by massive application of firepower.
After World War II, the Western Powers faced another
tactical and operational dilemma. The problem now was to
halt a Soviet-style blitzkrieg across the Northern German
Plain. Tactical forces needed defensive killing power to
absorb the initial Soviet armored shock and hold their
defensive positions. The operational problem was to strike
deep with long-range firepower in order to slow the rate of
arrival from follow-on armored forces at the front line.
Billions of dollars and the collective genius of a generation of
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brilliant minds succeeded in developing a remarkable set of
technologies capable of stopping a mechanized offensive
with precise, long-range killing power. Microchip
technology provided the tools necessary to extend the killing
zone and made targets easier to find, track, and kill.
Signs foretelling how the defensive’s return to
dominance might turn the cycles of war a third time began
to appear as early as the closing days in Vietnam. A few
laser-guided bombs destroyed targets that had previously
required hundreds of unguided dumb bombs. In World War
II, an average of 18 rounds was needed to kill a tank at a
range of 800 yards. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the
average was two rounds at 1,200 yards, and by Desert
Storm one round at 2,400 yards.
The ability to see and strike deep using ground and
aerial platforms served to expand the battlefield by orders of
magnitude. What was once a theater area for a field army
now became the area of operations for a division or a corps.
Just as an army moving at two miles per hour could not
cross a killing zone dominated by long-range, rapid-firing,
rifled weapons in 1914, the precision revolution made it
prohibitively expensive for an army moving at seven times
that speed to cross an infinitely more lethal space a hundred
times as large. Thus, in a conflict involving two roughly
equal—or symmetrical—forces, evidence seems to show
convincingly that the advantage goes to the defender.
Today, seven years after the prospect of a Soviet
blitzkrieg has crumbled with the same finality as the fall of
the Berlin Wall, we seem strangely content to remain frozen
in the third cycle. As the post-industrial age begins to give
way to the information age, we still find comfort in a vision
of future warfare that continues to emphasize the capacity
to kill with greater and greater efficiency.
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THERE IS NO SILVER BULLET
Arguments against a firepower-centered approach to
warfare have been with us since the earliest days of the
industrial age. War is a deadly business. Yet the object of
war is not to kill the enemy so much as it is to break his will
to resist. No matter how efficient and precise a firepower
system might be, victory is rarely defined by killing
everyone on the other side. The extension of influence or
control by force is much more powerful and palatable than
genocide through firepower. Therefore, our object in
applying firepower must be to exploit its substantial
paralytic effects to gain advantage.
Unfortunately, recent experiments in the laboratory of
real war substantiates the view that the paralytic effects of
firepower erode quickly over time. Soldiers become inured
to hardships and danger. Firepower that might break an
enemy formation early in a conflict eventually becomes
merely a nuisance once soldiers accustom themselves to
firepower’s pyrotechnic drama and devise effective means to
deflect, deceive, dissipate, and protect themselves from
firepower’s killing effects.
To win quickly and decisively at low cost in the future, we
must have the means to conduct the battle quickly and to
end it cleanly, preferably at the moment when the paralytic
effect of firepower is greatest. To delay beyond that moment
only increases the killing and makes the enemy more
effective by stiffening his will to resist and by allowing him
to reconstitute. Decision is best guaranteed through
maneuver of forces on the ground. Psychological
collapse—the breaking of an enemy’s will to resist—comes
when an opponent finds himself challenged and blocked
wherever he turns. He admits defeat when further pursuit
of his political objective is not worth the cost or when his
centers of gravity are threatened, controlled, or occupied
and he has no remaining options for restoring them.
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LETHALITY AND MANEUVERABILTY
To avoid the horrors of protracted firepower-attrition
warfare in the future, we must be sure to maintain a
necessary but delicate symbiosis between the ability to kill
and the ability to maneuver. Easier said than done if one
assumes that we still dwell in the third cycle of warfare, a
period that favors the defender.
As we gaze into the distant future and face the prospect
of a competent enemy with both the will to fight and the
means to develop or purchase his own systems of precision
firepower, the prospects of winning a third-cycle conflict
become even more sobering. Possessed with the intrinsic
power of the defensive and most likely defending on familiar
terrain, such a foe would not necessarily have to defeat us
tactically to win the conflict. He would most probably bow to
our overwhelming superiority in the air and at sea and
concede both. He would not have to seek victory so much as
the avoidance of defeat. He would only need to preserve his
ground force in the face of superior firepower long enough to
create stalemate and cause enough casualties for the
Americans to tire of the contest first. Again, an enemy
possessed with a will to fight at the beginning of a conflict is
likely only to grow stronger over time without direct
intercession and eventual domination on the ground.
RESTORING THE OFFENSIVE
The restoration of the offensive as the dominant form of
war will come with the appearance of a fourth cycle of
warfare, a cycle defined more by the new revolution in
information rather than the stale remnants of the machine
age. Imagine a maneuver force possessing the ability to see
with unprecedented clarity, to anticipate with unparalleled
sureness, to accelerate the pace of movement with
unequaled velocity, and to maintain an unrelenting
operational tempo. Such a force would be able to traverse
the killing ground, however expansive and lethal, relatively
untouched, and decide the campaign with a violent and
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debilitating movement that ends quickly with minimum
loss of life to all sides.
The fourth cycle of war will seek to exploit the
information age in order to increase the velocity of
maneuver. Speed must be the essential ingredient of a
future landpower force. Speed will be achieved by creating a
force unburdened by the logistical yoke that has long been
the principal impediment to agility and speed.
The secret of the dominance of the offensive in the second
cycle was not to be found in the tanks, personnel carriers,
and self-propelled artillery of blitzkrieg armies. The secret
lay, instead, in the ability of a portion of the maneuver
force—in the case of the Wehrmacht, just 10 of 117
divisions—to break free of the railhead long enough to reach
deep into an enemy’s rear with enough sustaining strength
to collapse his psychological center of gravity and hold it
down long enough for following forces to solidify the victory.
Today the railhead has been replaced by an equally
cumbersome and constrictive logistical umbilical cord. Like
the Germans in 1940, we must develop the means to break a
portion of our force free to achieve the same objective. The
information revolution promises to give us the means.
Information technologies will allow us to deposit outside the
close combat zone all but those forces necessary to move,
observe, and kill. Detailed knowledge of the enemy’s
strength will free us from our traditional fixation on
stockpiling and “worst casing” so that we will be able to
carry with us into the close combat zone only what we need
when we need it. In effect, we will know enough to know
what to leave behind.
The information revolution should allow us to track the
individual elements of a force with exquisite clarity and
detail. But knowledge of the enemy, alone, is not enough.
We must possess the means to act on what we know and
action is dependent, again, on speed. The combination of
knowledge and speed of movement will allow a future
battleforce to anticipate enemy movement and turn costly
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force-on-force engagements of past wars into surer and less
costly engagements by choice.
That combination will allow a battleforce to maintain an
unrelenting tempo. In the chess game of operational
planning, superior battlefield awareness will enable us to
stay four or five moves ahead of an opponent. Speed will
allow battleforces to shift quickly about the battlefield to
check, block and, when conditions are optimal, strike in a
ratio of friendly action to enemy reaction of, again, perhaps
four or five to one. Thus, the object of a maneuver force of
this type will not be to kill so much as to paralyze, to exploit
the ability to maintain a constant advantage of position in
order to close an enemy’s options, wear him down, and
eventually collapse his will. Speed of maneuver offers the
essential finishing function that balances our prodigious
ability to kill.
The imperative for speed in this new form of warfare
begins at home ports, airfields, and installations. A highly
lethal force, shorn of its Cold War impedimenta, will be able
to project itself from the homeland or from strategic points
overseas in days rather than weeks or months and arrive in
the operational theater ready to fight. The ability to get into
a theater “firstest with the mostest” reduces risk to forces
first to arrive and prevents the enemy from setting himself
into an advantageous defensive position.
Early arrival will change the elemental patterns of war
at the theater level. Such a campaign will allow nearsimultaneous rather than sequential applications of both
killing power and maneuver. Strategic speed will allow a
theater war to take the form of a coup de main. The bloody,
set-piece, sequential campaigns of the industrial age will
give way to sharp, intense acts of strategic preemption.
A landpower force optimized to capture the benefits of
the information age would take on physical characteristics
distinctly different from industrial age armies. First, such a
force would be able to divide itself into two functional
groupments: the first, essentially sustaining in character,
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might be removed from the combat zone entirely, relying on
sure communications and rapid aerial logistics to deliver
the goods and services of war to the combat zone in just the
proper quantities just when needed.
The combat force would become the second major group.
It must be compact, possessing just the people and gear
necessary to sense, track, move, and kill. Many essential
combat functions necessary in contemporary armies would
displace from the ground upward into the exosphere and
space. This “space-to-surface continuum” between the close
combat force and the information structures that sustain it
from above would, in fact, form the central nexus of an
information-age maneuver force. In effect, space becomes
the new high ground. When all the services occupy
vertically oriented battlespace, the character of multiservice missions changes from the segregated land, sea, and
air operations to a new approach which will be
characterized by total interdependence throughout this
surface-to-space continuum.
UNPRECEDENTED BATTLESPACE AWARENESS
The ability to see the battlefield and to know the enemy,
combined with the speed to exploit these advantages, will
fundamentally change the dynamics of fire and maneuver.
A commander able to observe enemy movement with fine
granularity would be able, with confidence, to divide his
own forces into comparably fine increments and position
each precisely enough to control and dominate each discrete
bit of enemy combat power. The ability to employ many
small units at once would allow a commander to cover a
large operational area with discrete combat elements. A
sports analogy is appropriate: a basketball team with
superior speed, agility, and understanding of the opposition
would be more effective playing man-to-man rather than
zone.
A commander with the dual advantage of speed and
killing power will dominate the battlefield. Superior killing
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power allows incapacitation of an enemy force, a necessary
capability, but by itself intrinsically indecisive. Superior
mobility allows exploitation of the temporary advantage
gained by the stunning effect of killing power.
If these two essential elements of combat power are
orchestrated with skill so that they are applied in harmony,
an unfettered battleforce would be able to strike multiple
vital points simultaneously or in a sequence of our choosing.
In a very short time, perhaps only hours, such a force would
be able to inflict a rapid sequence of local tactical disasters.
The cumulative effect of these closely spaced events would
serve to dislocate and confuse an enemy to the point that his
warfighting structures quickly disintegrate. This confusion,
dislocation, and disintegration will combine to produce an
unequivocal military decision with minimum cost to both
sides.
EXPERIMENTATION AND INNOVATION
The image of a landpower force to accomplish such deeds
is purely conceptual today. But certain realities have begun
to appear dimly through the veil of the future. First, at a
time when American arms will most likely be called on to
win an offensive campaign cheaply, the third cycle seems to
tell us that the advantage goes to the defender. The
offensive cannot be restored by firepower alone, because
firepower cannot provide the essential decisive function
necessary to end a campaign quickly on our terms at
minimum cost. Second, even when preceded by
overwhelming doses of precision firepower, a maneuvering
force cannot hope to succeed against a determined, thinking
enemy if its speed of movement cannot exceed the
20-kilometer-per-hour pace of a third-cycle force. An
information-age army must move at 10 times that velocity.
Finally, as in past cycles, technology promises a way out of
this dilemma. The information revolution will give land
forces both the mental agility and matching physical speed
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to restore the essential balance between firepower and
maneuver on a future battlefield.
Henry Ford never met Heinz Guderian, the German
general commonly held most responsible for exploiting
Ford’s invention to gain victory on the battlefield. Likewise,
history will eventually produce the warrior who will
capitalize on the opportunities offered by Bill Gates and the
revolution most often associated with his name. The name
and nationality of the warrior who someday will proclaim
himself the Guderian of the information age has yet to be
recognized. But one fact is certain: the information
revolution will continue to alter our world at an
ever-increasing pace whether we choose to engage ourselves
in it or not.
We cannot remain fixed on the third cycle of warfare for
much longer. Already, competing nations are striving to
chip away at America’s dominance in precision fires. Sooner
or later someone will find a way to match or counter our
firepower advantage. The result may well be equilibrium on
the battlefield that might lead to stalemate or eventual
defeat.
Imperatives for innovation and change are overdue. We
need to begin now to forge a new marriage between
battlefield knowledge and unprecedented landpower speed.
We must do no less than draw the outline for a new army
whose structure is predicated on the premise that the
machine age is past and the age of information has just
begun.
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PREPARING FOR WAR
IN THE 21st CENTURY

IN BRIEF
Recurring proposals to substitute advanced technology
for conventional military capabilities, epitomized by the
New Look of the 1950s, reflect a peculiarly American faith in
science’s ability to engineer simple solutions to complex
human problems. But as Vietnam proved, technological
superiority does not automatically guarantee success of
arms. Unpredictability constitutes the enduring nature of
war. Thus, success in war requires the rejection of
over-reliance on any single capability. America’s next war,
like those that have preceded it, almost certainly will be
won—or lost—on land.
The U.S. government has now embarked on its third
major reassessment of current and future military
requirements since the end of the Cold War. Given the
leadtime involved in making any significant change in the
nation’s defense posture, the results of this review are likely
to influence American military capabilities well into the
next century. All the more reason to insist that any such
reexamination of America’s military requirements should
reflect a clear understanding of the likely character of
future war. Thus we are troubled by recent claims that
technological supremacy will allow the United States in the
future to abjure the use of ground combat forces in favor of
delivering advanced precision weaponry from platforms
remote from conflict areas.
This is not the first time we have been lured by promises
of high-tech, bloodless victory. In the early 1950s, similar
promises produced the New Look, a strategy proposing to
rely on strategic nuclear weapons as an alternative to
conventional warfare. Describing the origins of the New
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Look, one observer noted “the American yearning for some
simple, single solution to all the bothersome and frustrating
complexities of living in a world of perennial conflict.”1
Then, as today, optimists insisted that technological change
had rendered conventional warfare obsolete. Events in
Southeast Asia and elsewhere soon disabused them. But the
resulting damage to conventional military capabilities
persisted long after the United States had abandoned the
New Look.
What overconfidence in nuclear weapons produced then,
overconfidence in the microchip threatens to reproduce
today. Recurring proposals to substitute advanced
technology for conventional military capabilities reflect a
peculiarly American faith in science’s ability to engineer
simple solutions to complex human problems. They also
gratify both economic and political interests. That remains
true even though the practical military impact of
technological supremacy over the past half-century has
been equivocal at best. Such supremacy could not prevent
the Netherlands’ defeat in Indonesia, France’s defeats in
Indochina and Algeria, America’s defeat in Vietnam, the
Soviet Union’s defeat in Afghanistan, or Russia’s more
recent defeat in Chechnya. All these episodes confirm that
technological superiority does not automatically guarantee
victory on the battlefield, still less at the negotiating table.
Nonetheless, belief in the possibility of a technological
“fix” for the challenges of war has shown astonishing
persistence. In addition to its impact on force postures, it
has significantly affected even how Americans define
military success. That influence peaked during Vietnam, in
which reliance on body counts and other quantitative
“indicators” virtually replaced strategic reasoning. And
while defeat in Vietnam temporarily discredited such
mechanistic thinking, some still insist that a technological
solution for war is “out there somewhere,” if only we could
discover it.
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In an important sense, therefore, U.S. military policy
remains imprisoned in an unresolved dialectic between
history and technology, between those for whom the past is
prologue and those for whom it is irrelevant. Today’s debate
about the preferred structure of American military forces
thus in the end is a debate about the future of war itself. The
debate goes far beyond which weapons to buy or whether to
favor this or that capability. At its heart, rarely considered
and even less often articulated, are fundamentally
incompatible views about the nature of war, about what
conditions produce victory and defeat—indeed, how one
should define these concepts—and ultimately, about the
purpose for which we maintain military forces in the first
place.
For those placing unbridled faith in technology, war is a
predictable, if disorderly, phenomenon, defeat a matter of
simple cost/benefit analysis, and the effectiveness of any
military capability a finite calculus of targets destroyed and
casualties inflicted. History paints a very different picture.
Real war is an inherently uncertain enterprise in which
chance, friction, and the limitations of the human mind
under stress profoundly limit our ability to predict
outcomes; in which defeat to have any meaning must be
inflicted above all in the minds of the defeated; and in which
the ultimate purpose of military power is to assure that a
trial at arms, should it occur, delivers an unambiguous
political verdict.
Such a view of war does not discount the importance of
technology. But it recognizes that technology is only one of
many influences on the conduct and outcome of military
operations, an influence mediated by the nature, scope, and
locale of the conflict, the character and objectives of the
combatants, the attitudes of local, domestic, and
international publics, and above all, the political issues in
dispute. Acknowledging war’s inherent unpredictability, it
rejects over-reliance on any single capability, seeks
maximum force versatility, and requires that military
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operations conform to the peculiar conditions and demands
of the conflict itself.
America’s military forces in the 21st century must
exploit every advantage our technological genius can
supply. But as we will argue in this article, the central
ingredients of military victory or defeat will continue to
reflect the enduring nature of war at least as much as the
transient means used to prosecute it. And in the end,
America’s next war, like those that have preceded it, almost
certainly will be won—or lost—on land.
The Geopolitics of Future War
From a geopolitical perspective, the world in which that
war might erupt may be indefinite, but it is not
indecipherable. On the contrary, it promises to look much
like that of the late 19th century. As in that era, the
principal engines of economic progress will continue to be
the wealthy nations of Western Europe, North America, and
the Asian rim. Political relations among these First World
nations are, if anything, more stable than those which
prevailed among the major powers after the Congress of
Vienna, which inaugurated modern history’s longest period
of sustained great power peace. Healthy democracies,
economic interdependence, cultural affinities, and the
shared memory of two appalling world wars have created a
community of interest that makes war among the developed
democracies nearly unthinkable.
Unlike the major powers for 130 years after Napoleon,
however, today’s developed nations do not dominate the
remainder of the world. Instead, they confront both
developing states—some of which, like Russia, balance
precariously between aspirations to join the developed
world and the threat of political, economic, and
demographic collapse—and Third World societies mired in
economic and demographic misery. Nations in both groups
tend to organize on different principles and operate on
different premises from those of the developed democracies,
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and it is in relations within and among them that future
military challenges are most likely to arise.
While some developing nations are poised economically
to enter the developed world, neither political freedom nor
respect for law, two of history’s most reliable inhibitors of
aggression, necessarily have accompanied their economic
growth. Some like China continue to pursue irredentist
claims against the territory of their neighbors. Others like
Iran assert religious suzerainty over entire regions. All seek
access to the raw resources that fuel development. And most
continue to see war as a legitimate way of achieving their
objectives. For many of these states, acquiring territory
remains a basic impulse, for prestige if for no other reason.
Armed aggression may not be their only or even their
preferred means. But especially among states with
authoritarian governments, the conquest of land remains a
legitimate ambition, and given their own economic and
strategic interests, the developed democracies cannot
remain unaffected.
In the meantime, vast portions of the world are
economically either stagnant or retrogressing. While the
proximate causes may be violent, venal, or otherwise
misguided governments, the fundamental problems are
structural. Many developing world societies remain
economically dependent on subsistence agriculture and
simple mineral extraction. In the meantime, the
introduction of modern medicine has only accelerated a
demographic explosion straining both their economic and
political arrangements.
Among these societies, war tends to revert to its most
primitive character. Driven by ethnic or tribal rivalries—
themselves often a function of differential population
growth—civil warfare will fester. Populous states will
launch calculated invasions of less-crowded neighbors.
Hordes of refugees will spill across borders provoking
violence. And while war in the Third World may be waged
with relatively unsophisticated forces, it frequently will

29

drag on beyond any apparent strategic purpose, in part
because it is aimed deliberately at depopulation. Finally, as
recent events in Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire illustrate, it
often will manifest war’s worst excesses—intentional
starvation, extreme brutality, and mass slaughter.
In these unhappy struggles, the developed democracies
typically will seek reasons not to intervene. But as we have
seen already, media-generated public revulsion may compel
intervention. The visual horrors of genocide may be
intolerable. Humanitarian efforts may backfire, as they did
in Somalia. Or the collapse of Third World societies whether
through internal dynamics or external invasion may
threaten to destabilize an economically vital region to the
point where nonintervention is imprudent.
Finally, we will continue to confront military challenges
from nongovernmental groups which fall neatly into none of
these categories, but whose military capabilities and
political, ideological, or economic objectives make them
impervious to restraint by the civil police power. Such
groups are far from a historical novelty, but their potential
access to sophisticated military technology is unprecedented. They will remain among the most difficult military
problems confronting us.
The Siren Call of Technology
While the military challenges outlined in this appraisal
vary in origin, kind, and degree of threat to U.S. interests,
all have one thing in common: In each case, strategic success
ultimately will require the direct control of land, people, and
resources. In confrontations with developing states, war is
likely to be about the control of territory. In Third World
episodes, it is likely to be about the control of populations.
And suppressing terrorist and other nongovernmental
challengers will require depriving them of political,
psychological, and material support.
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In none of these cases is technology alone likely to be
decisive, and in many cases the very nature of the contest
will restrict its use. Notwithstanding, some visionaries
insist that emerging technologies will utterly transform the
nature of war, permitting the defeat of future adversaries
from a distance with no need to risk precious lives in the
maelstrom of land combat. Such predictions ignore both
war’s inherent uncertainty and what we have learned about
military victory and defeat in our own time.
Soldiers and Marines intuitively recognize the limits of
prediction, and increasingly, even physical scientists share
that recognition. From quantum physics to meteorology,
science has become aware that “nonlinear” interactions
pervade the natural world. We call such interactions
“chaotic,” and where they predominate, confident prediction
is impossible. If that is true even of the apparent
regularities of nature, how much more true must it be of
war? As Clausewitz noted long ago, “No other human
activity is so continuously or universally bound up with
chance.” 2 Indeed, Clausewitz remains relevant today
largely because his work is “suffused with the understanding that every war is inherently a nonlinear
phenomenon, the conduct of which changes its character in
ways that cannot be analytically predicted.”3
The Enduring Character of War
Recognizing that, observers as far back as Thucydides
have insisted that war can be perceived accurately only
through the lens of history. To be useful, military theory
must be grounded in the known realities of the past, not
because the past repeats itself in specific ways, but rather
because it reveals aspects of war which are timeless.
One such enduring feature is the invariable
subordination of war to politics. “War is not a mere act of
policy,” Clausewitz asserted, “but a true political
instrument, a continuation of political activity by other
means. . . . War should never be thought of as something
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autonomous, but always as an instrument of policy.”4 In one
way or another, political considerations always condition
military operations. Allied commanders rediscovered that
enduring reality at the very outset of the Gulf War air
campaign, when two bombs aimed at a secret police
communications bunker in the heart of Baghdad destroyed
not only the bunker, but also 200-odd civilians sheltering
inside it. Political reaction to CNN’s telecast the following
morning resulted in the abrupt curtailment of all attacks on
the downtown Baghdad area.5 In the process, it also
removed any possibility of destroying the political
infrastructure of Saddam Hussein’s tyrannical regime.
As this incident confirmed, war in practice is hostage to
political concerns that routinely preclude the unconstrained
employment of military means. Such concerns tend to be
highly situational, hence unpredictable. For that reason
alone, the mere possession of advanced technology is no
guarantee of its practical utility.
The second and most pervasive of war’s enduring
characteristics is what Clausewitz called “friction.”
“Everything in war is very simple,” he observed, “but the
simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties accumulate and
end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable
unless one has experienced war.” 6 In battle, danger,
confusion, fear, fatigue, and discomfort combine with a
hostile physical environment to curtail the effective
performance of both men and machines. Moreover, as
battlefields enlarge, formations disperse, and operations
accelerate, these stresses increase, even as familiar sources
of physical and psychological support—proximity to other
units, lulls in activity, and the comfort of known
ground—continue to evaporate. Hence the laboratory at
best is an imperfect predictor of battlefield effectiveness;
and even where the employment of advanced technology is
politically unconstrained, it is far from a military panacea.
The stresses of battle, finally, merely are compounded
for leaders, who must make crucial decisions with little time
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for reflection and in a welter of typically ambiguous
information. “In the dreadful presence of suffering and
danger,” Clausewitz reminds us, “emotion can easily
overwhelm intellectual conviction, and in this psychological
fog it is . . . hard to form clear and complete insights.”7 Hence
the profound danger of claims like those of certain
Washington consultants who recently asserted, “What the
[Military Technical Revolution] promises, more than
precision attacks and laser beams, is . . . to imbue the
information loop with near-perfect clarity. . . .”8
Such arguments verge on the theological, having neither
scientific nor historical foundation. On the contrary, as one
observer has noted,
Much of the particular information which any individual
possesses can be used only to the extent to which he himself
can use it in his own decisions. Nobody can communicate to
another all he knows, because much of the information he can
make use of, he himself will elicit only in the process of making
plans of action.9

Similarly in war, there simply are too many critical pieces of
information inaccessible to sensors and beyond the power of
computers.
In an information-rich environment in which what
matters remains buried in noise, individuals at every level
are limited in both what they can absorb and what they can
pass along. And the more oppressed by danger and fatigue,
the more vulnerable they become to both inadvertent
misunderstanding and deliberate deception.
It is above all the interactive—indeed, antagonistic—
quality of war that makes it unpredictable. “War is not
waged against an abstract enemy,” Clausewitz points out,
“but against a real one.”10 America’s adversaries in the next
century will have options no matter what our technological
advantages. Political limitation, friction, and fog are not
artifacts of history, but rather conditions imbedded in the
very fabric of war. To suppose that technology could

33

eliminate them from the battlefield thus flies in the face of
the natural world as it is.
Instead, 2,500 years of history confirm that ambiguity,
miscalculation, incompetence, and above all chance will
continue to dominate the conduct of war. In the end, the
incalculables of determination, morale, fighting skill, and
leadership far more than technology will determine who
wins and who loses.
Distant Punishment vs. Physical Domination
Acknowledging war’s inherent uncertainty by no means
argues for ignoring technology. On the contrary, advanced
information and munitions technologies already have had a
significant influence on Army and Marine Corps doctrine.
Some believe they may radically alter the relationship
between maneuver and firepower, just as the tank and
airplane did from 1918 to 1939. And every modern armed
force must cope with increasing battlefield transparency,
munitions lethality, information overload, and logistical
vulnerability.
Our objection is not to technology itself, but rather to
claims that it will permit the achievement of victory by
distant punishment alone, with no need to exert direct and
continuing influence over the land, people, and resources
which are war’s ultimate stakes. In addition to what history
reveals about the inherent nature of war, our own military
experience in this century argues the contrary.
That experience repeatedly has confirmed that distant
punishment unexploited by the physical domination of
ground is a wasting asset. From Verdun to Cassino, the Iron
Triangle to Al Busayyah, firepower alone, even when
delivered on a massive scale, rarely has proved capable of
ejecting determined troops from the ground they occupy.
Even massive bombing in the Gulf War, for all its
destructive and demoralizing effect on the Iraqi Army, could
not by itself induce that army’s withdrawal from Kuwait.
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What is true of firepower delivered against troops in the
field may be even truer of firepower delivered directly
against an opponent’s civil infrastructure. In fact, the
evidence suggests that such efforts readily backfire,
particularly when directed against opponents whose
leaders can manipulate their publics’ interpretation of
events. We also must be concerned with the reactions of our
own citizens as they watch modern weapons impacting
among apparently defenseless populations, a problem likely
to intensify as the developing states which represent the
most probable loci of future high-intensity conflict continue
to urbanize.
Some argue that the increased precision of emerging
munitions will limit collateral damage, making less likely
both psychological stiffening on an enemy’s part and
psychological revulsion on our own. But precision means
one thing applied to military forces in the field, quite
another applied to heavily populated urban areas. Indeed,
fear of media reaction to the scenes of carnage even among
military targets along Kuwait’s “Highway of Death” in part
explains the Bush Administration’s decision to end
hostilities in the Gulf War after 100 hours, though all the
objectives of the ground offensive had yet to be achieved.11
There certainly have been a few cases in which the
limited use of distant firepower alone produced strategic
results. Air attacks against Libya in 1986, for example,
seem effectively to have diminished Muamar Gaddafi’s
eagerness openly to challenge the United States. In such
cases, in which objectives are limited or merely
demonstrative, distant punishment may well curb hostile
behavior. But it is unlikely in any permanent way to resolve
the underlying issue, as the history of the 1965-68 air
campaign against North Vietnam underlines. Rather, every
such application of distant firepower risks the
embarrassing possibility that the recipient simply will
ignore the attack, forcing the attacker to choose between
escalation or impotence.
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In short, over-reliance on distant punishment ignores
the psychology of an opponent’s will to resist. There is an
enormous difference between enduring distant attack,
which however unpleasant must eventually end, and
enduring the physical presence of a conquering army with
all of its political and sociological implications. We should
not lose sight of the difference between a Kuwait liberated
by ground forces and an Iraq still truculent and combative,
however ravaged by air attack.
The fundamental limitation of distant punishment is
that it commits without resolving. Notwithstanding, its
ease of use and apparent low risk make it deceptively
attractive in cases where U.S. strategic interests are limited
or ambiguous. Some even have urged redesigning American
military forces specifically for intervention in such cases.12
Such proposals are a gilt-edged invitation to back into war,
and ignore everything we have learned so painfully over the
past half-century about the incremental use of force.
Ground Forces and Future War
If resolution and durability are among the most
important and irreplaceable contributions of land forces to
victory in war and deterrence in peace, they are by no means
the only ones. In the geopolitical environment forecast
earlier, strategic success will place a premium on military
versatility. Even the United States cannot afford to
maintain capabilities tailored discretely to every potential
military challenge, nor will any single capability
accommodate all such challenges. Instead, American
military forces must be capable of rapid adaptation to a
broad and constantly varying range of strategic tasks and
conditions.
Ground forces remain the indispensable foundation of
that strategic versatility. Air and naval capabilities
complement but can never replace the ability to deploy
ground forces tailored to the peculiar conditions and
objectives of a given conflict. To say that in no way
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deprecates their importance. No American commander
today would consider launching ground combat operations
without command of the air and space, nor littoral
operations without command of the sea. Moreover, as the
United States continues to shift from a forward deployed to
an expeditionary force posture, dependence on both
aerospace and naval capabilities will increase merely to
ensure ground forces reach the theater of operations rapidly
and safely. Hence, to insist that future U.S. military
operations will inherently be joint is not just rhetoric but
rather frank acknowledgment of strategic and operational
imperatives. But only in unusual conditions will air, sea, or
space operations alone produce decisive strategic results. In
almost every circumstance, the effective integration of all
components will be required.
Moreover, U.S. military forces exist to deter as well as
fight. Even after a half century of practice, our
understanding of the dynamics of deterrence remains
imperfect, but we have learned that a key requirement is
making a deterrent threat credible. One of the central
arguments for relying upon the threat of distant
punishment is that its presumed low risk enhances that
credibility. As we have seen, however, situations in which
distant punishment alone is likely to be effective are
precisely those in which the issues in dispute are least
fundamental. The greater the stakes, the less likely that
distant attack alone will produce a favorable strategic
result. It follows that the greater the stakes, the less likely
that the threat of such attack alone will deter.
Instead, reconciling credibility with effectiveness
requires operational seamlessness. Deterrence is most
likely to succeed when complementary capabilities
reinforce each other, and when all contribute in a credible
way to the assurance of victory should deterrence fail. That
emerging precision attack systems promise more effectively
to kill people and break things is not at issue. The challenge
will be to translate those essentially tactical effects into
strategic results. And the principal mechanism of that
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translation will remain an unrivaled land combat
capability.
There is one additional reason why emerging
technologies must be designed to enhance rather than
replace land power. Whether to deter or fight, the U.S.
probably will confront future adversaries as a member of an
alliance. We have nearly a century of experience with
alliances. And if one lesson can be drawn from that
experience, it is that presence on the ground is an
irreducible bonafide of alliance commitment, especially for
the nation claiming leadership of that alliance.
Central to alliance commitment is the requirement to
share risk. Thus, Sir Basil Liddell Hart’s effort in the 1930s
to restrict the continental role of British ground forces not
only diminished deterrence, but also led to doctrinal and
material stagnation for which the British paid a heavy price
when deterrence failed.13 More recently, repeated U.S.
efforts to “rationalize” America’s NATO contributions by
substituting air for ground forces in return for greater
European ground force contributions invariably foundered
over the principle of shared risk.
The reality is that ground combat forces represent the
strongest evidence of alliance commitment. That, and the
fact that their deployment alone conveys an intention to
remain engaged for the duration, makes them the
irreplaceable adhesive of any military coalition.
War: A Contest of Wills, Not Machines
Any sustained period of peace challenges military
institutions. It requires holding on to the immutable and
terrifying realities of war in a climate of peacetime pursuits
and ease, because only by an understanding of what war has
been can we hope to glimpse what it will be. To prepare for
the future, we must keep our grip on the past.
America’s performance in its first battles rarely has been
impressive.14 The Gulf War broke the mold. For once,
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America took the field with a team that was ready to play.
And the result was the shortest, most successful, and in
American lives least expensive, military campaign in
modern history.
But the military forces which won that war had been
built to fight another, and in that fact there is a stern
warning for today’s planners. In an uncertain world, we
dare not base force requirements on preconceived
assumptions about whom we might fight in the next century
or how. Instead, American military forces must be able to
fight and win on any battlefield, under any conditions, and
with whatever means the nature of the contest requires.
And to do that, America will need robust, well-equipped,
and sustainable land combat capabilities as far ahead as we
can foresee.
Innovative application of emerging technology will
enhance those capabilities. But in the end, war is a contest
of human wills, not machines, in which means must be
subordinated to ends if the results are to justify the costs. In
the world we confront, those ends are likely to be more
complicated, and the circumstances in which they must be
pursued less predictable, than ever before in our history. A
military posture that evades rather than accommodates
that reality is doomed to expensive irrelevance.
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ADAPTIVE ENEMIES:
DEALING WITH THE STRATEGIC THREAT
AFTER 2010

IN BRIEF

The history of warfare reminds us that every dominant
military advantage eventually yields to a countervailing
response. For more than 50 years, the United States has
derived its current military superiority from a remarkable
ability to translate technological innovation and industrial
capacity into effective battlefield advantages. This military
dominance has become increasingly manifest by the precise
application of explosive killing power. It is only a matter of
time, unfortunately, before a creative opponent will develop a
method of war that will attempt to defeat our preoccupation
with the science of war and the application of precision
firepower.
The history of warfare suggests a martial corollary to
Newton’s fundamental law of physics: every successful
technical or tactical innovation that provides a dominant
military advantage eventually yields to a countervailing
response that shifts the advantage to the opposing force.
America’s military dominance has been on display for more
than 50 years. It has become the standard emulated by most
Western nations. The United States has derived its current
military superiority from a remarkable ability to translate
industrial capacity and technological know-how into
effective battlefield advantages—advantages that have
become increasingly manifest by the precise application of
explosive killing power. But half a century is a long time for
a method of war to have been practiced without the
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appearance of countervailing, competitive methods that
will represent a real challenge—something far more
dangerous and effective than the Pentagon’s current
buzzwords, “asymmetric warfare.” Inevitably a creative
opponent will develop a method of war that will attempt to
defeat our preoccupation with precision firepower.
The Established Cycle
The evolving sequence from dominance through
challenge and adaptive response has been a hallmark of the
Western way of war. In combat, as well as peacetime,
Western militaries have proven to be “complex adaptive
systems.” In other words, unlike the static and stylized
forms of combat that characterized much of the way empires
and other cultures have waged war throughout history,
Western military organizations have consistently adapted
and innovated during both peacetime and war. This pattern
of successful adaptation reaches back to the very dawn of
Western warfare. The Spartans went to sea to beat the
Athenians. To counter the genius of Hannibal, the Romans
developed the guile of Fabius and the determination of
Scipio. The longbowmen of Edward III found their match in
the tenacity and patience of du Gueschin’s band of Medieval
irregulars. Washington developed a body of Continentals to
threaten the long service professionals of Great Britain.
Moreover, the American militia fundamentally altered the
political context within which war among Europeans
occurred. The British utilized the strengths of Wellington’s
ancient regime army with the cold hard cash produced by
the Industrial Revolution to defeat the legions of Napoleon.
In 1918, Allied armies, after heavy defeats in the spring,
utilized not only enemy tactics, but new technology to break
the German Army in the field. Furthermore, Americans
should not forget that armies forged in the image of Maoist
China successfully held off and at times defeated the
firepower armies of the West during the Korean and
Vietnam Wars.
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This process carries an important warning for the U.S.
military as the United States embarks on a new century.
Military organizations, particularly skilled and motivated
ones, will adapt and learn on the battlefield. In fact, the
ability to adapt swiftly is an essential component of military
effectiveness—and as one side changes and adapts, so too
eventually will the other.
Every Age Has Its Own Kind of War
The great difficulty that confronts the U.S. military as it
enters a new century is that, for the most part, the services
still retain a mental and physical attachment to the combat
conceptions that had their origins through innovations
occurring in the 1920s and 1930s and served so well during
the Cold War. The apparent utility of these methods of war
during some of the post-Cold War skirmishes has only
served to reinforce this attachment. The U.S. vision has
been further clouded by a characteristic Western arrogance
that presumes that, to be a challenge, non-Western
militaries must mimic the Western way of war. As a result,
the movement within the non-Western world to discover
methods to counter the Western fixation on firepower has
remained shrouded in the shadows of unfamiliar military
cultures. Thus, U.S. military analysts have missed much of
the recent discourse and experimentation occurring outside
of the West due to the cultural schism that divides the
world’s advanced industrial democracies from the other
four-fifths of the planet.
Since 1918 the foundation of the twentieth century
Western way of war has rested on the perfection of accurate,
predictive firepower. The assumption has been that the
explosive power of modern munitions, if delivered with
great precision at decisive points in a timely fashion, will
create sufficient physical and psychological damage to
collapse an enemy’s will to resist. The collapse of the
enemy’s will on the battlefield such as the German Army on
the Western Front in 1918 or the French Army in 1940, or in
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his homeland as evidenced by the surrender of Japan in
1945, offers a warring state the opportunity to translate
dominance on the battlefield into decisive political results.
Truth is, challenges, and effective ones at that, to the
Western way of war have been germinating over the past
half-century. The Japanese in the Pacific displayed a
skillful capacity to adapt to the challenges posed by soldiers
and Marines in that theater. Over the course of 1943 and
1944, the Americans had won a series of quick and decisive
victories by using the mobility and firepower of their
amphibious forces. But the Japanese had observed what the
Americans had been doing as well; at the end of 1944 they
entirely revamped their approach to defending the islands
still guarding the approaches to the Homeland. In February
1945 on the small island of Iwo Jima off the coast of Japan,
Lt. Gen. Kuribayashi Tadamichi quite literally buried his
defending forces and their artillery deep in the natural and
man-made caves of Mt. Suribachi. Moreover, he ordered his
subordinates not to launch the banzai, suicidal charges that
had so characterized Japanese defenses before, an approach
that had exchanged Japanese bodies for American bullets
and shells. When it was over virtually the entire Japanese
garrison of 20,000 was dead; but the three attacking Marine
divisions had suffered 6,821 dead and nearly 20,000
wounded.
Things were even worse on Okinawa. There the
defending Japanese army commander had more troops and
more territory to defend. In effect, his defensive plan
abandoned the best beaches where the Japanese thought
the Americans would attack (and where they did attack), as
well as the entire northern two-thirds of the island. But Lt.
Gen. Ushijima Mitsuru buried his defending force under a
vast array of pillboxes, switch lines, and deep bunkers to
carry out an extended defense of the southern portion of
Okinawa. Ushijima recognized that his 32d Army could
never match American firepower, but he maximized what
firepower he had. His objective was to use mortars and
artillery in sufficient numbers and with enough deadly
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effect so as not to cede the firepower advantage completely
to the Americans. Fighting their way through deep
defensive lines, the Marines and soldiers eventually took
the island and completely destroyed the Japanese Tenth
Army of 70,000 men (killing 70,000 Japanese civilians as
well). But the casualty bill in the island fighting and among
the ships forced to stand off Okinawa to support the ground
forces in the face of massed Kamikaze attacks were
horrendous: 65,631 killed or wounded.
Another effort to redefine and codify an Eastern
approach to defeating the Western way of war began in the
mountain fastness of Manchuria immediately after the end
of the Pacific war. Mao Tse-tung and his marshals
developed a body of doctrine adapted from their successful
wartime guerrilla campaigns and modified their concepts to
fit the demands of a conventional war fought against an
enemy superior in technology and materiel.1 Mao perfected
his new way of war against the nationalists during the
Chinese Civil War fought between 1946 and 1949. His
concepts were simple and centered around three tenets, the
first and most important of which was “area control.” To be
successful Mao’s army first needed to survive in the midst of
a larger, better-equipped enemy.2 To ensure survival he
divided his army into small units and scattered them across
a broad expanse of territory. Controlling and maintaining
cohesion among such a disparate and scattered force was
and remained his greatest challenge.
Once his force was supportable and stable, Mao
proceeded to apply the second tenet, which was to “isolate
and compartmentalize” Nationalist forces. The challenge of
this phase was to leverage control of the countryside to such
a degree that the enemy gradually retreated into urban
areas and along major rail and road lines of
communications.3 The final act of the campaign demanded
an ability to find the enemy’s weakest points in order to
collect and mass overwhelming force against each point
sequentially, much as one might take apart a string of
pearls, one pearl at a time. Mao’s new style of conventional
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war, while effective, demanded an extraordinary degree of
discipline and patience to persevere under extreme
hardships. It also demanded the ability to transition quickly
from an area control force to a force capable of fighting a war
of movement.
From China to Korea
Within a year of the end of the Chinese Civil War, the
Americans severely tested Mao’s methods in Korea. During
the early days of the Chinese intervention—beginning in
October 1950—the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) badly
misjudged the killing effect of American artillery and
tactical air power. Pushed too quickly into maneuver
warfare, the Chinese massed in the open, often in daylight,
to expand their control over the northern portions of the
Korean Peninsula.4 They extended their narrow lines of
communication farther down the mountainous spine of
Korea as they advanced.5 But they soon found their logistic
support exposed to the terrible effects of American air
power. The Chinese paid a horrific price for their haste.
Their spring 1951 offensive sputtered to a halt as U.S.
artillery and aerial firepower slaughtered Chinese soldiers
in masses, while air interdiction cut their supply lines and
forced a retreat back across the Han.
Brutal experiences led quickly to sober lessons relearned
from the Chinese Civil War. As a highly skilled complex
adaptive system the Chinese Army quickly adjusted to the
actual conditions of this new war. Over the next two years,
subsequent Chinese attacks remained limited and
controlled. The Chinese high command learned to hold most
key logistic facilities north of the Yalu River well out of
reach of U.S. air attacks. South of the river the Chinese
dispersed and hid their forces while they massed only in the
period immediately before launching an attack. Because
their forces were so difficult to locate and so easy to
transport, mortars became the Chinese weapon of choice.
PLA soldiers moved at night and chiseled their front lines of
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resistance deep into hard, granite mountains. American
casualties soon mounted, while the Chinese stabilized their
casualties at a rate acceptable to their political leadership.
Far more Americans died in combat during this “stability
phase” of the war than during the earlier period of fluid
warfare. A cost acceptable to the Chinese became too costly
to the Americans. The result was an operational and
strategic stalemate. To the Chinese, stalemate equaled
victory.6
From Korea to Vietnam
Over the next two decades the Vietnamese borrowed
extensively from the Chinese experience and found creative
ways to lessen the killing effect of firepower, first against
the French and then against the Americans. The
Vietnamese also proved highly skilled in adapting to the
new challenges posed by their Western opponents. The
Vietminh won the battle of Dien Bien Phu against the
French Army in spring 1954; the battle was a straight out
conventional confrontation.7 The Vietminh based their
tactical and operational approach on Mao’s unconventional
methods. Their conduct of the battle was remarkably
reminiscent of siege operations conducted by the PLA
during the Chinese Civil War. In both cases the secret of
success proved to be dispersion and careful preparation of
the battlefield. The Vietminh remained scattered in small
units whenever possible to offer smaller, and thus less
detectable and less lucrative targets, and to allow their
troops to live off the land. Fewer supply lines and logistic
sites offered even fewer opportunities for interdiction fires.
To win the Chinese and the Vietminh eventually needed
to attack. Successful attacks demanded the ability to mass,
at least temporarily. The Vietminh needed to exercise great
care in massing under the enemy’s umbrella of protective
firepower. Superior intelligence provided sufficient
information to select the right time and place. Their ability
to collect and orchestrate the movement of tens of thousands
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of soldiers at just the right moment allowed attacking forces
to collapse the enemy’s defenses before French firepower
could regain the advantage. This remarkable ability to
“maneuver under fire” perfected against the Nationalist
Chinese and the French, reached new levels of refinement
during the second Indo-China War against the United
States.
During the early days of the conflict, impatience as well
as ignorance of the enormously more potent U.S. firepower
led the Viet Cong (VC) and the North Vietnamese Army
(NVA) to push too quickly for a showdown. Nevertheless,
there is some evidence to suggest that Giap deliberately
sacrificed units in the Ia Drang in 1965 to find out exactly
what the American capabilities were. The result, however,
was that over the course of 1965 and much of 1966 the VC
and NVA suffered terrible casualties. But Giap learned
quickly to accommodate his strategic plans to the new
realities imposed by American firepower. By 1967, the
North Vietnamese had shifted the bulk of their attention to
the Marines in I Corps, a region where the NVA was closer
to its logistical support and up against U.S. forces that
possessed substantially less firepower. Over this period, the
North Vietnamese relearned the importance of dispersion
and patience. They redistributed their forces to keep their
most vulnerable units outside the range of American
artillery while they moved their logistic system away from
battle areas into sanctuaries relatively safe from aerial
detection and strikes.
Thus, the VC and NVA dusted off and applied many of
the same methods that had proven useful in previous Asian
wars against Western style armies, including the use of
submerged bridges, overhead coverings for major facilities,
and practically invisible artillery positions. As the
Americans developed technologies to find the enemy, the
enemy found innovative ways to evade detection. The VC
consistently spoofed U.S. aerial and ground based intercept
stations with deceptive transmissions; they also built fires
and phony roads and deployed elaborate decoys to fool
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interdicting aircraft. 8 Whenever close combat was
necessary, the VC chose to attack soft support bases rather
than formidable front-line forces. The enemy continued to
refine its doctrine for breaking contact and withdrawing
quickly from firefights to lessen the exposure of its troops to
American firepower. Increasingly, the VC chose to “hug”
American units before attacking in order to remain so
closely engaged that U.S. forces could use supporting fires
from artillery and aircraft only at considerable risk to
themselves. The Tet offensive represented a reversion to
earlier tactics, much against Giap’s wishes, but the terrible
casualties again forced the VC and NVA to return to a more
prudent approach. The general results of Giap’s indirect
approach to the Asian art of war were immediate and
dramatic. By early 1969, for example, the ratio of enemy to
friendly casualties dropped by half, or two-thirds in some
areas, compared to the period before the Tet offensive.9
Overconfidence again appeared in the North
Vietnamese high command as the South Vietnamese
assumed responsibility for the war on the ground. By 1972,
the war had lost much of its unconventional nature.
Beginning in April 1972 main force North Vietnamese units
equipped with effective gun and missile defenses and
supported by tanks, artillery, and trucks pushed across the
Demilitarized Zone and against several major South
Vietnamese cities. Again, U.S. aerial firepower took a
terrible toll of enemy forces until Giap’s commanders
learned how to maintain mechanized formations in the field
and to maneuver effectively in spite of American air
superiority. When dispersion and patience once again
replaced mass and impetuosity, victory was suddenly
within the grasp of the North Vietnamese.10
To be sure, victory took time. Over the next three years,
American firepower continued to generate pyrotechnically
impressive displays. But throughout this difficult period,
Giap gained ground in the south, and, as long as the resolve
of the North Vietnamese leadership remained intact, Giap
rightfully recognized that ownership of enemy territory
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would ultimately guarantee victory. His operational
challenge in the south remained unchanged. He needed to
reestablish his army’s ability to survive and maneuver
successfully while under aerial attack; once the doctrine
and training were in place to allow this to happen on a broad
scale and throughout the combat zone, battlefield success
and the ultimate outcome were no longer in question.
From Vietnam to Afghanistan
Half a decade later and half a continent away in
Afghanistan, the Soviets learned the same harsh, firsthand
lessons of overconfidence when first-world military
organizations confront third-world militaries which have
the will, tenacity, and skill to remain effective in the field
despite complete firepower inferiority. Year after year, the
Soviets arrayed themselves for conventional combat and
pushed methodically up the Panjir Valley only to be
expelled a few months later by a seemingly endless and
psychologically debilitating series of methodical and
well-placed ambuscades and minor skirmishes. Borrowing
a page from the American textbook in Vietnam, the Soviets
tried to exploit the firepower, speed, and intimidating
potential of armed helicopters. They employed helicopters
principally as convoy escorts and to provide fire support. At
times, Hind helicopters proved enormously lethal and
effective, particularly early in the war, when the
Mujahideen were psychologically unprepared. But the
Mujahideen eventually borrowed a page from the
Vietnamese textbook. They first learned to employ heavy
antiaircraft machine guns and later Stinger shoulder-fired
missiles to shoot the gunships down in increasing numbers.
The result of military frustration and defeat in Afghanistan
presaged the collapse of the Soviet Union.
The Middle East
Beginning in 1982, after nearly three decades of failure
in open warfare, an alliance of Arab state and non-state
52

actors pushed Israeli mechanized forces out of Beirut. Back
streets, tall buildings, and other forms of urban clutter
provided the Arabs just enough respite from the firepower
intensive methods of the Israelis to wear away Israeli
morale both in the field and at home. Unable to bring the full
force of their superior maneuverability and shock effect to
bear, the Israelis paused just short of their operational
objectives. Excessive casualties and the public images of
bloody excesses on both sides eventually resulted in an
Israeli withdrawal from Beirut. This success in Beirut soon
provided Israel’s enemies in the region with a new and
promising method to offset the Israeli superiority in open
mechanized combat. Now a spectrum of low-tech threats,
that run the gamut from weapons of mass destruction
delivered by crude ballistic missiles, to random acts of
terrorism, to children throwing rocks at soldiers, confront
an increasingly frustrated Israeli military and public.
One of the more curious ironies of the recent wars in the
Middle East has been the fact that Western style militaries
have had great success when fighting against non-Western
enemies who mimic Western firepower doctrines. The Gulf
War is the most recent example of failed efforts by Arab
states stretching back through the conflicts in the Middle
East to 1948. In 1973 Arab armies enjoyed some measure of
success while employing Western methods, but their
success was as much due to Israeli overconfidence as to the
limited aims the Arabs sought. Even the People’s Liberation
Army, erstwhile creator and most successful practitioner of
a method of war effective against a conventional,
firepower-centered system of war, failed when it violated its
own recipe by invading Vietnam with conventional and
motorized regiments in 1979. In that war, the world
watched the extraordinary spectacle of the star pupil
teaching a bloody lesson to its former friend and mentor.
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Operation Desert Storm
During the Gulf War, despite an extraordinary level of
incompetence at the highest level of the Iraqi leadership,
the Iraqi Army displayed considerable capacity to adapt on
the battlefield. As the American air campaign began to focus
on the destruction of the Iraqi ground forces in the Kuwait
Theater of Operations (KTO) in early February, the Iraqis
almost immediately began to adapt in order to limit their
losses.11 By constructing berms around their tanks and by
scattering them widely across the desert, the Iraqis ensured
that an aircraft dropping precision guided bombs would
only be able, at best, to destroy a single vehicle with each
pass. By burning tires next to operational vehicles they
spoofed their tormentors into missing the real targets; and
finally by using antiaircraft effectively they kept a
substantial portion of coalition aircraft at an altitude where
they were unable to do substantial damage. The best
trained Iraqi units endured several weeks of allied air
bombardment with unbroken will and their combat
capability essentially intact. The most impressive
indication of the Iraqi ability to adapt came in the
operational movement of a substantial portion of the
Republican Guard during the first hours of Desert Storm.
Elements of two divisions shifted from a southeastern
defensive orientation to defensive positions facing to the
southwest along the Wadi al-Batin. In those positions the
Tawakalna Republican Guards Division and the 50th and
37th Armored Brigades would be destroyed by the U.S. VII
Corps.12 Nevertheless, sacrifice by these units provided
time for the remainder of the Republican Guard to escape.
Significantly, the Republican Guard carried out this
movement in terrain and weather conditions ideally suited
to interdiction and despite the overwhelming superiority of
coalition air power.
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The Emergence of Future Threats
Nearly a decade beyond the defeat of the Republican
Guard, the United States military has yet to face an enemy
capable of doing us serious harm. Yet, if the past is prologue,
this vacation from violence must end eventually. It is still
too soon to postulate who our significant competitor might
be. However, it seems reasonable to anticipate with some
degree of certainty that a major military threat to our vital
national interest is not likely to arise from the 20 or so
developed industrialized democracies. Although warfare
among or between mature democratic states is not
impossible, such a prospect is highly improbable. Likewise,
the huge number of states at the opposite end of the
have-and-have-not continuum are not likely to pose a
serious military threat either. These “failed states,” mostly
in the developing world, will certainly continue to call on
Western humanitarian and peacekeeping assistance. To be
sure, some may seek to do us harm. But the desperate
economic condition of these states will simply deny them the
means to threaten either our vital national interests or the
interests of our allies.
In between these two extremes lies a group of states
most likely to become candidates for serious military
competition in the next century. Some of these so-called
“transitional states,” located primarily in Europe, the
Middle East and Asia, are already beginning to develop the
economic means to generate income to support more
sophisticated militaries. While they may expand militarily,
a certain number of them will fail to develop a concomitant
facility with democratic institutions. Thus, we should
anticipate that perhaps by the end of the next decade a few
transitional states will be able to procure the military
means and build a collective will to challenge Western
interests seriously within their respective regions of
influence. And should these threatening states be astride or
near a region whose continued stability is vital to the
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interest of a Western nation, we must be prepared to
respond by force if necessary.
Increasingly, non-Western militaries are identifying
and internalizing the lessons of recent wars. Their most
recent thoughts and writings concerning the operational
and tactical problems confronting them in a fight against
Western style military organizations suggests some clear
warnings for the future. First, non-Western militaries
understand that the West does possess vulnerabilities: an
aversion to casualties and excessive collateral damage, a
sensitivity to domestic and world opinion, and an apparent
lack of commitment to prepare for and fight long wars. They
perceive that Americans in particular still remain
committed to a style of war focused primarily on the single
dimension of precision strike. They are already thinking
about how to target Western vulnerabilities while
capitalizing on the three inherent advantages they possess:
time, will, and the inherent power of the defensive. Taking a
page from Mao and Giap, our potential future opponents
have learned the value of time and patience. From their
perspective, swift success is not essential to ultimate
victory. In particular, the Chinese experience suggests that
the maintenance of an army in the field at all costs, even in
the face of the most damaging punishment, must be the first
rule of war—a lesson not entirely surprising to students of
the American Revolution.13
The second lesson apparent to our potential opponents is
that it is imperative to interfere with an intruding power’s
intention to end the conflict quickly and at minimum cost.
Thus, the logic of their strategy will lead to efforts that
impede rather than prevent the intrusion of a Western
opponent. In recent wars, non-Western armies have learned
to limit the damage and duration of air campaigns by
dispersing their forces in the field and by distributing
telecommunications, logistics, and transportation
infrastructures as widely as possible. Moreover, they
understand that sophisticated air defense networks, whose
effectiveness depends on airfields, surface-to-air missile
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sites, and complicated and vulnerable command and control
nodes, have become more of a liability than an asset. Again,
time, patience, and a willingness to sacrifice can substitute
for technological sophistication. A few guns and missiles
scattered about the countryside, capable perhaps only of
shooting down the occasional intruder, may be enough to
raise the level of frustration and impatience of the attacker
sufficiently to limit an air campaign.
The experience of the Gulf War has also suggested to
potential future opponents that they must not allow the
United States unfettered use of air bases in surrounding
territory. Their first option will be the use of intense
diplomatic and political pressure to prevent U.S. forces from
gaining access to airfields. Our recent experiences in the
Gulf suggest how effective this approach may prove to be.
But even if American air forces gain access to foreign bases,
U.S. troubles will not be over. We can expect that through
the means of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and special
forces, any future opponent will attack the airfields from
which the U.S. will conduct any future air campaign. Even
the North Koreans, the sole remaining vestige of Stalinist
militarism, are striving with their missile and weapons of
mass destruction programs to ensure that they have the
means to interfere with the movement of U.S. forces onto
the Korean peninsula, should war break out.
Once conflict on the ground begins, potential opponents
understand they must capitalize on their superior mass to
offset the superior firepower and precision technology of
Western armies. They will capitalize on the advantages of
being on the defensive in or near their own territory. As they
gain confidence, they will search for opportunities to mass
sufficient force to achieve local successes. As in the air
campaign, the enemy will seek to frustrate Western ground
forces by employing just enough modern weaponry to
extend the campaign indefinitely. A few precision cruise
missiles against major logistic bases will add to the casualty
bill that Western militaries must explain to their civilian
populations back home. The object will not be decisive
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victory, but stalemate, stalemate that if continued for any
prolonged period of time will inevitably result in the erosion
of Western political support for the conflict.
Early Signals of Change
As non-Western militaries develop concepts for
defeating the American firepower-centered method of war,
the character and composition of their forces will slowly
change. The impulse that existed during the Cold War to
mimic Western force structures is rapidly disappearing.
Foreign militaries that were once Cold War clones are
taking on identities unique to their own culture and
societies. The mountains of metal, consisting of expensive
yet often second-rate air, sea, and ground machines of war
that today serve as potentially lucrative targets in a conflict
against modern Western militaries are rapidly
disappearing. Non-Western armies, in particular, are
getting lighter. The need to survive and remain effective
against the threat of overwhelming Western killing power is
forcing them to develop means to disperse, hide, or if
possible eliminate the vulnerable logistics, transportation,
and telecommunications facilities that now characterize the
Western way of war.
Evidence of this trend lies in the shopping lists of many
wealthier non-Western militaries. Instead of investing in
sophisticated aircraft and blue water fleets, most are
purchasing or developing cheap weapons of mass
destruction and methods of delivering those weapons.
Mines, both sea and land, as well as distributed air defense
weapons add credence to the conclusion that the intent of
these militaries is to use such weapons as a means to keep
potential enemies at bay. Most money and attention is going
toward land forces because armies provide political
legitimacy in non-democratic states. They are the most
useful instrument for regional wars of aggression, as well as
the surest means for suppressing internal dissent and
thwarting troublesome outsiders. For that reason the officer
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corps of non-Western states are becoming more mature,
professional, and better educated. A visit to any of the more
vigorous military educational institutions in the emerging
world underlines a renewed sense of intellectual curiosity
and a willingness to study the tenets and theory of war on
their own terms. Younger officers, no longer fettered by the
ideological constrictions of the Cold War, are seeking to
discover ways of fighting that conform to their own unique
cultures, local threats, and regional circumstances.
The Information Age—A Neutral Ally
At present there are too many in the U.S. and other
Western military organizations who believe that they can
best address the appearance of a major competitor in the
next century by exploring the technologies of the
information age to develop ever more effective means of
finding the enemy and killing him from a distance. There
are a number of troubling concerns with this premise. The
most obvious is that the information revolution will be
neutral in this looming competition; in fact it may favor the
competition more than it favors Western militaries because
potential enemies will be able to tailor new technologies to
their particular style of war without becoming
information-dependent. On one hand, the increasing flow of
information is quite literally drowning commanders, staffs,
and intelligence organizations. This is the crucial problem
of the information age—one that we have yet to solve. The
evidence is already clear that information technology will
not simplify the decision-making process, but in fact makes
it more complex. Our future opponents, however, given
their expectations and aims, will require much less
information to strike effectively—particularly since their
aim is not to win a decisive victory. They will be, moreover,
less dependent upon the microchip to conduct their method
of warfare. A thinking opponent will quickly realize that our
intensive reliance on information age technologies becomes
a weakness that can become an asymmetric target.
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A reading of current military writing from abroad,
particularly Asia, reveals that many armies are already
placing extraordinary emphasis on information operations
and information warfare. At present American analysts are
taking considerable comfort in the observation that few
have made serious investments in information warfare and
precision systems similar to those possessed by Western
military organizations. What, however, they fail to see is
that Asian armies already understand that advances in
information technologies will favor their style of warfare
just as much as it does the Western style. In particular, the
internet and wireless, non-nodal communications will allow
dispersed armies to mass rapidly. As information becomes
more secure and information centers more dispersed and
less vulnerable, potential opponents will wield more flexible
and agile land forces. Moreover, they will be able to divide
their forces into smaller and thus less detectable
increments. In perhaps one of the strangest potential
ironies of the future, Western information technology may
well provide non-Western armies solutions to two vexing
problems. First, cellular technology and the internet may
allow them to maintain a concert of action for long periods
among widely dispersed units. Second, these same
technologies will allow them to orchestrate the rapid
massing of dispersed units when opportunities arise to
transition to the offensive.
The result may well be a technological foot race that
either side could win. As we develop the technologies to find
and kill an enemy, our potential opponents will develop the
technologies to become even more difficult to find. The
prospect becomes even more sobering when one considers
the fact that the commercial sector is now in the process of
providing future competitors with the tools they need, as
our research centers continue to perfect non-nodal,
distributed, and netcentric global information technologies
for paying customers on a worldwide basis. Moreover,
potential U.S. opponents do not have to spend a dime for the
development of any of these systems. And again we must
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remember that such opponents have a very different
strategy in mind for the next war. They have only to create a
stalemate and inflict sufficient casualties on Western forces
to raise political difficulties for the political leaders who
decided to intervene (in the words of Nevile Chamberlain) in
“a quarrel in a far away country between people of whom we
know nothing.”
The Warnings Are Real
Clausewitz provides us with a harsh and accurate
warning about the fundamental nature of war:
War, however, is not the action of a living force upon a lifeless
mass (total nonresistance would be no war at all), but always
the collision of two living forces. The ultimate aim of waging
war . . . must be taken as applying to both sides. Once again,
there is interaction. So long as I have not overthrown my
opponent I am bound to fear he may overthrow me. Thus, I am
not in control: he dictates to me as much as I dictate to him.14

It is this fundamental Clausewitzian point that
Western, and American military organizations in
particular, are in danger of forgetting. Our potential
opponents in the next century will have thought long and
hard about how to attack our weaknesses.
The less than sterling performance of the U.S. military
in two recent wars against thinking, creative, reactive
Asian militaries possessed with their own will, should make
Americans cautious about an over-reliance on a style of war
focused primarily on the advantages of superior firepower.
There is no compelling evidence in the modern history of
war to suggest that the killing effect of modern weapons is
sufficient to break the will of a determined opponent. The
survival of Waffen SS and Wehrmacht defenses, severely
attrited though they might have been by the massive
bombardment of Allied air forces, is one more indication of
how tenacious the human will can be under the worst of
circumstances.
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To be sure, firepower can be paralytic in its effect. But
paralytic effects by fire are always fleeting. Armies have
shown time and again that they can become inured to the
paralytic effects of fire and can even learn creative ways to
lessen its destructive effects. Add to this factor the ability of
non-Western armies to utilize the advantages of time, mass,
will, and the power of the defensive, and the single
American advantage of superior killing power becomes
much less persuasive as an instrument of war than it
appears on first consideration.
Our experience in wars recently passed should serve as
both a guide and a caution as we prepare today for the
prospect of facing some opponent on a future battlefield. The
United States must choose its wars carefully and refuse to
allow an inflated opinion on the utility and effectiveness of
precision weapons to push for involvement in a conflict that
precision strike and distant punishment cannot win by
themselves. The experience of Vietnam should provide a
sobering caution. To a considerable extent the American
military embarked on that conflict believing that air power
and technology could deliver far more than they actually
could in the face of a clever and ruthless opponent who
consistently adapted and changed to every new innovation
the American military brought to the war.
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A SWORD WITH TWO EDGES:
MANEUVER IN 21ST CENTURY WARFARE

Battles are won by slaughter and maneuver. The greater the
general, the more he contributes in maneuver, the less he
demands in slaughter.1
Winston Churchill

An observer standing in the midst of the French
positions on the heights of La Marfee can clearly make out
the crossing points across the Meuse River seized by
German infantry on the afternoon of 13 May 1940. The day
was bright and cloudless. The French held the commanding
heights in strength. Their two hundred guns ranged the
ground over which German columns inched their way to
assembly areas on the east bank. Yet, the crossing
succeeded. Within four hours the 1st Rifle Regiment,
supported by Infantry Regiment Grossdeutschland, had
crossed the river in strength and ruptured French defenses
irreparably. Over the course of the evening, French troops,
who held most of the tactical cards, dissolved in panic. In
one of those rare moments of cataclysmic impact, a single
afternoon’s combat sufficed to open the door to the collapse
of the most respected army in the world. The result sealed
the fate of the Third Republic.
How could it have happened? Any student of tactics
knows that a river crossing against a defended shore is the
most difficult of all tactical maneuvers. In such a maneuver,
the assaulting side requires overwhelming superiority in
firepower and mobility. Yet the Germans had neither.
Historians have tended to ascribe the German success to
superiority in mechanized warfare. In fact, the critical

1. Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis, 1915 (New York, 1923), p. 5.
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assault that broke the back of French resistance resulted
from the efforts of infantry and combat engineers paddling
across the Meuse in rubber boats. The battle culminated in
the Wehrmacht’s favor 12 hours before German engineers
completed the bridges necessary to carry German armor
across.
The Germans succeeded because of the excellence of
their operational method–one that played out on the
battlefield like a superbly orchestrated symphony. The
instruments of blitzkrieg–tactical aircraft, tanks, infantry,
sappers, and artillery–each added their own unique
harmonic at the right time and in proper balance. They
managed to balance the brute strength and psychological
intimidation offered by firepower with the speed and
physical paralysis provided by rapid movement. This fusion
of fire and maneuver resulted in a seamless, unrelenting
offensive that made the German assault on Sedan so
overwhelmingly decisive. The German success was a
triumph, not of overwhelming mass or firepower, but of both
applied in harmony using intellect, foresight, imagination
and will.
Victory in France had its roots in Germany’s defeat in
World War I. Decades of introspection and disciplined study
during the inter war years taught the Germans a crucial
lesson about the relationship between technology and the
nature of war. Modern rifled weapons had upset the balance
between the ability of armies to prepare the attack by fire
and their ability to use maneuver against the enemy’s
vulnerable points. The battlefield had become so vast and
lethal that soldiers attacking on foot could no longer cross
no-man’s-land with sufficient strength intact to achieve
decisive results.
What the Germans understood in developing their
doctrine was that, given the dispersion of troops, confusion,
and chaos characterizing modern warfare, top-down control
was no longer in the cards. It worked for Napoleon because
he could see virtually the entire battlefield at Austerlitz.
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But it was no longer a possibility on a battlefield where not
only distance but the very violence and confusion of modern
war separated soldiers and units. Troops now had to
understand the objective and then, as the operation
unfolded, adapt their responses to the tactical situation as it
existed. Above all they must not wait for their commanders
to tell them what to do. Rather, depending on
circumstances, they had to act in accordance with their
training, intuition, and understanding of the immediate
situation.
The balance and harmony between maneuver and fire
remained the essential imperative of maneuver warfare
through the remainder of the machine age. They formed the
nexus of American combat doctrine during the last decade of
the Cold War. “AirLand Battle,” developed jointly by the
Army and the Air Force in the early 1980’s, represented the
final maturation of mechanized warfare, combining the
aerial and ground dimensions into the instrument that
proved so effective in the Gulf War. But, in retrospect, that
doctrine and the Gulf War appear as the final refinements of
a machine age fast disappearing. As the machine age fades
with the appearance of a new millennium, the responsibility
of U.S. military leaders is to anticipate and prepare for a
new age.
The information age promises to change the context of
war as decisively as the machine age altered war in the 19th
and 20th Centuries. The challenge today is not unlike that
faced by a previous generation of military thinkers who
sought to anticipate how changes in technology and
geopolitics would affect future wars. Unfortunately, the
recent success of U.S. forces in the Gulf may well cause
American military leaders to misjudge the course and
duration of future war in the next century. The present
fixation on firepower and bloodless wars may well cause the
U.S. military to develop a 21st Century version of the
methodical battle that brought catastrophe to the French
Army and nation. History provides ample warning that a
single-dimension approach to war is risky and dangerous.
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Adaptive military organizations quickly learn how to
counter technical and tactical advantages that often only
provide their possessors fleeting advantage.2
War in the 21st Century: What Won’t Change?
Thinking about war in the next century, military
innovators need to grapple with a number of essential
questions. The most obvious has to do with what will
change and what will remain the same. On the answer to
those two questions rides a host of others: What will be the
role of technology? What kind of asymmetric possibilities
are open to our opponents? What will be the underlying
principles of command and control? What are the
vulnerabilities of U.S. military forces, and perhaps most
important, what is it that U.S. military power will need to
achieve in terms of operational results? In the end American
preparations and thinking about force structure and
doctrine for the next century should aim at ensuring that at
the tactical and operational levels of war, U.S. military
forces will imitate the Germans and not the French along
the Meuse.
As has been the case throughout the past 2,000 years,
political concerns will undergird the conduct of war.
Clausewitz’ trinity of people, government, and military–and
the ambiguities that relationships among them
involve–will determine the parameters within which the
United States will employ military force. And connected
with the political dimension will be the will of the United
States as well as of its opponents. In the Vietnam War the
American military and government fought a limited war,
while its opponents engaged in a war of “national
liberation”–a total war.3 Thus the political context within
which America fights will prove as critical in the next
2. Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., “Adaptive Enemies,” Strategic Review,
Winter 1999.
3. See in particular Harry Summers, On Strategy (Carlisle, PA, 1981).
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century as it has in the past centuries. If the political will
does not exist, then all the military power is of little use.
Moreover, the United States will fight its wars in the next
century for political purposes and that will demand the
occupation of territory as opposed to simply smashing up
the landscape.4
Equally important to thinking about war in the future is
the fact that there are certain immutable facets to human
conflict that technology cannot change. Contrary to the
claims of some current theorists, technology alone will
never eliminate the fear, confusion, ambiguity, fog and
friction of battle. Such claims represent the rebirth of the
technological mechanistic view of the world that the
American military took with it to Vietnam.5 Everything
that modern science (not to mention history) indicates about
the world is that mankind lives in a nonlinear universe of
immense complexity. The American military can achieve
superiority of battlefield information, and we must do so in
order to exploit fully our technological superiority. But
human beings will never gain anything approaching
complete information dominance, because information
alone does not, and will never equate to knowledge and
wisdom about the enemy. As Clausewitz suggested in On
War: “War …is not the action of a living force upon a lifeless
mass…but always the collision of two living [thinking]
forces.”6 Our opponents will have limitless opportunity to
4. Paul Van Riper, USMC and Robert H. Scales, Jr., “Preparing for War in the
21st Century”, Strategic Review, Summer 1997.
5. In his memoirs McNamara ascribes the American difficulties in Vietnam to
the following cause: “Uncertain how to evaluate the results of the war
without battle lines, the military tried to gauge its progress with
quantitative measurements such as enemy casualties (which became
infamous as body counts), weapons seized, prisoners taken, sorties flown,
and so on”. We later learned that many of these measures were misleading
or erroneous. Robert Strange McNamara, In Retrospect, The Tragedy and
Lessons of Vietnam (New York, 1995), p. 48.
6. Carl von Clausewitz, On War (Princeton, 1975), p. 77. For a clear discussion
of why Clausewitz will remain as relevant in the next century as has been in
this century see Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, Non-Linearity, and the
Unpredictability of War”, International Security (Winter 1992/1993).
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find a way to win regardless of whatever technological
superiority we might possess. And as the Vietnam War
suggests, they will react with intelligence, imagination and
sophistication. The intellectual source of the German
success at Sedan was derived from the 1933 edition of the
German keystone manual, Die Truppenführung (“Troop
Leadership”). It suggested all too accurately that:
Situations in war are of unlimited variety. They change often
and suddenly and are only rarely from the first discernible.
Incalculable elements are often of great influence. The
independent will of the enemy is pitted against ours. Friction
and mistakes are everyday occurrences.7

Firepower and maneuver will continue to be the crucial
determinates of how military operations play out on the
21st Century battlefields. The relationship between these
two primal variables will also follow the patterns of past
wars. Rarely has superior firepower determined the
outcome of a war. Armies and nations have displayed
remarkable resiliency in enduring sustained punishment
wrought by bombs, artillery and missiles. In World War II
four years of strategic bombardment were not sufficient to
break the will of either the Nazi regime or the German
people. Years of extensive bombing over Vietnam failed to
reduce the flow of troops and supplies to support the war in
the south. In the Gulf War, despite relentless pounding by
coalition forces, Saddam Hussein refused to withdraw his
forces from Kuwait.8 While firepower kills, it cannot by

7. Chef der Heeresleitung, Die Truppenführung (Berlin, 1993), p. 1.
8. Robert H. Scales, Jr., Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War
(Washington, DC, 1993), pp. 368-69. See also Williamson Murray, Air War
in the Persian Gulf (Baltimore, MD, 1995), p. 307. Murray makes the point
that if Saddam had been allowed to withdraw from Kuwait without a
ground campaign, he would have been able to make the claim that his army
had stood unbeaten and unbroken in the field. In effect the Iraqis would
have been able to create another Dolchstoß legend, as the German Army
had done after its defeat after World War I.

72

itself achieve the political objectives required for victory.9
Even when delivered on a truly massive scale it has rarely
succeeded in ejecting determined troops from the ground
they occupy.10
But maneuver by itself also has inherent limitations.
Depending on the experience of soldiers and their leaders,
the unexpected presence of enemy forces in their rear or on
their flanks, while disconcerting, rarely leads to total
collapse. Stonewall Jackson’s brilliant maneuver in hitting
Hooker’s exposed flank at Chancellorsville would probably
have failed against a more resolute opponent.11 While
MacAuthur’s success at Inchon began with a successful
amphibious landing behind North Korean lines, the
collapse of Communist forces occurred only after they had
lost a bitter struggle to hold Seoul.
Decisive maneuver is extremely difficult to execute
because the complexity of maneuvering many thousands of
individuals across the landscape demands extraordinary
skill and no small amount of luck. The risk is always high
that the inherent friction so much a part of land warfare will
quickly turn the most brilliant plan of maneuver into a
costly slugging match where the victor will be the one
willing to endure and suffer the most. Maneuver is made all
the more difficult because it is inherently an offensive action
and, as Clausewitz cautioned two centuries ago, the
defensive is inherently the stronger form of war. The
maneuvering side must by necessity risk exposure,
detection and destruction to a much greater degree than the
defender. Clausewitz’ caution is made all the more sinister
by a corollary which suggests that the power of the defensive
9. See William Hawkins, “Back to Vietnam? Iraq and the Limits of Air Power”,
Strategic Review, Spring 1998, pp. 43-50. See also Williamson Murray, “Air
War in the Persian Gulf: The limits of air power”, Strategic Review, Winter
1998.
10. See Paul Van Riper and Robert H. Scales, Jr., “Preparing for War in the 21st
Century”, Strategic Review, Summer 1997, pp.14-20.
11. It is worth noting that the majority of the Union Corps Commanders at
Chancellorsville voted against a withdrawal.
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becomes greater still when the state of weapons technology
allows firepower systems to dominate the battlefield. The
corollary has not been evident in our most recent conflicts
because we were the only side to possess the most modern
precision firepower weapons. But if the past is prologue this
favorable condition cannot last for long. Eventually a future
foe will copy or counter our precision advantage, and we
may well discover the truth of the corollary painfully unless
we find the technology to reverse the firepower advantage.
It is only when one side exploits the effects of firepower
by maneuver that an enemy force begins to fall victim to the
psychological dislocation of its fighting elements. The
resulting psychological collapse spreads throughout the
defeated force and eventually leads to paralysis.12 Only
when paralysis occurs can the attacking side gain the
overwhelming decision it seeks at minimum cost to itself.
Thus it is the combination, the subtle, symbiotic
interrelationship between fire and maneuver that provide
the decisive force necessary to end a contest quickly.
Firepower temporarily paralyzes and impairs the enemy
and thus creates opportunities to translate a temporary
advantage into a lasting one through exploitation by
maneuver.
War in the 21st Century: What Will Change?
Some aspects of future war will be decidedly different
from today. For one thing, our enemies will be different. The
American military is being carefully watched by those who
some day might wish us harm. Potential opponents see
opportunity and advantage in the way we have comported
ourselves in recent conflicts. They are increasingly coming
12. As Clausewitz, who had experienced military catastrophe, suggests:
“When one is losing, the first thing that strikes one’s…intellect is the
melting away of numbers. This is followed by a loss of ground…Next comes
the break-up of the original line of battle, the confusion of units, and the
dangers inherent in the retreat…The feeling of having been defeated, which
on the field of battle had struck only the senior officers, now runs through
the ranks down to the very privates.” Clausewitz, On War, p. 254.
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to believe that the American fixation on precision strike
makes it possible to win simply by avoiding defeat.
Tenacity, patience, and a willingness to sacrifice are
effective counters to a high tech foe who has technology but
little stomach for protracted conflict. The technological
demands of hostile forces whose only objective is to avoid
losing are most certainly modest.
A major war, anywhere in the world, may demand
massive deployments of U.S. forces from North America
into areas where no base structure exists or where, even if
the bases exist, there will be direct threats from enemy
cruise and ballistic missiles.13 Moreover, the projection of
U.S. military power may demand a forced entry into areas
where the enemy has found the opportunity to hunker down
and prepare defenses to meet an expected American thrust.
Just enough precision or counterprecision weaponry will be
sufficient to inflict unacceptable casualties on American
forces. Sea mines, submarines, conventional brown water
vessels and cheap weapons of mass destruction will keep
intruders away from a hostile enemy’s shore.
The Gulf War and the lethargic reactions of the Iraqi
military to Coalition military operations should not suggest
how future opponents will fight in the next century.14 We
must be prudent enough to give them credit for some
substantial advantages. First we must assume that a
prospective opponent will possess a high degree of political
and military competence. If they are competent and well
led, then we must also concede to them an advantage of will
and tenacity to resist. Our future enemies understand
clearly that in any conflict time will be our enemy and our
enemy’s friend. He may lose all of his battles and still win so
13. See among others on the changed strategic framework for war in the next
century, Williamson Murray, “Preparing to Lose the Next War,” Strategic
Review, Spring 1998.
14. To understand the weaknesses of the Iraqi military before the Gulf War one
must possess and understanding of the nature of the Iraqi regime and
Saddam Hussein’s tyranny. The best book on this subject remains Samir
al-Khalil, Republic of Fear, The Politics of Modern Iraq (Berkley, 1989).
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long as he preserves legitimacy by maintaining control of
his army in the field.
In all likelihood he will field greater numbers. As we saw
in the Gulf a mass of undisciplined, unmotivated, poorly
trained soldiers can be as much an impediment as an
advantage. But just enough training with equipment just
modern enough to be marginally effective against a
technologically superior opponent may well provide a less
sophisticated but determined opponent with a force difficult
to defeat quickly. Armed in all probability with advantages
of massive numbers, determination and willingness to
endure, a future enemy will not need to match us system for
system to remain viable on the battlefield long enough for us
to tire of the conflict and withdraw.
Regardless of advantages in mass and will, no thinking
enemy will follow a doctrine that exposes his forces to
destruction from American aerial delivered precision
firepower. Over time he must transition from a Soviet style
linear offensive doctrine centered around massive armored
maneuvers to a more cautious doctrine that emphasizes the
defense and control of broad areas of territory. Tactical
units will disperse to the greatest extent possible while
retaining the ability to mass on demand. The enemy will
divide his combat forces into increasingly smaller
increments with more and more empty spaces appearing
between them.
The Size, Shape and Pattern of the 20th Century
Battlefield
So what then might the battlefield of the next century
look like, and how can the U.S. military leverage their
capabilities to take advantage of a potential opponent’s
weaknesses? To begin with, we must understand what
maneuver warfare aims to do and what its fundamental
philosophy will remain. First, maneuver aims to disrupt
and then to destroy the enemy’s equilibrium. Consequently,
it is not maneuver for its own sake that is the primary focus
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of maneuver war, but rather combining firepower and
maneuver in such fashion that the enemy’s entire command
and control structure can no longer function. In other words
he can no longer respond in a coordinated fashion to the
moves of his opponent. This then will have important
implications for how the American military should prepare
forces to operate in the next century.
The first characteristic of future battle that will affect
the nature of American war in the next century is that our
battlefields will be very distant and, in all likelihood,
located in regions of the world both remote and
inhospitable. Getting to these places will in itself require an
act of maneuver, in this case strategic maneuver, just as
critical a task to success as maneuver on the battlefield. If
we, as a nation, are to win quickly at minimum cost we must
arrive early in a conflict, hopefully early enough to interfere
with the deployment scheme of the enemy, perhaps early
enough to place forces on the ground between the enemy and
his operational objectives. Imagine how much more quickly
and painlessly the Gulf War might have concluded if in
August 1990 we had anticipated Saddam’s intent and
possessed a maneuver force with strategic velocity
sufficient to have arrived in time to block the movement of
the Republican Guard into Kuwait. To be sure, then as
today, we can project both firepower in the form of tactical
aircraft and presence in the form of light ground forces. But
we did not have then nor do we yet have maneuver forces
able to arrive quickly and fight enemy main force units
decisively.
Well into the next century, once precision weaponry has
reached the arsenals of the world’s most prominent
militaries, the shape and character of the battlefield will
change fundamentally. Armies will adapt, as they always
have, to revolutionary improvements in weaponry and
develop effective ways to either copy or counter them. This
process of adaptation is both natural and inevitable. The
battlefield will continue to empty as armies seek to lessen
the destructive effects of precision firepower. Again, this a
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continuing and spontaneous process that has been with us
since the first precision revolution started thinning the
battlefield with the introduction of rifled ordnance in the
mid nineteenth century. Union and Confederate forces at
Gettysburg were packed to a density of approximately
26,000 soldiers per square mile. On a World War II
European battlefield a firefight on terrain similar to
Gettysburg might involve several battalions of about 3,000
men. In Desert Storm the battlefield of Gettysburg could
easily have been covered by a mechanized company in the
attack.
On a future battlefield with precision weapons in the
hands of both sides we can anticipate the battlefield
spreading out even further. Gettysburg might well become a
platoon position of perhaps three dozen soldiers and their
weapon systems. With densities that thin, traditional forms
of machine age maneuver will no longer be necessary.
Armies spread over vast distances and divided into ever
smaller tactical increments will no longer be assailable
through the use of linear constructs of the direct attack,
penetration or envelopment. Clausewitz’ centers of gravity
and Jomini’s decisive points will no longer be easily
identified, nor will they be geographically centered and
concentrated. Highly rigid air defense grids, interconnected
communications nodes and logistic networks of the past will
give way to porous, distributed, and autonomous formations
able to absorb repeated precision strikes with little loss of
people or effectiveness. No amount of precision weaponry
will be able to destroy robust formations divided into small
increments spread over vast distances. The challenge of an
enemy so arrayed will be to retain control and cohesion
among so many dispersed and isolated elements on the
battlefield. Curiously, information age technologies in the
form of satellites and cellular telecommunications may well
provide him with just the right tools to spread himself out
and still retain the ability to mass on demand. As a
testimony to the curious nature of our times, the
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technologies spawned by information based societies may
well be turned against them on some future battlefield.
So how then must we operate in the future to achieve the
moral and psychological collapse necessary for decisive
maneuver warfare? Let’s begin with a restatement of one of
the immutable principle of warfare. War in practice
requires the application in the proper balance between the
ability to maneuver and the ability to destroy. As a side
optimizes his operational method to accommodate one, he
makes himself increasingly vulnerable to the other.
Misjudgments concerning the true state of balance between
fire and maneuver greatly increased the risk of catastrophic
failure. The balance could get substantially out of kilter
because of political or doctrinal misjudgments or by one side
being too slow to adjust to opportunities offered by advances
in technology. As the French demonstrated at Sedan, the
natural response to the threat of an attack by fire was to
hunker down, spread out and concentrate on dominating
the battlefield by firepower. But this so called methodical
style of war made them particularly vulnerable to assault by
maneuver. The Germans saw opportunities for countering a
method of war that had become unbalanced in favor of
firepower and therefore vulnerable to maneuver. As our foes
become more fixated on surviving precision strike, similar
opportunities must inevitably arise.
To defeat a dispersed enemy we must disperse ourselves.
Close combat will become a contest for control of territory. A
vast battlefield thinly held will provide unoccupied spaces
that can be assaulted and occupied at minimal cost. Thus
the enemy can be collapsed by interposing forces between
and among his widely scattered formations. We will possess
the ability to see, sense, and track with great clarity, an
ability secured by our control of the vertical dimension.
Unblinking eyes in the exosphere and space will change how
soldiers define key terrain. In past wars the decisive
advantage went to the side occupying the high ground.
Command of observation insured command of territory.
Thus, from Little Round Top to Monte Casino to Pork Chop
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Hill the infantryman’s bloody obligation has been to take
the hill. But our exploitation of the potential promised by
satellites and high altitude remotely piloted vehicles will
create a new high ground gained and dominated by
information age technology rather than blood. Ground units
will now be able to nest on almost any piece of ground and
still command their surroundings. The enemy will no longer
be able to predict when and where American forces will land
in their midst. Frontal attack, ambushes and meeting
engagements, long the most costly events in ground combat,
will be less likely. Fewer soldiers in contact with the enemy
and occupying uncontested ground events will surely reduce
the cost of ground combat tremendously.
The ability to maneuver and occupy territory takes away
from the enemy his first tenet of success: area control. A
highly mobile and sophisticated ground maneuver force
capable of operating in small units scattered across the
countryside will deny the enemy refuge and source of
sustenance. Our superior ability to see the battlefield with
unparalleled clarity coupled with our ability to occupy or
control key points will take away his ability to assemble his
scattered forces without risking piecemeal destruction by
fire. A soldier’s eyes on every target will ensure that the
right and most vital targets are hit. Our information
advantage will help us to reduce the threat of surprise and
ambush and will allow us to select and strike or capture an
enemy’s own centers of gravity and decisive points no
matter how well hidden or scattered.
Regardless of how compelling the argument might be for
maneuver as an essential component for achieving a
decision on a future battlefield, the reluctance to put troops
on the ground for fear of suffering excessive casualties
continues to persist. Images of the first 20 minutes of the
film “Saving Private Ryan” are compelling and chilling.
But the information age promises to make ground combat
considerably less destructive that the screen images of Utah
beachhead in “Private Ryan.” The film serves as a useful
metaphor to explain the difference. Conjure the opening
80

scene in your mind for a moment, but imagine that Captain
John Miller knows exactly where the German defenses are
located. Not only can he see them, but he has the ability to
watch them move about and to anticipate where they might
move next. He has at his command the ability to destroy
some of the more critical static positions with precision
munitions as his Higgins boat approaches the shore. He also
can see well inland and knows with equal clarity where the
enemy isn’t located. Now imagine that Miller can lift his
boat over the beach and land it precisely in a spot that is safe
from enemy fire but positioned so that his platoon, once
dismounted, can effectively block enemy egress from the
beach. The enemy is now left with two unacceptable
alternatives: either move out of his protected position into
the open and face the certainty of destruction by fire, or stay
in place and cede the initiative and the advantage
permanently to the intruder.
Consider for a moment a more contemporary scenario.
Recall our recent effort to intimidate and punish the Iraqis
for not allowing full inspection of their nuclear, chemical
and biological storage sites. Imagine how much more
compelling the impact of military action might have been
had we had the ability to follow tactical aircraft and cruise
missile strikes with a sudden aerial assault by hundreds of
individual ground units each capable of landing safely near
a known or suspected site and commanding it by direct
observation and covering it by fire.
Suppose further that each maneuver unit were robust
enough to maneuver about for days if not weeks.
Information age technologies will allow the tooth portion of
a land power force to become extremely lean, self-contained
and completely mobile. This capability will be achievable
because most of the traditional impedimenta for a close
combat force—-such as logistic and administrative
facilities, higher command and communications centers
and long range fire support units—-can be removed from the
immediate battle area and held in a support base hundreds
of miles distant from the battlefield. Only those few forces
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necessary to prosecute the close in fight would be placed in
immediate proximity of the enemy’s main force units.
The objective of blitzkrieg in the information age will be
the same as its machine age predecessor, namely the rapid
paralysis and eventual psychological collapse of an
opponents will to resist through overwhelming application
of a balance of firepower and maneuver. But technology and
the nature of our future enemies will cause the new
blitzkrieg to look considerably different. The aim will be
different. As long as the enemy possesses precision
weapons, no matter how primitive, the operational-tactical
offensive that proved so successful for the Germans will
prove to be too costly in future war. The dynamics of the
future battlefield call for a return to the strategic
offensive-tactical defensive approach where an offensive
force uses its strategic mobility to place its combat units into
positions so threatening to the enemy that he must either
attack them or capitulate. Thus the most costly phase of the
battle, the tactical offensive, becomes necessary for enemy,
not friendly, forces to execute.
The requirement to overwhelm an enemy scattered
across a vast area will require a maneuvering force to
blanket or saturate a broad area with many small,
autonomous and extremely mobile combat elements. Such
an operation would play out more like a take down rather
than a traditional linear movement through an enemy’s
defensive formations. Duration, timing and tempo would be
different. Information age blitzkrieg would demand a
continuous, relentless operation opened first with precision
firepower followed immediately by a pattern of maneuver
layered over the complete expanse of an the enemy’s
defenses in a single smothering act of aggression.
In order to overwhelm so much territory so quickly with
so many discrete bits of combat power both fires and
maneuver will increasingly have to be delivered from the
air. An aerial maneuver force capable of operational
maneuver of this sort will be costly to build. But remember,
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the armored formations that broke the back of the French
Army made up less than eight percent of the total German
army in 1940. Speed and agility count far more than sheer
weight of metal if the objective is to collapse the enemy’s will
rather than slaughter him. Speed and agility also guarantee
safety and lower casualties. A force mobile through the air
will be practically immune from the threat of attack by
missiles tipped with weapons of mass destruction. Aerial
agility lessens the risk of defeat in detail. If surprised for
any reason, the force possesses the mobility to shift quickly
out of harm’s way and approach the enemy from another
direction. Aerial mobility permits a maneuver force to
command more territory with fewer soldiers, thus limiting
the number of soldiers exposed to enemy fires within the
close combat area.
By the end of the next decade the maturation of the
information age will provide the United States military
with and even more remarkable ability to see the enemy and
to strike him quickly with greater and greater precision.
However, information age advances alone will not
guarantee our ability to lift the Higgins boat over the beach
or to coerce Saddam into doing our will through a credible
threat of force. If we are to remain viable as a military power
well into the next century, we must improve dramatically
our ability to seize and control ground. We must build into
our system of war the speed and agility to move unimpeded
across large expanses of territory. We must be able to place
combat formations at decisive points with the same
precision and flexibility that we now have to place explosive
killing power on distant targets.
The ability to complement precision fires with precision
maneuver offers two essential advantages for warfare in the
future. First, we would be able to beat an enemy at his own
game of area control if we possessed the ability to array
forces across a broad area yet retain the ability to mass them
quickly at the point where the enemy is most vulnerable and
weak. A balanced method of war that includes both of the
timeless dimensions of fire and maneuver will greatly
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complicate the plan of an enemy who might seek to repeat
the recent successes of others who have shown how to win
against an approach to war centered principally around
firepower.
An enemy who optimizes his operational method to
remain viable and intact in the face of an opponent vastly
superior in firepower, will by necessity make himself more
vulnerable to assault by maneuver. If he disperses across a
wide area to avoid the destructive effects of precision strike,
he must suffer the loss of cohesion and control and thus be
less able to mass against a threat from the ground.
Dispersion will leave gaps in his ability to command his
territory by observation and fire. These gaps will provide a
maneuver force with the local sanctuaries he will need to
occupy territory without having to fight for it. An expansion
of forces over a wide area will increase the distances
between each of his units in the field, thus making it easier
for maneuvering forces to interpose themselves between the
enemy’s major units to paralyze them in place. If he
disperses we disperse to check him at every decisive point,
never allowing him to disappear into the shadows. If he
masses we mass faster and bring to bear our overwhelming
advantage in killing power. Facing two dimensions of threat
rather than one, he will no longer be able afford the luxury of
choosing the passive option of hunkering down to outlast
and endure precision strikes. With troops in his midst he
must act or lose. But if he attacks, our side then garners the
inherent advantage of the defensive. To attack he must
mass. But massing spells destruction by precision fires.
Check by fires, checkmate by a balance of fire and
maneuver.
A rapid orchestration of fire and maneuver on the
battlefield is critical to winning quickly at minimum cost.
Near simultaneous application of maneuver with fires
allows an attacking force to sustain or make permanent the
stunning yet transitory psychological effects of firepower.
War is a test of will. The surest way to collapse an enemy’s
will is to control his territory. Without physical occupation
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warfare is nothing more than punishment from a distance,
something that any nation with a will to resist can endure
indefinitely.
Nevertheless, a word of caution is in order. The same
technologies that will allow us to accelerate strategic and
operational maneuver may also, if we are not careful, slow
us down and impede our ability to maneuver with the
precision we will require to achieve decisive results and win
quickly. Too much information received through too fine a
telecommunications instrument will create the temptation
to micromanage the battle. This at a time when maneuver
intended to paralyze an enemy spread over vast distances
demands decentralized command and control at the lowest
possible levels. Without the ability to out think the enemy
by exercising superior agility and initiative, greater speed of
maneuver will only shorten the path to defeat. A
commander who lets some higher authority do his thinking
for him and who waits for orders before acting will never be
able to use the instruments at his command effectively.
This is not to say that higher commanders must take a
hands-off approach. To the contrary, future war will
demand that commanders manipulate a huge mechanism
composed of enormously more parts spread over vastly
greater distances and moving at vastly greater velocities
than today. The challenge to a commander of applying
precision firepower and maneuver will be all the greater
because, if he is to gain the most from each, he must deliver
one immediately behind and in close proximity to the other.
Therefore, a commander, in order not to become his own
worst source of friction, must learn to think ahead of his
opponent and to orchestrate his symphony rather than play
each bar one instrument at a time. Otherwise he will never
be able to react to the inevitable uncertainties and surprises
in war. The 1933 edition of Truppenführung still carries
with it the essence of maneuver warfare, and its cautions
continue to resonate from one age of warfare to the other:
“situations will be of unlimited variety...the independent
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will of the enemy will always be pitted against ours...friction
and mistakes will continue to be everyday occurrences.”
A final word of caution. Regardless of how successful we
are at restoring the balance between fire and maneuver in
the future, we must accept the truth that all future victories
will not be cheaply won. A thinking enemy willing to
sacrifice and fortified with enough technology to deny us
unlimited domination of the battlefield will most certainly
cause us damage. If we hope to restore a range of balanced,
offensive options to American commanders beyond the Year
2010, the power of the information age must be harnessed to
develop a new generation of maneuver platforms that will
be able to place close combat soldiers into commanding
positions on the battlefields at the least possible cost.
Tomorrow’s battlefield success will be achieved by Joint
Task Force Commanders who have the ability to
orchestrate precision strike with precision maneuver. The
leap ahead in situational awareness guaranteed by
improvements in information age technologies promises to
provide us with the instruments necessary to add physical
agility to our future force as well as superior killing power.
The dawn of a new age of warfare and the anticipated
emergence of clever, adaptive enemies will require an order
of magnitude increase in strategic and operational speed of
maneuver if we hope to strike the enemy quickly and
preemptively and collapse his will to resist.
The corollary to Newton’s fundamental law of physics
echoes with a sense of urgency: every successful technical or
tactical innovation that provides a dominant military
advantage eventually yields to a countervailing response
that shifts the advantage to the opposing force. America’s
military dominance in firepower and attrition warfare has
been on display for almost five decades. We must anticipate
a future military challenge that will attempt to defeat our
preoccupation with precision strike. We must use the time
we have in the decade ahead to restore balance in our future
method of war. Our future arsenal of military capabilities
must include a 21st Century sword with two equally
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compelling edges: precision maneuver as well as precision
firepower. Without these two applied in balance and
harmony, future conflicts might well devolve into massive
wars of attrition. Churchill’s understanding of the
relationship between slaughter and maneuver is both
propitious and sublime. Great generals win with maneuver.
Let’s begin now to take on the challenge of a future
competitor and begin now to build a balanced force to defeat
him.
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FROM KOREA TO KOSOVO: HOW AMERICA’S
ARMY HAS LEARNED TO FIGHT LIMITED
WARS IN THE PRECISION AGE

Author’s Introductory Note
This article was written after a visit to Albania in May
1999. During that trip, I developed the central thesis for
this essay: In wars of limited liability, success must be
gained with a limited expenditure of means. A brief review
of recent history clearly tells us that we have been
practically learning this lesson in real wars for half a
century, beginning with Korea. The imperative to prepare
for a full-scale war against the Soviets, however, has
effectively impeded our ability to embed this lesson into our
warfighting doctrine. Kosovo is a wake-up call.
The Cold War is over. Thankfully, we expect it will be
some time before we have to face the prospect of fighting
another major military competitor who can threaten our
vital national interests. But recent events such as Kosovo
seem to be telling us that lesser conflicts fought for less than
vital interests will continue to challenge us. We must
improve our understanding of these conflicts. We must also
develop a realistic doctrine for winning them based upon
our own practical experience. This article addresses these
issues and concludes with a proposed maneuver warfare
concept for this new era of limited liability wars in the
Precision Age.
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FROM KOREA TO KOSOVO: HOW AMERICA’S
ARMY HAS LEARNED TO FIGHT LIMITED
WARS IN THE PRECISION AGE

Every age has its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions,
and its own preconceptions. Each period, therefore, would
1
have held to its own theory of war.

Carl Von Clausewitz

Many in the professional ranks of the American military
see the reluctance to put soldiers on the ground in Kosovo as
a disturbing precedent that calls for future wars to be
fought and won by air power alone. A close examination of
American battlefield performance, however, suggests that
the Kosovo experience marks nothing more than another
data point, albeit a dramatic one, along a clearly defined
continuum of transformation by the United States. Since
the end of the Second World War, America’s military forces
have adjusted their unique capabilities to produce a new
style of warfare. This is the result of a fundamental shift in
the relationship between the dynamics of firepower and
maneuver. When the dynamics of combat undergo
substantial transformations, radical shifts in doctrine must
be made to accompany and capitalize upon them. During
this last half-century, the principal factors affecting the
conduct of wargeostrategic, political and technological
conditionshave been altered by the events of our time.
Geostrategy:
The end of the Cold War stand off between the two major
global powers removed the protective blanket that had
1. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard
and Peter Paret, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 593.
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dampened all of the old ethnic, tribal and religious embers
left smoldering since the end of the Second World War.
Lifting great power control gave the green light for
aggressive regimes to set about righting perceived regional
wrongs. Frustrated autocrats felt free to satisfy their
hegemonic ambitions usually at the expense of some less
powerful neighbor. At home, national paranoia over the
threat of a great cataclysmic war gave way to social outrage
directed at powers who tramp on the territory, rights, or
well-being of lesser states.
No longer are our wars desperate struggles to preserve
our right to exist as a nation. Instead, our most recent
conflicts have been fought as wars of conscience to further
peripheral interests in many diverse corners of the globe.
Our potential enemies are increasingly being perceived as
local tyrants who are intent upon gaining hegemony over
some part of the world only tangentially important to our
domestic welfare.
Technology:
The course of war would be difficult enough to anticipate
if the shifting relationships between international actors
were the only significant factor to influence change in the
future. But we must also account in our calculation for the
fact that we live in a transitional era set within a crease
between the machine age and the information age. The
microchip is altering the way armies fight just as
thoroughly as did the gasoline engine and radio by lifting
armies off their feet and mounting them inside land and
aerial vehicles.
We know enough now from field experiments and
practical experience with information age warfare to
anticipate with some clarity how the microchip will
continue to alter the course of war. The battlefield will
continue to expand, perhaps geometrically, now that
communications no longer effectively limit the amount of
territory a military force can occupy and control. The ability
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to see with great clarity and strike with even greater
precision will force ground units to take full advantage of
the opportunity to spread out and disperse in order to
survive. Fear of destruction in detail by precision strikes,
principally from above, has already made linear, echeloned,
massed armored formations an anachronism of a machine
age that is now just passing.
Domestic Politics:
Both the geopolitical and technological trends of the
recent past have raised expectations by the American
people that our wars will be fought in a manner such that
the political ends are worth the costs and the costs are
increasingly measured in terms of expenditures of human
life. Casualties soon may represent a dominant, perhaps the
dominant measurement of success or failure in wars of
limited ends and means such as Kosovo. Dead Americans
are becoming our most vulnerable center of gravityand
our enemies know it. As we have seen from recent events,
serious doubts on the part of our national leaders about
casualties may not only delay, but may well prevent
commitment of ground forces.
The tolerance bar that we use to measure our casualties
has been driven ever downward by America’s changing
attitudes toward conflict. Since our most recent wars have
been fought increasingly to further peripheral interests
abroad rather than for national survival, we are less willing
as a nation to send our sons and daughters into harm’s way.
Likewise, modern weapons technology has also raised the
expectation that precision weapons can now substitute
explosive killing power for manpower on the ground.
Limited War Precedents: Korea to Vietnam:
To its credit the American military began, intuitively at
least, to sense these shifts in battlefield dynamics as early
as the Korean War, the first of our modern wars in which
limited strategic interests did not justify unlimited
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commitment. Combat commanders in the field, quick to
recognize the importance of preserving the lives of their
soldiers, routinely modified their way of fighting to achieve
success at minimum cost. The most pervasive doctrinal
adjustment made during our first two experiences with
limited war was to increase the firepower available to
support maneuver forces in close combat and to lessen the
exposure of close combat soldiers to direct attack by the
enemy.
Early battles in Korea began with the application of
doctrinally correct proportions of firepower to maneuver
inherited from the Second World War.Very quickly,
however, field commanders increased their demand for
artillery and air power to support ever more compact and
self-contained assault forces. What began as traditional
dismounted infantry assaults in 1950 soon became
elaborate tank, infantry, and firepower intensive
demonstrations intended to gain the objective with
minimum cost in lives.
During the Battle of Soryang in the spring of 1951,
twenty-one battalions of artillery fired over three hundred
thousand rounds in five days in support of a single push by X
Corps. Two years later, at Pork Chop Hill, nine battalions
fired over thirty-seven thousand rounds in less than
twenty-four hours in support of a single regimental assault.
As the weight of firepower increased, the densities of
infantry formations decreased in proportion. By the winter
of 1950-51, General Ridgway conducted most of the Eighth
Army counter attacks at regimental level. That spring,
Ridgway consistently used nothing larger than company
teams to spearhead his advance to the Han River.2

2. Billy C. Mossman, Ebb and Flow: November 1950-July 1951, Washington,
DC: U.S. Army Center of Military History, 1990, pp. 238-239, 350-354,
442; S.L.A. Marshall, Pork Chop Hill: The American Fighting Man in
Action, Korea, New York: Morrow, 1956, p. 196.
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Similarly in Vietnam commanders learned quickly and
adapted a European style, maneuver- centric method of war
to match the realities of limited war in constricted Asian
terrain. Close combat units gradually increased the
proportion of supporting fires and lessened the exposure of
lead elements moving into contested areas.
General William DePuy, commanding the First Infantry
Division in 1966-67, realized quickly that artillery and
tactical aircraft were responsible for most enemy casualties.
His casualties, on the other hand, came principally from
three sources: enemy mortars, concentrations of enemy
small arms fire delivered against infantry units in set-piece
ambushes, and mines. His common sense solution was
simply to use much smaller infantry units to locate and fix
the enemy, usually squads or platoons, and then orchestrate
a varied medley of supporting firepower systems to do most
of the killing.3
Once the enemy was located, the infantry’s task was to
stay out of the killing zone, avoid decisive engagement and
pull back just far enough to allow effective delivery of
ordnance, but not so far as to allow the enemy breathing
space to disengage and escape the firepower trap. The old
infantry adage “close with and destroy the enemy” became
simply get close enough with as few forces as possible to
“find, fix, flush and set up the enemy for destruction by fire.”
DePuy was among the first to grasp the fact that modern
firepower technology and the imperative to win at lower cost
together were sufficient to cause a shift in the relationship
between firepower and maneuver. In later years he was
fond of saying “On a battlefield increasingly dominated by
lethality, if you can be seen you can be hit, if you can be hit,
you will be killed.” Whether traditionalists liked it or not,
3. Paul H. Herbert, Deciding What Has To Be Done: General William E.
Depuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations, Leavenworth
Papers, No.16, Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1988, p.
19-23.
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DePuy believed that the balance had in fact shifted to the
point that firepower systems, not infantrymen, had now
become the central instrument for achieving decisive effect
on the battlefield. To DePuy, the doctrinal maxim that
firepower supported maneuver may well have been
reversed.4
While seeming to offer the promise of less costly
victories, DePuy’s concept of maneuver supporting fires
failed to last as a viable doctrine much beyond Vietnam.
There were cultural objections. Commanders rightfully
feared that training combat soldiers not to close with the
enemy might diminish fighting spirit and create hesitation
and a loss of decisiveness and élan.
Experience in real combat also demonstrated
shortcomings of a firepower-centered doctrine. The most
persistent complication was offered by the enemy who
learned over time how to lessen the killing effects of our
fires. After suffering horribly from American firepower
during the Tet offensive in 1968, the North Vietnamese
quickly changed their fighting doctrine. They learned to
“hug” close to units in contact and to keep larger formations
dispersed and positioned just out of artillery range. The
enemy soon became very adept at hiding in built-up areas
and the jungle. They also learned imaginative ways to
deceive reconnaissance and spoof even the most
sophisticated detection technologies.
Second, pressure late in the war to reduce casualties
served to pervert DePuy’s intent. As the war dragged on,
firepower became too much of a good thing. Maneuver
commanders began to complain that a firepower intensive
doctrine had become a millstone around their necks. A
single example serves to make the point. The “forcefeed-fire support system” used by the 25th Infantry Division
4. John L. Romjue, From Active Defense to Airland Battle: The Development of
Army Doctrine, 1973-1982, Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command, 1984, pp. 8-9.
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toward the end of the war relegated the control of every
contact, however minor, to the duty officer at division
headquarters. He was instructed automatically to dispatch
a stream of firepower systems into the fight to include Air
Force gunships, tactical airpower, attack helicopters, and
even “flame bath” helicopters equipped with napalm. The
firepower would come even if the battalion commander felt
that such a rich dose was either wasteful or counter to his
scheme of maneuver.5
Another extreme example of the debilitating influence of
firepower late in the war comes from a corps artillery
commander in the Central Highlands region of Vietnam
who reported that his command fired almost two million
rounds in seven months of relatively inactive combat
equating, by his best estimate, to a ratio of 1,000 rounds or
roughly $100,000 per kill. Lives were saved to be sure, but
the resulting loss of flexibility and control was rightfully
lamented by infantrymen on the ground.6
Yet in spite of these shortcomings, maneuver
commanders returning from Vietnam supported DePuy’s
hypothesis. The new limited war imperative to win at
minimum cost demanded that the traditional balance
between fire and maneuver be altered significantly just as
DePuy suggested. A remarkable study done by a group of
returning infantry commanders at the Army War College in
1969 concluded that firepower was now the dominant factor
on the American battlefield. They wrote that maneuver is
performed primarily to pinpoint the location of the enemy,
and to increase the effectiveness of the massive application of
fire on the enemy. Ideally the enemy should be killed at the
maximum effective range of organic weapons.The need to
advance infantry to “zero” range will proportionately

5. Robert H. Scales, Firepower in Limited War, Washington DC: National
Defense University, U.S. Government P:rinting Office, 1990, pp. 287-296.
6. Scales, p. 143.
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increase friendly casualties and decrease the ability of foot
infantry to maneuver or use fire support.7
Post Cold War Precedents:
Practical experience in subsequent wars continued to
reinforce the lesson that the cost of a conflict must remain in
proportion to the perceived value of the endeavor. The Gulf
War in particular taught the value of a protracted
preliminary aerial bombardment to wear down and
demoralize the Iraqis sufficiently to make the land
campaign as casualty free as possible. The battlefield
continued to thin in the Gulf as the firepower quotient rose.
The range and lethality of modern tanks and the ability of
maneuver forces to see vast distances in the desert allowed
armored formations to open up to an unprecedented degree
thereby exposing forward maneuver elements as little as
possible. What might have constituted a battalion front in
World War II was now occupied by a force as small as a
platoon. Instinctively when faced with the realities of real
war against a thinking enemy the Army returned to
DePuy’s maxim of minimum exposure for maximum killing
effect.
The loss of eighteen rangers in close, back alley fighting
in Somalia dramatically underscored a corollary to DePuy’s
maxim: a tactical engagement fought for too high a price for
too little return might very well by itself determine the
strategic outcome of a national endeavor.
Recent experience in Kosovo now seems to suggest that
the bar continues to lower as the country begins to accept
the burden of limited liability wars fought to prevent harm
to one ethnic or cultural group by another. Some even
suggest that the bar has been lowered so much for wars like
7. Richard E. Cavazos, et al., “Analysis of Fire and Maneuver in Vietnam:
June 1966 - June 1968,” unpublished Student Research Paper, U.S. Army
War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, 1 March 1969, pp. II-v and II-210,
II-212.
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Kosovo that a ground campaign with its attending risk of
casualties is a thing of the past at least for American troops.
Perhaps, the argument goes, the precision revolution has
given us the ultimate tool, the silver bullet, to win future
wars by firepower alone.
However, a closer look at Kosovo suggests that, while
improvements in precision munitions may continue to tilt
the firepower-maneuver equation in favor of the former, the
nature of the enemy and the immutable character of war
continue to argue for the preservation of balance between
the two classic components of war. The Serb reaction to
firepower dominant assault was remarkably similar to the
North Vietnamese over a quarter century before. The
Vietnamese realized that overwhelming firepower alone
could never compensate for the presence of an aggressive
force on the ground to find, fix and fight them in close
combat. Without a ground threat, they merely had to array
their forces in order to endure punishment by fire alone.
Serb tactics followed the Vietnamese example with
remarkable fidelity. Units went to ground and dispersed
over wide areas. Soldiers hid their equipment with great
skill and constructed dummies that proved effective at
spoofing aerial observers and image interpreters. Trouble
for the Serbs arrived with the ground threat from the
Kosovo Liberation Army. However amateur and ineffective,
the presence of the KLA in their midst forced the Serb army
to come out of hiding and begin to mass. Once in the open,
the Serbs were obliged to trade the security of their hiding
places for battle in the open.
If Kosovo suggests that maneuver still remains essential
to a balanced approach to war, how then do we resolve the
problem of maneuvering without suffering excessive
casualties? Back to DePuy and his maxim. DePuy’s maxim
correctly grasped the trend of the expanding battle area as
the range and lethality of weapons continues to increase.
Soon the battlefield will become so expansive and porous
that the conventional schemes for ground maneuver may
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well play more to the advantage of the enemy rather than to
ourselves. On an expanded battlefield an adaptive enemy,
armed first and foremost with patience and guile, might
well be able to offset our advantage of superior firepower
with a countervailing strategy centered around the
occupation and control of large thinly occupied areas of
territory. His tactic will be defensive and centered on
controlling ground. He cedes the other dimensions of war
because he knows he cannot compete against a
technologically superior enemy on the sea and in the air. On
the defensive, he may appear to lose the initiative and with
it, in the conventional wisdom, the ability to win, but like
George Washington during our Revolutionary War, not
losing either forces or ground becomes the effective
equivalent of a new kind of winning. So his object is not to
win but to avoid losing by holding on and preserving his
forces in the field just long enough for the enemy to tire of
the conflict and go home.
DePuy’s maxim, reinforced by experience in Kosovo,
suggests that as an enemy disperses across a broad area and
goes to ground in order to avoid destruction by fire he makes
his force increasingly vulnerable to defeat by maneuver. A
dispersed enemy force cannot mass quickly, nor can it cover
all of its territory by fire from static positions. An enemy
gone to ground cannot see beyond the end of its nose and
cannot react in time to turn back forces which might
suddenly rush to occupy the uncovered, unprotected terrain
in its midst.
But DePuy also demonstrated that a ground force must
change its style of maneuver to gain full advantage of the
potential provided by modern firepower systems. A force
optimized to fully exploit precision fires must be able to
maneuver quickly against a dispersed, static enemy. This
can only be done if that force has adopted new methods of
warfighting at the strategic, operational and tactical levels
of war.
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Strategic:
The surest way to win at minimum cost is to win quickly.
A decisive, quick victory can best be assured by an early
arriving force of overwhelming power capable of conducting
a strategic takedown. A “strategic preemption” force would
first seek to use airpower to frustrate enemy deployment
long enough for early arriving ground forces to position
themselves between the enemy and his initial operational
objectives. Enemy ground forces caught in the act of
deploying or moving forward in the attack can be easily
targeted and destroyed by precision weaponry.
Time is a particularly critical factor on a battlefield
dominated by firepower. As we have seen in Korea and
Vietnam too long a delay in collapsing an enemy greatly
heightens the risk that an act of strategic preemption will be
stretched into a wasteful war of attritiona war the enemy
knows we cannot win. As we have seen from our own recent
experience with limited wars of attrition, given enough time
an enemy will learn to avoid destruction by dispersing and
burrowing into the countryside or by massing inside his
urban terrain.
Our difficulties with projecting forces to Korea, Iraq,
Kosovo and elsewhere, tell us that quick victories are hard
to achieve when an intervening power like the United
States is an ocean away from an enemy who perhaps has
only to violate a neighbor’s territory to fulfill his aggressive
intentions. An enemy acting unilaterally can mobilize
quickly and achieve almost total surprise. A major power
like the United States, on the other hand, can respond only
with great deliberation. Time must be taken to build
political consensus for action both at home and within the
international community. Thus the chance exists that an
enemy will be able to initiate aggressive actions, or even
possibly gain his initial objectives before we can intervene.
The example of the Serbian dash into Kosovo
demonstrates the particular futility of attempting to

102

preempt an enemy force using airpower alone. Similar
experiences with strategic intervention by air in previous
limited wars suggests that such an effort can be made
orders of magnitude more effective if aerial platforms are
guided to their targets by eyes on the ground. Special
operations forces planted deep inside North Korean, North
Vietnamese, and Iraqi territory have proven their ability
repeatedly both to survive and to take away the enemy’s
ability to hide from or spoof attacking aircraft.
Given the right strategic conditions and resources,
however, strategic preemption can succeed and succeed
decisively. Our strategic takedown in Panama took only a
day to cause the collapse of Noriega’s army of thugs. The
secret of success lay in the ability of the American command
to synchronize the delivery of overwhelming power
simultaneously against a multitude of objectives spread
throughout the entire Republic. That power was an effective
mix of air operations to paralyze and disorient through
selective destruction and ground operations to seize, hold
and ultimately to confirm the effects.
Before the Panamanian forces could even begin to
comprehend what was happening, they found themselves
surrounded, overwhelmed and blocked at every turn.
Victory, as evidenced by the disintegration of the PDF,
came, not with physical destruction so much as with the
utter inability of the enemy to react effectively in any
direction, leading to the ultimate collapse of his will to
resist.
Operational:
The apparent shift in the firepower-maneuver balance
in favor of firepower works to the disadvantage of a force
which seeks to intervene in a distant theater and operate
offensively against a static foe. It has been a long-standing
tenet of warfare in the modern age that a firepower
dominant battlefield environment favors the defensive.
Experience has shown that the surest way for an offensive
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force to overcome this disadvantage and succeed on a
firepower dominant battlefield is to employ an operational
offensive-tactical defensive method of war. The concept is
both simple and timeless. An attacking force maneuvers to
place himself between the defender and his line of
communications. The defender then can either remain
static and wither or leave the security of his defenses to
attack the force to his rear now set firmly in place and ready
to receive him. Defenders like the Serbs who must disperse
and go to ground in order to survive a precision attack are
particularly vulnerable to such a stratagem because the
attacker can take advantage of the enemy’s thinly occupied
battlespace to locate and then occupy voids left uncovered
by fire and observation.
The secret of success against an enemy gone to ground
would be to paralyze him with precision fires just long
enough to allow an early arriving ground force to
simultaneously occupy multiple points throughout the
enemy’s area of operations and saturate the enemy’s most
vital areas with small, discrete, autonomous and highly
lethal, mobile combat elements.
In order to gain and maintain maneuver dominance
ground combat units would not need to physically occupy
key terrain or confront enemy strong points directly.
Instead, an intervening force would occupy uncontested
terrain close enough to control and thus dominate these
vital centers through direct observation and the use of
short-range precision weapons. Such a violent,
unanticipated and overwhelming act would take the form of
a strategic takedown or coup de main rather than a
conventional form of linear maneuver.
A once cohesive body of enemy forces would now be
divided into isolated pockets, each a sub-critical mass
severed from its parent body unable to communicate or
maintain itself for very long without resupply and unable to
be reinforced. Once the intervening force gains the
advantage of position over the enemy the factor of time also
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shifts to his favor. The enemy cannot linger very long in a
fractured state. His choices are either to fight or wither. But
fighting will be a problem. Once set within the enemy’s
critical area the intervening force is in a position to call the
tactical shots now that he can leverage the power of the
defensive to his advantage.
Modern precision technology strengthens the inherent
power of the defensive phase of an offensive-defensive
stratagem. The range and lethality of our superior
firepower weaponry expands the killing zone making it far
more expensive for a less sophisticated enemy to move
unprotected against us in the open. The static side has the
advantage of watching and engaging with firepower from
positions well out of the enemy’s much shorter lethal reach
while remaining relatively secure in fixed, covered
positions. The enemy is trapped and can only escape by
massing to attack. If he masses he becomes a perfect target
for destruction by precision strike. Check and checkmate.
Our dominance in situational awareness given to us by
our overwhelming advantage in information technology will
help us solve the problems that DePuy and other American
field commanders found most vexing in this new style of
war. DePuy realized that a change in tactics alone could
reduce casualties only to a limited degree. In Vietnam, no
matter how small and protected he made his lead elements,
the cost of the initial contact was still too high. Also, DePuy
was frustrated by the ability of the enemy to escape before
his supporting firepower became most effective. The enemy
could slip away because ground forces could be not be
assembled quickly enough or spread thin enough to cover all
avenues of escape particularly in the rugged wooded terrain
in Vietnam.
The Army learned from its experiments with digitization
at the National Training Center in 1997 that a properly
internetted maneuver brigade provided with an
immediately available suite of aerial sensors could expand
its area of control by a factor of four or more. Superior
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situational awareness allowed units to locate all friendly
units and most of the enemy immediately around them. The
ability to see the battlefield with great clarity and
immediacy allowed them to anticipate each enemy
movement and avoid being surprised. Also, units
participating in these force-on-force experiments
discovered that the ability to spread out, yet still remain
cohesive and able to maneuver, freely allowed them to
outflank and surround much larger units in open combat.
Tactical:
If we have been successful at gaining positional
advantage and paralyzing the enemy at the operational
level then we must seek to finish the fight in close combat
with the smallest possible loss of life. Once secure in
operational sanctuaries, tactical units will expand outward
to find the specific location of previously unlocated enemy
ground units. These tactical scouts will be preceded by
aerial eyes in the form of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)
or other downlinked aerial sensors. These sensors must be
capable enough to find small discrete pockets before the
scouts stumble within the range of enemy direct fire
weapons. The scouts’ mission will be to define the outline of
the enemy formation clearly and then locate and destroy all
significant points of resistance without the finding force
becoming decisively engaged or suffering casualties.
Seen from a point high above, the battlespace in a
culminating campaign against a dispersed enemy might
appear in the mind’s eye like a distant prairie ablaze with a
thousand fires. All of the individual fires would be
surrounded simultaneously by groups of firefighters
building fire lanes and pouring on flame retardant
selectively in order to keep the smaller fires from combining
to form larger conflagrations.
Most enemy points of resistance would be left to burn
themselves out, particularly those in difficult areas such as
close terrain, forests and cities. Those which threaten
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people or property would be fought aggressively, but from a
distance. Firefighters would move in close enough to be
effective but not so close as to be trapped by the flames.
Close combat of this sort will be decisive to be sure, but
decisive from a distance. Close combat units will maintain
just enough contact to surround, contain and feel out the
shape and size of each enemy formation. As precision
strikes begin to wear away the will of the enemy, close
combat forces converge methodically with deliberation. By
this stage of the fight time becomes our ally. The initiative
belongs entirely to us. We can only lose now if impatience
causes us to be careless and allows a desperate enemy to
inflict more casualties than we can afford. Eventually,
surrounded, unable to mass, out of touch with adjacent
units and higher authority, each discrete enemy force slowly
collapses.
Finding the Balance:
Our Cold War fixation on fighting the big battle has
impeded the development of weapons appropriate for
fighting limited liability wars just as surely as it has
impeded our ability to internalize and accept limited war
fighting doctrine. This has lead to some curious ironies.
Recent experiences have taught us that the surest way to
win limited wars is to win them quickly. Time is our greatest
enemy and our enemy’s greatest friend. Yet as our
experience in Kosovo has shown, we still lack the means to
transport decisive landpower to even a local theater of war
in time to preempt or preclude the offensive actions of a
minor tyrant.
We seek to win at minimum cost. During wars in this
century the overwhelming majority of battlefield deaths
have been suffered by infantrymen in close combat. The
greatest killer of American infantry has been the homely
and unglamorous mortar, followed closely by the rifle and
machine gun. Yet while today we possess the technology to
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remotely locate strategic targets in Belgrade or Baghdad, a
platoon leader must still rely on DePuy’s tactic of direct
observation and contact in order to locate a machine gun
position. We can strike strategic targets with precision from
thousands of miles distance but our platoon leader has no
way to destroy a mortar over the next hill with any degree of
precision.
Recent post-Cold War experience in Kosovo and Iraq
have shown that even an army of inept petty tyrants can, if
given time, adapt and learn to counter our unique method of
fighting limited wars. Add to this uncomfortable truth the
realization that the American people will continue to
demand cheap victories and it seems absolutely apparent to
those who have studied recent history that the United
States will no longer have the luxury to improvise on the
battlefield. Fortunately, the recent history of limited wars
offers more than just a warning. It offers us a historical trail
of practical and empirical evidence which provides a path to
guide us into an uncertain era. In sum the recent past seems
to be telling us that:
• A battlefield dominated by precision fire favors the
defensive. Therefore, the surest way to win at acceptable
cost is to employ an operational offensive-tactical defensive
strategy whereby the attacker uses superior mobility to
place his forces amongst and between the enemy such that
the enemy is forced to wither and concede or to attack in the
most disadvantageous circumstances.
• Firepower intensive wars must be won quickly. Over
time, the effects of firepower diminish. Therefore, decision
on the battlefield must be achieved before the weight of
munitions needed to achieve effects exceeds the practical
limit of the force to deliver them. However, the promise of a
geometric increase in killing power for a given weight of
munitions offered by cheap distributed precision weaponry
will relieve us at last of the millstone of the ammunition
train. Infantrymen will now be able to kill the enemy
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effectively in the close fight without suffering substantial
loss in mobility.
• The enemy must be located precisely and fixed with
the smallest possible exposure of the maneuver force. In the
long term this finding function might well be performed
remotely from air or ground vehicles.
• An adaptive enemy will most likely counter our
superior precision strike capability by dispersing, hiding
and going to ground. While such a posture limits his
vulnerability to precision, it also makes his force extremely
vulnerable for exploitation by maneuver forces capable of
controlling his most vulnerable points from the ground.
• The object of close combat in the future will be to find
and fix the enemy without closing to within decisive
distance of the enemy’s weapons. Decisive range is defined
as the practical limit of the enemy maneuver unit’s organic
weapons.
• Maneuver forces must be provided the tools to
adequately support an offensive strategy that is dominated
by precision firepower. We can kill very deep targets with
great precision, principally from the air. Likewise, combat
units can kill with precision very close using direct fire from
guided anti-tank missiles. But the firer is exposed and
vulnerable during this direct exchange. We lack the ability
to kill with precision in the zone between these two
extremesjust where this new style of warfare needs
precision mostclose enough to find, fix and track directly
without being so close as to become vulnerable to the
enemy’s direct fire systems.

A Cautionary Conclusion:
DePuy’s doctrinal method is best suited for wars of
limited liability which clearly occupy only a narrow segment
of our potential future conflict spectrum. Surely, for the
near term at least, America’s soldiers will find themselves
most involved in non-shooting peacetime contingencies.
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True, but we already have shown that we can do presence,
peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions well as
demonstrated by the performance of American soldiers in
Bosnia, Kosovo, Haiti and elsewhere. We can do better to be
sure. But our past performance tells us that our doctrine for
stability operations today is fundamentally sound.
Improvement is always needed but the imperative for
changing the way we conduct these kinds of operations is
not pressing. Our most serious doctrinal challenge starts
when bullets begin to fly. Recent history tells us that
limited wars are what we do most often with least success.
These kinds of wars need the most attention to insure that
we will be able to win them at the least possible cost in the
future.
A second caution deals with the perception that
Americans are no longer willing to expend blood in foreign
adventures. The day may well come soon when a serious
competitor threatens an interest vital enough to allow a
serious sacrifice in blood. However, while the American
people may someday allow military professionals to spend
lives more freely, they will never again allow soldiers’ lives
to be wasted. So even in a major war we will continue to
shoulder the obligation to fight and win at minimum cost.
Our experience in recent war tells us that regardless of
how intense the combat, cheap victories will come only if we
change our warfighting doctrine to accommodate the new
realities of the precision age. Modern weapons technologies
have changed the dynamics of battle. The relationship
between the dynamics of firepower and maneuver has
shifted fundamentally. We must begin now to alter the way
we fight in order to stay ahead of potential enemies who, as
we have seen in Kosovo, already have begun to understand
and exploit our tendency to rely on firepower alone to win on
the battlefield.
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CLASHES OF VISIONS:
SIZING AND SHAPING OUR FORCES
IN A FISCALLY CONSTRAINED
ENVIRONMENT

Author’s Introductory Note
In the Fall of 1997 the Center of Strategic and
International Studies put together a panel to debate the
conflicting views that the three services had about the
nature of future war. I was joined by Major General Charles
Link, U.S. Air Force, Retired, and Lieutenant General Paul
Van Riper, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired. We were scheduled
for about an hour but the exchange became so passionate
that it lasted nearly three times as long and could have gone
much longer had the schedule permitted.
General Link gave a presentation that argued that the
recently completed Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study
(DAWMS) conducted by the Joint Staff was seriously flawed
in that it failed to give air power sufficient credit for its
destructive power against a postulated ground force
invading South Korea. He contended that, in fact, air power
would have been sufficient to “halt” the enemy force short of
its strategic objectives and thus would have provided the
American leadership a viable alternative to the immediate
introduction of ground forces into the theater.
Needless to say, General Van Riper and I took a
conflicting position. The excerpt that follows was the last
presentation of the day and it is a fairly concise
encapsulation of my retort to General Link’s depiction of
what has since become commonly referred to as the Air
Force Halt Strategy.
***
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A Soldier’s View
Let me begin by addressing a couple of points. The first is
the issue of gaming: the problem we have with DAWMS and
all the other games over the years is that we are using what,
in essence, is an analytical training tool that has evolved
over 20-25 years, based on old, Lanchestrian models—
force-on-force engagement; in short, the old force
application models that go back to World War II. We then
take attrition-based models and apply them to the art of
war. Of course, the further we get into warfare, the more it is
an intellectual rather than a physical exercise; and the more
that information will determine your ability to win on the
battlefield, the less viable force-on-force attrition-based
models become. This is a given.
The second issue is that of the sequence of operations.
Again, particularly as we look toward warfare in the future,
I agree with General Link 100 percent: the days of the
sequential linear joint operations are over the moment the
enemy gets the opportunity to buy even a nickel’s worth of
precision or counter-precision. We have to get beyond the
old Desert Storm models of how to fight wars. Making
yesterday perfect is a portent for disaster, and I am going to
tell you not necessarily how to rearrange deck chairs, which
is what General Link has talked about for the past hour, but
how to design a new ship to carry the deck chairs to victory.
General Link said something, perhaps inadvertently,
that I haven’t heard him say before. He talked about the
need for operational art, the services’ need to maintain the
hands-on experience, the fingerspitzgengefuhl, that’s so
necessary for an understanding of the operational art
within the services. I do not know whether he intended to
say this, but our view of operational art is subjective rather
than objective. We are not looking for the golden ball
bearing factory here. We approach warfare as a holistic act
in which the object is not butchery, but the collapse of an
enemy’s will to resist. It is an art rather than a science. And
if Johnny can’t dive bomb, that’s too bad; but if Johnny does
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not understand the fundamental character and nature of
war in the future, then all the precision and all the dive
bombing in the world will lead you up a blind alley.
The object of war is not to kill everyone: is not butchery;
is not genocide. We in the Army maintain that the object of
war is the destruction of the enemy’s will, not his physical
destruction. The purpose of combat is to convince the enemy
that he has lost. And the enemy, in terms of the American
art of war in the 21st century, is time. General Link has that
dead right: the longer a campaign is drawn out—the more a
campaign becomes a sequential battle of attrition that is
determined by the pace of buildup and counteroffensive—
the more likely we are to suffer unnecessary casualties.
Why? Look at the Firepower Curve chart.
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Unless your object is to kill everyone, then the principal
impact of killing power, or precision firepower—call it what
you want—is psychological and not physical: over time, in
every war in which firepower ever has been applied alone, to
include the Gulf war, the psychological effect of firepower
decreases over time.
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What we seek is a Sedan, not a Khe-Sanh. We seek to
have the ability to compress that cycle of war and apply
maneuver and firepower—the components of combat
power—not sequentially, but simultaneously. Because
remember, over time the enemy bonds himself to his
leaders. Anthropologists call that terror bonding. The
enemy becomes inured to war. A good example of this is the
image of the British soldier brewing tea on the firestep in
the middle of a German bombardment. More important
than his apparent comfort, he learned how to deal with it.
After the terrible disaster of Saipan in 1943, the
Japanese 32nd Army under General Cho—when he was
ordered to defend Okinawa—figured this out. He learned
how to handle it. In the Battle of Shuri Castle, U.S. forces
suffered 9,000 dead and 90,000 casualties in 89 days of
combat because the Japanese had figured it out. They got it
right. Fast-forward to the time after the terrible slaughter
of the spring offensive of 1951 in the Huan Ju Bowl; the
Chinese got it right. They figured out how to deflect the
killing power of U.S. aerial firepower. Once they did that,
what did we have? A stalemate for the next year and a half
that caused far more casualties from that point forward.
After the terrible slaughter of North Vietnam’s Tet
Offensive in spring 1968, General Giap got it right. He
figured it out and changed his strategy to be able to achieve
his political and military aims by ceding U.S. dominance on
the firepower battlefield.
We need to be careful. If you take a single-dimensional
approach to combat, you give the enemy the opportunity to
take a single-dimensional counter. If you do that, an enemy
with a nickel’s worth of technology is going to beat you every
time. History tells us this is true.
I am going to talk to you about the Army After Next. I am
not simply going to rearrange the deck chairs. What is
important is what happens next. What sort of enemy do we
face in the years ahead?
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Here is where I disagree with General Van Riper a bit.
The information revolution will give us mental agility and
“information dominance,” but sometime in the future,
probably after 2010, our potential foe—someone I will call a
major competitor, not a peer competitor—will have the
ability to apply combat power effectively on the battlefield.
So, by 2010, to have information no longer will be enough;
this will result simply in building an Army that only will die
smarter. You have to have the ability to act on what you
know, to balance your ability, to put speed into the equation
so that you can exploit “information dominance.”
I think we agree on everything we have heard so far. But
the enemy we will face in the future after 2010 will not be a
peer competitor. No one else will buy carrier battle groups,
infantry divisions, and stealth fighters to compete with us in
the next 20 to 25 years, but the threat is even more sinister
because it is a threat based around an asymmetric
approach. I have seen from my tours around the world over
the past two and a half years that many of our future
competitors have it right; they have figured us out. A little
bit of technology applied in the right direction—for example,
cheap cruise missiles; distributed air defenses that have no
nodes; the ability to place both sea and land mines; the use
of cellular telephone technology; and so on—will make an
enemy very difficult to take down with a single-dimensional
approach, and the enemy then can apply his own
advantages. The number-one advantage that we will have
in the future is defeating the enemy’s will—the ability to
collapse the psyche of his people. To try to destroy that will
with firepower alone, as the British learned in London, the
Germans in Berlin, and the North Vietnamese in Hanoi,
will serve only to steel that will rather than break it.
The enemy also has the power of the defensive. So, in
order to win, he doesn’t have to beat the Americans any
more than George Washington had to beat the British after
Long Island. If he can achieve a halt phase in a future war,
he wins! Because halt means he’s been able to extend the
campaign out, and time is on his side.
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If all this is true, then how do you take on that strategy
after 2010?
The answer is speed: speed to balance knowledge; the
ability to seek protection and to achieve a decision in times
and order of magnitude quicker than our ability to conduct
campaigns today; the ability to move about the battlefield
and to exploit what you already know.
Why is speed important? The challenge we face is very
similar to the challenge that armies have faced for hundreds
of years. In order to collapse the enemy’s will to resist, we
have to cross a deadly zone. We have to be able to get
through the enemy’s area of effectiveness to strike at his
operational center of gravity and collapse it in order to
achieve victory.
The muzzle-loading rifle extended the killing zone of the
infantryman from 150 meters to 1,000 meters or more. Back
then, armies moved at two and a half miles an hour.
Americans learned at Gettysburg and at Antietam exactly
what the price for that was. It is no different today.
Today, we have an Army, or a land power, that moves at
20 kilometers an hour, and the killing zone is thousands of
miles wide. We can achieve a decisive effect on a future
battlefield with a 20-kilometer-per-hour Army no more than
we could at Le Mans and Le Chateau with a two-and-a-halfmile-per-hour Army in 1914. We must accelerate the pace of
movement in order to be able to achieve decisive effect. How
do you do that? By strategic, operational, and tactical speed.
What is the long pole? Logistics. Not technology,
logistics. We took 640,000 tons of ammunition with us to
Desert Storm. It took 40 tons of fuel to drop a single ton of
bombs. We took 28,000 containers with us to Saudi Arabia.
That is why the campaign buildup took six months, because
we had an Army—I would say a military—that was much
too heavy. An Army division weighs 94,000 tons. It takes
another 90,000 tons to sustain it for six weeks. No matter

118

how much you know, you can’t inject speed into that
equation with a military that is heavy and immobile.
Finally, as Lenin said, quantity has a quality all its own.
The bottom line is this—and here I agree with General Van
Riper—ultimately, close combat is a blue-collar business. If
the density of the battlefield becomes too thin, factors other
than technology and physical effect begin to determine how
effective you are on the battlefield (such things as bonding,
cohesion, leadership, the ability to control and deal with the
fear of violent death). So even an army that thins out on the
battlefield, so to speak, still will have to be able, when the
close fight occurs—and it always does—to be able to coalesce
and bond units together.
Let’s talk about strategic speed—getting there “firstest
with the mostest,” to quote General Nathan Bedford
Forrest. The first element of winning wars after 2010
against a major competitor will be to get to the theater of
war very quickly to begin the process of the collapse of will
from the moment you leave the continental United States.
How will you do it? You can put air power, sea power, and
land power into this equation, but this is how we do it today:
you have a line in the sand with forward-deployed forces.
Early-arriving forces give you a political statement, and
maybe they will be able to survive, but they certainly are not
able to achieve decisive effect. As General Link said, an
enemy force has the opportunity to set itself operationally.
Whether it is in Kuwait, in Budapest, or along the Pusan
perimeter, the enemy has the ability to set himself
operationally. Therefore, subsequent operations—what he
calls the counteroffensive—is reactive. You are trying to
reestablish yourself in a theater of war.
What we need is the ability to preempt the enemy on the
battlefield. Here is where General Link and I agree. It is the
ability to arrive on the battlefield and, through an act of
strategic preemption—a strategic takedown operation—
keep the enemy from his operational objectives and destroy
him in detail, to disintegrate his force—not to butcher it, but
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to disintegrate his force in the field. When you do that,
campaigns go from months to weeks, in some cases from
weeks to days. The operational level of war takes hours and,
in some cases, perhaps days, depending on the nature of the
terrain.
How will you do it? You have to break that logistical
umbilical cord. You have to accelerate the pace of movement
by an order of magnitude. The only way to do that is to go up.
Here again, General Link and I agree. If you can go up—if
you can exploit the “surface-to-space continuum,” as we call
it—you can gravitate many of your combat support
functions outside the immediate confines of the battle area
and you can gravitate many of the combat support functions
upward—including logistics, intelligence, communications,
and fire support (to some degree).
So it is conceivable, then, that you could build a force
that is split, much as it appears in the following chart. In
fact, we saw hints of this in Desert Storm: the ability to split
a force. Keep in the battle area only those forces that kill,
sense, move, and fuse information. That’s it. Move
everything else outside the battle area. How far? That
depends on technology. Probably outside the immediate
reach of weapons of mass destruction.
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The left part of the above chart is an industrially efficient
organization that provides just what’s needed, just in time.
The right side of the chart is a military force that is
extremely small, extremely lean, very agile, and able to
move operational distances at hundreds of kilometers an
hour.
We conducted an operational war game in early 1997. As
a matter of fact, we conducted seven iterations—one Marine
and six Army. I will not go into the details, but allow me to
give you some insights.
The first thing we learned is that the art of war does not
change. The second is that, if you do not control space, you
lose. You must be able to know more than the enemy does,
and that difference needs to be on the magnitude of six,
seven, or eight to one. When we fought RMA forces that were
roughly equal, we had something like the blitzkrieg. When
we bumped up the information advantage by about a factor
of two, we saw a very fluid, dynamic battlefield. When we
pushed it up to six to seven to one, the whole character of
warfare changed.
If you can apply killing power and maneuver nearly
simultaneously and lay that over an enemy force across the
entire spread of his operational array, it is like putting a wet
blanket over a fire. You snuff it out and you collapse it. It is
the double shock of destructive power and a maneuver force
that surrounds you and occupies all positions of advantage.
This is what collapses the enemy’s will to resist—not
constant butchery. That is what does it. I think the war
game showed that.
General Van Riper and I were raised in an era in which
we saw enemy units aggregated in rectangles displayed on a
piece of acetate on a map. The information was always
wrong, it was always old, and we never trusted it. The
aggregations we saw of the enemy—and even of ourselves—
were always in blocks.
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But what happens if you can see the enemy in exquisite
detail, in near-real time? What if, instead of seeing, squares
on a map, you can see individual units and individuals, just
as General Link mentioned? If you can do that, then you can
take the Blue force and break it down into aggregations that
correspond to the Red force. Then you have command and
control again, thanks to the information revolution, to
coordinate all that and apply it as a single blanket of
maneuver. If you can do that in a very short period of time, a
campaign goes from a month-long, exercise, a bloody
exercise, to something that lasts hours.
In the six iterations that we ran, we fought in Central
Europe, Southwest Asia, and Northeast Asia. The
operational phases lasted from two hours to two weeks. The
enemy did what you would expect it to do: he went straight
for the cities and more complex terrain. When he did that, he
stretched out the length of the campaign considerably. By
the way, another point to General Link’s idea, if you are
going to model future conflicts, it has to be free play, force on
force; fixing the enemy does not give you insights if the coin
of the realm is information.
Go to the strategic game. If you can pick up a strategic
force and move it—in this case, to Europe in about 36
hours—and have it in combat immediately, it makes you
more efficient militarily, but it also makes your diplomacy
and political problem infinitely more complex. We learned
that during our strategic war game at Carlisle Barracks in
January 1997. So if you are not careful and you don’t build
coalitions carefully over time, you run the risk of either
going to war alone or going to war without the preconditions
properly set. The enemy knows this; therefore, he knows
that our strategic center of gravity is our ability to build a
coalition and to do it quickly.
Jointness becomes interdependence. Listen to me now,
because this is important. We cannot fight a campaign—
whether the center of mass is air, land, or sea—in the
traditional building-block, phased, time-sequenced manner

122

that joint doctrine calls for today. If you do this, as we
learned in our war game, the biggest source of combat
friction is ourselves, not the enemy. It is ourselves, because
of this obsession we have with putting everything in a
matrix. We have to learn to get beyond joint doctrine and
come to something that my war gamers call interdependence, or the ability to orchestrate killing power and a
positional advantage concurrently.
Our Achilles’ heel was space, and the enemy knew that.
The Red commander in this game was James Blackwell,
formerly of the Center for Strategic and International
Studies—and you trained that diabolical bastard well
because he attempted immediately to collapse this
surface-to-space continuum. As soon as he started to do
that, that became our center of gravity, and we had another
Pearl Harbor in slow motion. The lessons are that we must
protect our space assets, and there is no such thing as space
war, air war, or ground war—it is a single continuum in
2020.
Operational impressions: speed and mobility. If you
can’t combine the two together, all the firepower in the
world does not help. There is great synergy when you mix
maneuver and firepower. The more killing power you can
bring from outside the battlefield into the battlefield, the
smaller and more agile your operational force becomes.
Special operations forces are our global scouts. I could go
into a great deal of discussion about this, but the people who
made the coalition possible and allowed us to fight with
coalition partners effectively with a high-tech/low-tech mix
were the special operations forces that we employed in the
game.
How about technology? How do you build a force like
this? Just as General Heinz Guderian learned in the 1920s
that the diesel engine and metal roads in Central Europe
were going to give him the blitzkrieg irrespective of whether
he wanted it, the information revolution is going to allow us
to build flexibility and “information dominance”
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irrespective of whether we choose to do so. Much of the
technology I am talking about is derivative as outlined in
the following chart. How do you project a force overseas in a
day and a half rather than six months? You do it by
exploiting the work that is being done as we speak today by
General Michael Loh and others to exploit the so-called
middle market. Aircraft and high-speed sealift will allow us
to pick up strategic forces and move them very quickly
directly into an operational area and free up what formerly
were strategic assets to move forces within the theater of
war.
T o S e t th e S ta g e fo r A A N , th e A rm y S h ou ld A u g m e n t Its E x is ting
R es e a rc h a n d D e ve lop m en t E ffort b y F u rth er E x p lorin g T h e se
S y s te m s an d T ec h n o lo g ie s . (u p d a te d )

A ir -g ro u n d a p p ro a c h u s es
g ro u n d ta c tic a lly w ith o u t
relyin g o n it fo r m o b ility

T h e n ew hig h g ro u n d –
firep o w er an d C 3 I

S u p po r t
Co m b at

A A N T E C H N O L O G Y S H O R T L IS T
• H yb rid P o w e r S y stem s
• L o g istics E fficien cie s (fu el efficien c e, u ltra -reliab ility,
w e ig h t-r ed u c tio n )
• H u m an E n g in e er in g /C o g n itiv e E n g in eer in g
• S ig n a tur e C o ntr o l (in c lu din g c o u nte rs)
• P ro tec tio n S c h em es for L a n d S ys te m s (in clu d in g
a ctive p r ote ctio n )
• A d v an c ed M ate rials
• A ffo r d ab le p rec is ion a n d alter n ate leth ality m ea n s
• A lte rn ative P ro p ella nts
• N o n -le th al ca p ab ilitie s
• B io lo g ic a l a n d C h em ic al P ro te ctio n , An tid o te s, an d
V ac cin es

A A N S Y S T E M S S H O R T L IS T
• S itu atio n al Aw a ren e ss
• G lo b a l M a n eu v er P la tfo r m s
• A d va n ce d Airfra m e
– H ea v y L ift/T actical U tility L ift
• F u tu re F ig htin g G ro u n d C ra ft
• A u to n o m o u s an d S e m iau to n o m o u s
U n m a n n ed S y stem s (air, g ro u n d, s en so r s)
• A d va n ce d F ire S u p p o r t S ys tem
• “L ivin g In te rn et” w ith m o b ile N L O S c om m s
• A ss u re d in tel, s u rveilla n ce an d re co n
• S o ld ie r as a sys tem
em imp r, bas ic

That is a fast and dirty Army After Next. Suffice it to say
that what you have just heard is not the idle ramblings of
some gray-headed, two-star general, but the culmination of
a great deal of work done by a team of people who, for the
past two years, have worked very hard and approached this
from a holistic, eclectic perspective in which we started with
the art of war and geostrategy and worked back toward
technology, instead of going into some technological toy
store and pulling the things off the shelves that we thought
were the neatest. The result, we, at least, believe, is an
image of war as it begins to unfold through the murky future
that will look increasingly like the cycles of war to come.
124

Chapter Eight

AMERICA’S ARMY:
PREPARING FOR
TOMORROW’S SECURITY
CHALLENGES

Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr.

Strategic Studies Institute
U.S. Army War College
Army Issue Paper Number 2
November 1998

125

AMERICA’S ARMY:
PREPARING FOR TOMORROW’S SECURITY
CHALLENGES

Every age [has] had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and
1
its own peculiar preconceptions.
Carl Von Clausewitz

Introduction:
The chronicles of military history teach us the
importance of preparing for future security challenges. It
would be unrealistic to anticipate the next 25 years as the
beginning of a peaceful century void of conflict. As
Clausewitz observed, every age has indeed been marked
with its own kind of war. While the means change over time,
warfare will remain “An act of force to compel our enemy to
do our will.”2
America’s elected leaders should expect numerous
international security challenges as the new millennium
witnesses continued racial, economic and religious tensions.
Some of these conflicts will be so severe that our very
national viability and existence could be in jeopardy. The
United States, moreover, must anticipate the rise of
regional hegemons3 who will undoubtedly challenge our
vital national interests. In some instances, these security
threats will require resolution by using the element of
military power.
The Army is preparing to meet tomorrow’s security
challenges by implementing a strategy that will transform
1. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard
and Peter Paret, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 593.
2. Ibid., p. 75.
3. For purposes of this discussion, regional hegemons are defined as
nation-state actors who attempt to dominate their respective region of the
world by either threat or use of military force.
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it from a heavy, forward-deployed force to a lighter, more
versatile, power projection force. The knowledge-rich
attributes of Force XXI will be enhanced with the physical
agility of Army After Next Era Battleforces. These new
capabilities, in combination with a fully trained force
consisting of high quality people from both active and
reserve components, will enable America’s Army to remain
the world’s dominant strategic land power during the 21st
Century.
The World Beyond 2010:
While the first decades of the 21st Century will reflect
dramatic social and economic change, some things will
remain predictable. There is little evidence that suggests
the Information Age will alter the perpetual characteristics
of geopolitics.
Geopolitical interactions based upon the pursuit of
international order, stability and the balance of power will
continue to influence the national interests of the United
States. The nation-state will remain fundamentally the
same. These states will be identifiable political entities
bounded by geographical parameters. They may exercise
sovereignty in new ways as the old Industrial Age
bureaucracy designed to regulate commerce and industry is
pushed aside by Information Age innovations.
Global restraint, maintained through the balance of
power during the Cold War, will be more difficult to achieve
as the world is likely to disintegrate into areas of multipolar
tensions with competing regional hegemons. Reduced
influence of a bi-polar strategic balance has already allowed
the world to return to its pre-Cold War natural condition.
Competing states will seek to gain dominance over their
neighbors. Conflicts will abound as some nations redress
historic grievances and others open old wounds that have
been festering for hundreds of years. The proliferation of
information, while increasing knowledge and
understanding among nations, also galvanizes ethnic
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groups and contributes to cultural friction within troubled
regions. Some states may disintegrate into smaller,
ethnically based units. This fragmentation will cause both
interstate and intrastate conflict.
What is different today is the fact that, thanks to the
growing interdependence of world markets and the
expansion of information, even the most local source of
friction may spark sympathetic heat in distant places. The
thousand year conflict in the Balkans has become more than
a localized squabble between conflicting ethnic and
religious groups. What goes on there affects relations
among the West, Russia and the Muslim countries of the
Middle East. The lingering territorial dispute and nuclear
arms race on the Indian subcontinent, the conflicting
interests over the Spratly Islands among China and other
Southeast Asian nations, and the continuing issue of the
relationship between Taiwan and China point to other
likely areas of regional strife and disharmony.
Future conflicts will most likely occur along the same
geopolitical and cultural fault lines that have separated
civilizations for millennia. These historic lines extend
across northern and southern Europe, converge in the
Balkans, and traverse through the Middle East; continuing
beyond Eurasia, turning south toward the Pacific Rim,
down the Malay Peninsula and into the Indonesian
Archipelago. As in the past, these geopolitical fault lines
will continue to witness ethnic, religious, economic, and
political confrontation. 4
As the competition for resources and regional dominance
intensifies, hegemons will likely develop where the
intersection of sociopolitical zones collide. Since these
regional fault lines contain abundant natural resources,
particularly petroleum, these economic attributes will
continue to capture the interest of the United States and
other advanced countries. Between now and 2025, it is
4. For greater detail see Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations,”
Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, p. 25.
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We Can Begin to Identify Geopolitical Trends
•
•
•
•

Fracturing and Regionalization.
Diffusion of Threats.
Rise of Regional Hegemons.
Resurrection of Lingering Hostilities dormant during
the Cold War --- return to normal global chaos
• Anti-Access Strategies.

Conflict continues to center around States or
State-Like Actors.

reasonable to assume that if an aspiring regional hegemon
emerges to threaten either our interests or the interests of
our friends and allies, conflict will likely occur.
Future militaries throughout the world will continue to
reflect the societies they defend. Just as the Agricultural Age
and Industrial Age affected how armies fought, information
technologies will have a dramatic impact upon the character
of military organizations and force structure. The power of
the microchip already makes it possible to know much more
about the location of both enemy and friendly forces. This
enhanced situational awareness requires us to begin
thinking in terms of a surface- to-space continuum that will
transform the traditional battlefield of the past into a future
“battle-space” that will be more vertical than linear.
This enhanced knowledge will mean American forces
will strategically deploy with greater speed to the theater of
operations and then act with greater speed throughout the
operational and tactical battle-space. Digitization not only
improves the ability to communicate, it fundamentally
alters the relationship between fire and maneuver. With
the capacity to attack an enemy’s center of gravity with
great precision, our forces will maneuver with greater
dispersion and protection to overwhelm the opponent’s
ability to resist.
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Just as societies and states will reflect various stages of
economic development and modernization, global militaries
will likely retain elements of older, industrial armed forces
while selectively buying state-of-the-art technology. In all
likelihood, the proliferation of weapons and technologies
will continue, thus contributing to the potential
destabilization within regions of interest to the United
States. For example, warriors from failed states might
equip themselves with outdated weapons yet have access to
weapons of mass destruction and employ the latest
technology to exploit our information systems.

America’s Vital National
Interests in the 21st Century:
The United States has little choice but to remain globally
engaged beyond 2010. America is expected to maintain one
of the world’s largest economies, and we can assume with
some certainty that the United States will continue to
actively promote democratic principles, free market
economies and human rights.
For the American military, the Third Millennium began
in August 1990 when GEN(R) Colin L. Powell, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shifted the United States from
131

threat-based planning to capabilities-based planning. This
approach reflected the changing strategic landscape
resulting from the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the
Cold War. For the last several years this methodology has
been the basis for determining the required forces needed to
secure America’s national interests.
The President’s National Security Strategy defines vital
national interests as those of such importance that we, as a
nation, will do whatever is necessary to defend them
whenever our national survival is at risk. Vital interests
include the physical security of our territory and the
security of the territory of our formal allies. They also
include the safety of American citizens at home and abroad.
Part of insuring our security is maintaining access to trade
and resources that are vital to our economic well-being. To
defend these vital interests we are, and will remain, ready
to use military force “unilaterally and decisively.”5

Important but not vital national interests are those that
affect our national well-being and the character of the
world, but do not threaten our national survival. We may or
may not use military force to address these interests,
depending on the costs and risks and how these measure
against the interests at stake.6 Many of the threats to our
5. See A National Security Strategy for a New Century, Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, October 1998, p. 5.
6.

Ibid.
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interests through 2010 and beyond will fall into this gray
area of “important” but not “vital.”
The third level of interests addresses humanitarian
concerns. These interests stem from our historical idealism
and our democratic values and heritage. As a nation we will
continue to stand for what is good and right. If people need
our help, we may act because our values demand that we do
so. Often, we will try to avert humanitarian disasters
through diplomacy or by cooperating with a wide range of
international and non-governmental organizations. In
many cases, it will make more sense to take action early to
alter a situation which, if left unattended, might grow into a
disaster requiring a massive intervention, which might be
costly in terms of both treasure and lives.7
Our national interests will remain focused on Europe,
East and Southwest Asia.8 These regions are strategically
important to the United States because most of our vital
interests extend from the continental United States to
Europe, Asia and the Pacific Rim. The United States must
be prepared to act wherever vital national interests
intersect with regions of potential conflict. Latin America is
certainly important to the United States, as stated in the
Monroe Doctrine, and we are mindful of events in Africa.
But, not every conflict will require U.S. military action.
Military intervention, however, may be required if an
outbreak of conflict within these regions jeopardizes our
national interests.
Future Threats: Who Might Oppose the United
States?
We can postulate with some degree of certainty that a
major military competitor is not likely to arise from modern
democratic states. Although warfare among or between
democracies is not impossible, because of mutual economic
7.

Ibid., p. 6.

8.

Ibid., p. 12.
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interests and the similarity between political and social
culture, such a prospect is highly improbable.
It seems almost a certainty that current threats will
continue from hostile subnational groups, criminal cartels,
and transnational terrorists. While each group may possess
the capacity to cause great mischief, they are not expected to
pose a threat to our continued existence and viability as a
nation. Various rogue states may possess the will, but their
lack of means to do us harm will not allow them to be more
than a temporary threat to any vital national interest.

Probable Long-Term U.S. Strategy (to 2025)
• Security Policy will center on:
– Security of the United States.
– Stability overseas in areas of vital national interest.

• Military Strategy will center on:
– Defense of United States; land, sea, air and space.
– Forward engagement (stationing) in vital regions.
– Projectable Military Power.

• Engagement & Enlargement will continue worldwide
across the full spectrum of operations.

Likewise, failed states are not likely to pose a significant
threat. Although there may be plenty of people in these
states who have very little regard for our nation or its
values, the only way they can threaten us will be through
criminal activity involving various forms of terrorism.
Although this is an area of concern, the states themselves
will simply lack the means to threaten our vital interests.
The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a
particular concern but this activity is not expected to
threaten our national survival. It would be threatening to
our homeland and overseas interests if any of these entities
gain access to either chemical or biological weapons of mass
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destruction. However, delivery systems with limited range,
along with the increasing sophistication of detection
capabilities, constrain their viability as a weapons system.
Moreover, there is no basis to assume that the current policy
of deterrence will not continue to be effective as the United
States has declared that the use of such weapons against
our forces and homeland will incur a rapid and deadly
retaliation.
The Rise of a Major Competitor:
A major competitor, however, with both the will and the
means to oppose us, could become a significant threat to our
vital national interests and possibly to our continued
viability as a global power. While we do not predict the
emergence of a peer competitor, one that could match the
United States in all military categories, certain regional
states have both the national will and the convincing
military means to challenge and threaten the regional
interests of the United States and our commitment to
favorable world order. These countries would not try to
match American air, land, and sea capabilities. Instead, as
regional powers, their conventional center of gravity would
be protected by a large army and reinforced by selective
investments in key systems such as missile defense, or
cheap but effective air and naval counter measures. These
resources would feature just enough precision and lethality
to deter outside incursions and achieve regional dominance.
The famous study of strategy and warfare, written by
Sun Tzu, warned: “In battle one engages with the orthodox
and gains victory through the unorthodox.”9 The most
dangerous future opponent will heed the lessons from the
Gulf War and will subsequently design a strategy that
avoids our strength and uses indirect means to erode our
national will. This opponent will exploit perceived
American weaknesses such as an over-reliance on
9. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, translated by Ralph D. Sawyer, Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1994, p. 187.
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More than 8 YEARS into the 21st CENTURY we
see a RISING PATTERN of ASYMMETRY
• Shedding Cold War Impedimenta
• Streamlining forces: Less weight, more mobility
• Less corrupt, more ideologically tuned
• From internal security to regional projection
• More mature, professional, educated
• Doctrinal focus on Operational Art. - Deflect air/seapower to preserve “Armies in being”
• Off-the-shelf information age technologies
• Just enough conventional weapons technology to keep low tech forces viable
• Offensive strategy: Satisfy long simmering hegemonic ambitions
• Defensive strategy: Primitive strategic forces to prevent interference from abroad.
Army
India
North Korea

1,000,000

Pakistan

520,000

Iran

345,000

Iraq

350,000

Russia
China

Asymmetric Investments

980,000

670,000
2,200,000

technology, an aversion to casualties and collateral damage,
a lack of commitment for sustained campaigns and
sensitivity to world opinion. Willing to invest a
disproportionate amount of resources into advanced
weaponry, this potential adversary will not seek to defeat
our military forces in the field. Rather, he would adopt a
defensive-offensive strategy that seeks to counter critical
American advantages and deter, or, at the worst, attain an
operational stalemate.
Without question, beyond 2010, America should expect
the new century to bring a new kind of war that will
threaten a number of vital national interests. The most
serious threat will likely arise from a transitional state bent
on becoming a regional hegemon. This potential enemy may
feature a partially modernized military, specially tailored to
counter American technology and enriched with just
enough Information Age advancements to seize the
initiative. Such an adversary will not try to defeat us, but
will seek to deter our incursion into a regional crisis, or
make our involvement so costly that we withdraw. These
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opponents will realize that a stalemate can be defined as a
victory. These nations and actors with revolutionary
impulses are going to be difficult to deter and defeat in the
coming century.
National Security Policy Beyond 2010:
As the world leader of democratic principles, our security
policy serves three objectives. First, it must provide for the
physical security of the United States by making sure our
military capability is strong enough to deter aggression and
protect our national interests. Second, we seek stability in
those areas of the world where American vital interests are
at stake. Third, we will promote democracy abroad and
bolster economic vitality along the cultural fault lines where
American interests and potential instability converge. Only
a long-term commitment of American power to those
regions will foster the kind of stability that will ensure that
U.S. vital interests are not threatened.
Our national military strategy must further reflect our
commitment to deter aggression and preserve our way of
life. As a global power, the United States must be
unmatched in its ability to defend U.S. interests by air, land,
sea and space. It is no longer useful to think of this nation as
a “maritime” or “continental” power. Air and sea lines of
communications are the interior lines of a world where our
far-flung interests may be threatened.
The Army of the 21st Century will use those air and sea
lines of communications to move where it must to secure our
interests. In the Roman Empire, the Mediterranean Sea
both facilitated commerce and allowed for the movement of
troops. The Empire was sustained for nearly four centuries
largely because Rome was master of both the sea and the
land. The Army will never participate in operations that are
completely independent of the other services. During the
next century, the United States must continue to be a global
maritime and aerospace power. Joint, Unified and
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America’s Strategic Challenge Might Play Out Like This...
Threat
Constrained Competitors

Regional Competitors

Major Competitors

•
•
•
•
•

• Industrial-Age Forces
• Selective Precision
• Asymmetric Strategies
and Investments
• Quasi-Professional
• Limited WMD
MILITARY

• Information-Age Forces
• Precision and Mass
• Hegemonic Ambitions,
“Anti-Access Strategies”
• Professionalized
• Proliferated WMD

Industrial-Age Forces
Very Limited Precision
Asymmetric Strategies
Quasi-Professional
Sparse WMD
2000

2010

Response
• Tension Management
• Engagement and
Enlargement
• Peacekeeping/Peace
Enforcement
• OOTW

PREEMPTION
CAPABILITY
BECOMES
ESSENTIAL

• 2-MRC Strategy
• Improved Forces
• Improved Strategic and
Operational Mobility
• Improved Situational
Awareness
• Forward Presence

2020

• Major War-Winning
Capabilities
Precision, Mass, Speed
Strategic Maneuver
Information Dominance
Jointness to
Interdependence

•
•
•
•

Coalition action will be necessary to secure our worldwide
interests and respond to future threats.
Developing the Army’s Long-Range Vision:
America’s Army will continue to be the only element of
military power prepared to exercise direct, continuing, and
comprehensive control over land, its resources and its
people. During the next 25 years, the Army will exist to
deter aggression and to fight and win the nation’s wars.
Other requirements will include providing options during
small-scale contingencies and peace operations such as
humanitarian and domestic assistance. Despite the
infusion of technological systems, the Army of the future
will be a total quality force seamlessly integrated with
active and reserve components. More importantly, it will
continue to rely on a strong value system that demonstrates
an organizational commitment to take care of people.
As the long-range transition from Force XXI to Army
After Next continues, great change will occur in the Army’s
physical, technological and cultural makeup. Beyond 2010,
the Army must complete the metamorphosis from the
rudimentary efforts initiated with Force XXI to the fully
integrated force envisioned within the Army After Next.
These changes will physically alter the institution’s
war-making sinews and will ensure the Army’s viability
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well into the next century. While a future enemy may gain
competencies that would counter American technical
advantages, we must retain a dominent ability to win
quickly and decisively at low cost. Moreover, the Army must
have the means to conduct battle rapidly and to end it while
the paralytic effect of firepower is greatest.
To fulfill its role as the land component member of the
joint team, the 21st Century Army must acquire a number
of mental and physical capabilities that will ensure
full-spectrum dominance. The Army must be sufficiently
versatile to operate effectively across a wide range of
missions as part of a joint force or multinational coalition
that can win quickly and decisively. Combat elements will
incorporate the effects of knowledge and speed to gain
positional advantage while protecting the force within an
environment of near total strategic, operational and tactical
battle-space awareness. This force will be capable of moving
rapidly to any point where conflict threatens our vital
interests. The 21st Century Army will combine the effects of
battle-space awareness and precision fires to derive the full
potential of strategic speed and dominant maneuver. As
these changes become fully integrated, the synergistic
effects derived from these various capabilities will enable

But we must Anticipate the Rise of a Major
Competitor by 2025
A Major Competitor:

Not a Peer
(US Look-Alike)
Competitor

Will Not
• Try to recreate a Cold War bipolar world
• Attempt to match US system-for-system
Will
• Focus on landpower
• Apply limited resources asymetrically
• Frustrate US with just enough precision to kill and buy time
• Capitalize on intrinsic potential of mass, popular will, and
inherent strength of the defensive
Stalemate Works to the Advantage
of the Competition
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the Army to be the nation’s force of decision on the 21st
Century battlefield.
The objective must be to use all the capabilities of a
balanced military force so that the final outcome of any war
will be decided before the first engagement. The way to do
that is to collapse the enemy’s will to resist. Strategic
preclusion is a process that involves marshalling forces
rapidly and moving them to points of conflict quickly.
In Operation Desert Storm we saw a glimpse of this. As
soon as the decision was made to deploy American forces
into the Persian Gulf in great numbers, the television news
programs showed troops getting on airplanes, tanks on
flatcars moving toward ports, aircraft taking off for bases in
Saudi Arabia, and ships leaving port. Iraqi leadership saw a
formidable force building and moving inexorably toward
them. The psychological destabilization of the enemy begins
with mobilization and deployment, and culminates with the
total collapse of the enemy brought about through an
integrated attack that combines the destructive effects of
maneuver and precision engagement.
The Army’s Contribution To Our National
Military Strategy:
In the 21st Century, the twin pillars of our national
military strategy will continue to be forward presence and
power projection. Both active and passive deterrence will be
essential throughout the regions where we maintain vital
national interests. After more than three years of active
investigation, we are convinced that four major categories of
military forces will be required in order to effectively
execute a comprehensive National Security Strategy.
Global scouts are a key resource and part of the Army’s
effort to bridge active and passive deterrence measures.
Consisting of attaches, foreign area officers, conventional
and special operating forces, global scouts build and nurture
a reservoir of trust and goodwill with potential coalition
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partners. These soldiers seek to favorably shape the
strategic environment. While these teams teach the
fundamentals of combat, they also seek to educate other
cultures on democratic values and governmental
procedures.
Forward presence forces demonstrate our national
resolve and commitment to maintain peace and stability
within a region. These resources serve to deter aggression
and they help prevent major crises through aggressive
engagement programs and coalition building. Either
through the foresight of our predecessors or fate, we
currently have forces throughout the world stationed in
Beyond 2010 Knowledge Dominance will no
longer be enough. We must have….
Speed -- to Exploit Knowledge:
• Forces must move to survive and succeed
– Linear Speed -- Strategic preemption
– Angular Speed -- Anticipate, out think, gain
positional advantage
• Pulsed, continuous operations
• Agile, high operational transition capability
• Adaptive, full-spectrum force

regions where our vital national interests endure. These
forces are deployed on foreign soil and their presence is
usually enough to deter hostile actions. If necessary, they
can provide an immediate response to acts of aggression and
stabilize the situation until reinforcements arrive.
American forces stationed in South Korea are an excellent
example of strategically positioned forward-deployed
forces.
Because of its current forward positioning along historic
lines of conflict that are of great interest to the United
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States, the 21st Century Army will play the largest role of
all the services in favorably shaping the geo-strategic
environment through peacetime engagement activities.
Most countries throughout the world depend on large land
forces to define and defend their way of life. Very few
nations, in contrast, have significant navies or air forces as
part of their military structure. In the eyes of our friends
and allies, and even our potential enemies, troops stationed
overseas represent the ultimate American commitment to
peace and stability.
Global scouts and forward deployed forces will only be
effective if they are backed with a credible reservoir of
over-the-horizon forces that can mobilize and deploy from
the United States to wherever acts of aggression occur. The
essence of our military credibility will be continental-based
forces that can rapidly deploy to either preclude aggressive
actions or defeat an opponent before his forces have time to
achieve complete victory.
Charting the Road Ahead−
The Army as an Integral Member of the Joint Team:
During the next 25 years, the world’s security
environment will be shaped by the interaction of nations
undergoing various stages of national economic and social

Strategic Speed
• Power projection from all
points on the globe converge
and paralyze enemy
• Simultaneous convergence of
overwhelming land, air,
space, and sea forces
• Overseas presence quickens
global maneuver
• Being “First with the Most”
reduces risk and begins
process of psychological
Seize initiative,
domination
build momentum . . . an image of uncontestable
competence and unstoppable force
The Goal: A globally self-deployable force capable of striking directly at
strategic and operational centers of gravity
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development. While the information revolution will
undoubtedly affect most societies, only a few nations will
have transitioned into the Information Age by 2010. For
those nations that make this leap, information technologies
will also permeate their older industrial production
facilities as well as their agricultural sectors. In some
nations, these effects will be positive, fostering greater
socio-economic progress. In other societies, people may
suffer while their government pours resources into building
a military machine that could transform these nations into
regional hegemons.
With few exceptions, major conflict between states will
occur in the vicinity of long-standing geopolitical and
cultural fault lines that separate civilizations. Nations and
groups will continue to seek ways to impose their wills upon
each other and when they do, war will result. American
involvement will occur whenever its vital national interests
intersect with conflict along these tectonic fault lines.

Certain nations will choose to invest in conventional
military forces, information technologies and selected
weapons of mass destruction. Their purpose will be to
dominate selected regions while deterring American
incursions. If confronted, they will employ an asymmetric
strategy that seeks to avoid America’s military strengths
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and exploits perceived weaknesses. Nations that follow this
pattern represent our most significant future threat.
While the world beyond 2010 will present a number of
strategic security challenges, America will remain as the
single global military power. Although the fundamental
nature of war in the 21st Century will not change, new
weapons will alter the traditional relationship between fire
and maneuver.
During the early decades of the 21st Century, the Army
of 2025 will differ from today’s Army in two distinct
ways. First, it will achieve unprecedented strategic and
operational speed by exploiting information technologies to
create a knowledge- based organization. Second, it will
exhibit tremendous flexibility and physical agility through
streamlined, seamlessly integrated organizations that use
new tactics and procedures. The collective result will be a
versatile, full spectrum, capabilities-based force that can
decisively respond to any future global contingency. As the
world begins a new age and a new century, the Army is
preparing for the next kind of war that will emerge.
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THE DAWN OF A NEW AGE OF WARFARE:
AND THE
CLARION CALL FOR ENHANCED
MANEUVER CAPABILITIES

The Information Age will alter modern warfare in the
Century just as the Industrial Age altered 20th Century
battlefields with new forms of integrated mechanization.
Armies reflect the cultural fabric of their sponsoring
societies. There is a historical and symbiotic relationship
between advancing technology and the evolving means of
warfare. As Clausewitz observed, every age has indeed been
marked with its own kind of war. The information
revolution promises to deliver a watershed of change that
will again significantly alter the context of future war.

21st

During the past 50 years, much of the talent, energy and
national resources of the free world were invested within
the Defense Community to ensure that the battlefield
advantage resided with the armed forces who were
compelled to fight from defensive positions. The military
threats of the Cold War Era required this type of operational
capability. For more than two generations, democratic
nations invested their military research and development
funds to improve precision strike capabilities. The
dividends from this investment strategy yielded a suite of
weapons with unprecedented lethal range and accuracy.
The Cold War, consequently, ended with defensive forces
enjoying the battlefield advantage.
The Battle Trumpet Sounds Anew
If we hope to restore a range of balanced, offensive
options on the battlefield of tomorrow, the power of the
microchip must be harnessed to develop a new generation of
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maneuver platforms that will be able to counter precision
fires while making contact with the enemy. Precision strike
only brings a single dimension of offensive heft to the battle.
To be sure, firepower can be paralytic in its effect, but these
effects are always fleeting. Firepower alone will not collapse
an opponent’s will to resist nor will it bring the coalition
commander certain victory. The clarion call for a new
generation of maneuver platforms sounds anew.
Tomorrow’s battlefield success will be achieved by
commanders who have the ability to orchestrate precision
strike with precision maneuver. As computer technology
enhances both situational awareness and precision
munitions, soldiers of tomorrow will simply die smarter if
we fail to develop this leap-ahead physical agility. The dawn
of a new age of warfare and the anticipated emergence of
clever, adaptive opponents will require an order-ofmagnitude increase in strategic and operational maneuver
speed.
Almost 10 Years into a Strategic Pause
We are now experiencing a period of strategic calm very
similar to the interwar years of 1918 to 1939. The end of the
Cold War and the defeat of Iraq’s Republican Guard marked
a major geopolitical transition that has introduced an era of
global harmony. The world beyond 2010, however, promises
to become a complex web of international security concerns.
Global restraint, maintained through the balance of power
that existed during the Cold War, will be more difficult to
achieve as long-standing multipolar tensions fester and
competing regional hegemons attempt to dominate their
respective corners of the world. Conflicts will abound as
some nations redress historic grievances and others open
old wounds that have been simmering for hundreds of years.
Future conflicts will most likely occur along the same
geopolitical and cultural fault lines that have separated
civilizations for millennia. These historic lines extend
across northern and southern Europe, converge in the
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Balkans, traverse through the Middle East, continue
beyond Eurasia, turning south toward the Pacific Rim,
down the Malay Peninsula and into the Indonesian
Archipelago. As in the past, these geopolitical fault lines
will continue to witness ethnic, religious, economic and
political confrontation.
The Rise of Major Military Competition
If the past is an indication of the future, this global
vacation from military violence will end eventually. It is too
soon to postulate whom the significant challengers might
be, however, we have started to develop some emerging
insights regarding the origin and context of future regional
conflict.
During the next two decades, states will continue to
cluster in one of three major groups based upon their
political, economic and social differences. It seems
reasonable to anticipate with some degree of certainty that
major military threats will not likely arise from the
approximately two dozen developed, industrialized
democracies. Although warfare among or between mature
democratic states is not impossible, such an outcome is most
improbable. Likewise, at the opposite end of the
have-and-have-not continuum, there is a large number of
states who struggle for survival and they will not have
either the economic or military means to challenge our vital
national interests. Without question, these “have-not”
nations will certainly continue to need humanitarian and
peacekeeping assistance.
In between these two extremes there is a group of
“transitional” states most likely to become candidates for
serious military competition in the next century. These
evolving states, located primarily in Europe, the Middle
East and Asia, are already beginning to develop the
economic means that will generate the expandable income
to support more sophisticated militaries. We should
anticipate, by the end of the next decade, a few of these
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transitional states to become adaptive enemies with both
the national will and military means to challenge us. These
competitors will enjoy both the positional advantage of the
defense and the technical advantage of newly emerging
precision munitions to challenge our interests within their
respective regions of influence.
Without question, the United States Army expects the
new century to bring a new kind of war that will threaten a
number of vital national interests. The potential enemy of
the early 21st Century may feature a partially modernized
military, specially tailored to counter American technology
and enriched with just enough Information Age
advancements to seize the initiative. Such an adversary will
not try to defeat us, but will seek to deter our incursion into a
regional crisis, or make our involvement so costly that we
withdraw. These opponents will realize that a stalemate
can be defined in their terms as a victory.
The Microchip is a Neutral Ally
Presently, many military organizations believe that
they can best address future competition with technologies
that improve our ability to find and kill the enemy from a
distance. This superior knowledge, unfortunately, will not
be sufficient to ensure future success. Even the great
chess-masters, who have 100 percent clarity and real-time
vision over their battlefield, must cope with the unexpected
moves from a thinking opponent.
The information revolution, at best, will be neutral as
military competitors challenge each other. It will alter the
nature of warfare and potentially do more for our opponents
than it will do for us. A thinking opponent will quickly
realize that our intensive reliance on information age
technologies becomes a weakness that can become an
asymmetric target.
One of the potential ironies of the future may occur
because western information technologies could provide
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non-western armies with solutions for two of their most
vexing problems. First, cellular technology and the Internet
may allow them to maintain a concert of action for long
periods of time with widely dispersed units. Second, these
same technologies will allow them to orchestrate the rapid
massing of dispersed units when opportunities arise to
transition into offensive operations.
The prospect of this scenario becomes even more
sobering when one considers the fact that many commercial
ventures already provide future competitors with the tools
they need while commercial research centers continue to
perfect non-nodal, distributed and net-centric global
information technologies. All of these resources will be
available to paying customers without one developmental
dollar spent by our potential opponents. The technological
foot race is underway and either side could win. As we
develop the technologies to find and kill the enemy, our
potential opponents will develop the technologies to become
even more dispersed and difficult to find.
Charting Tomorrow’s Capabilities Today
The Information Age beckons the Defense Community
with a clarion call for innovative thought and
experimentation. Increasingly, the dominant means of
warfare will become less anchored within existing
industrial age impedimenta and more reflective of new
systems, innovations and adaptations launched by the
unfolding march of the information revolution. As the size
and lethality of the deadly zone increases, our industrial age
experience becomes less relevant as a means of determining
the future course of modern war. During the peaceful
interlude that we currently enjoy, it is important to examine
new ideas and evaluate the merit of new concepts.
Fortunately, we have a rich historical roadmap of
experiences that give us a sense of direction. The chronicles
of military history teach us the importance of developing a
vision for the future of landpower that will guide
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technological developments and assist with the
development of new fighting doctrine. The blueprint for
successful Armies beyond 2010 will be discovered through
both analyses of military history and an organized
experimentation effort that must be sustained over a period
of many years.
The imperatives for charting tomorrow’s capabilities
today are imposing. The secret of future victories will be
discovered if we are willing to foster innovation and support
experimentation during the next decade. A revised
blueprint for tomorrow’s Army is possible to imagine if new
concepts, doctrine and structure are investigated. Certain
victory in 2025 can only be assured if we accept the premise
that the era for industrial age warfare is passing quickly
while we are just witnessing the dawn of information age
warfare.
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INTRODUCTION

The Chief of Staff of the Army and the Commander,
Training and Doctrine Command established the Army
After Next project in February 1996 to help the Army
leadership craft a vision of future Army requirements. The
project connects the process of change represented by Army
XXI and guides future Army research and development
programs. This is the TRADOC commander’s second annual
overview of the AAN program.
Visualizing the future requires a process that
anticipates the nature of warfare in the next century and
the evolution of U.S. national security requirements. For
that purpose, AAN conducts broad studies of future warfare
to frame issues vital to the development of the U.S. Army
and to provide those issues to the senior Army leadership in
a format suitable for integration into TRADOC combat
developments programs. These studies focus on, but are not
constrained to, the period 2010 and beyond. The choice of a
30-year point of focus is intended to place a distant
intellectual beacon far enough in front of the pace of change
so that ideas and a vision of the future will not be constricted
by near-term budgetary and institutional influences. Such
an approach is needed to break free of the action-reaction
cycle of incremental change, which can only hold the future
hostage to the past. To ensure a comprehensive and holistic
perspective focused on 2025, the program is organized
around four broad research areas: the geostrategic setting,
the evolution of military art, human and organizational
issues, and technology trends.
By 2010, the Army will exploit the Force XXI effort to
achieve nothing less than a technological and cultural
metamorphosis. By then, over a decade of experimentation
and field exercises will create a knowledge-based force,
Army XXI, balanced across our traditional imperatives and
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possessed with a clarity of observation, degree of
decentralization, and pace of decision making unparalleled
in the history of warfare. AAN simply seeks to provide the
Army of 2020 with the physical speed and agility to
complement the mental agility inherited from Force XXI.
Following the conceptual direction set by Force XXI’s
advanced warfighting experiments, AAN’s primary
research mechanism is a series of free-play tactical,
operational, and strategic war games and war-game
excursions designed to explore the character of future
warfare and to provide an in-depth joint and multidisciplinary examination of political, social, demographic,
and technological trends likely to affect the future of war.
Insights derived from games conducted to date comprise the
heart of this report. Because they reflect only the first cycle
of AAN studies, these insights should be considered
suggestive rather than conclusive. Future AAN war games
can be expected to refine them significantly.
THE PROCESS OF CHANGE
The history of warfare reveals a cyclical pattern of
military change in which evolving technology alternately
favors attack or defense. Before the Industrial Age, such
cycles alternated slowly because innovation developed and
spread slowly. After the Industrial Revolution, the cycles
began to accelerate, though they were still somewhat
retarded by political and institutional conservatism and the
uneven development of military technologies. By the
American Civil War, rifled muskets—the precision weapons
of the day—had greatly extended the deadly zone troops had
to cross to close with an enemy, a condition favoring the
defense. Subsequent advances in artillery led European
armies to believe that superior firepower would restore the
power of the offensive and with it the possibility of quick,
decisive victory. Events proved them wrong. While lethality
skyrocketed, the pace of movement across the widening
deadly zone remained that of a marching soldier.
Technology thus served only to increase the slaughter and
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to mire armies on both sides in a conflict of attrition to which
there seemed no alternative.
By 1918, the Germans had found a partial solution—a
method of opportunistic infiltration allowing infantry to
transit the deadly zone intact—but they lacked the
technology to accelerate the advance enough to reach
decisive objectives before the defender could recover. By the
onset of World War II, the internal combustion engine,
armor plating, and the wireless provided the means to
accelerate maneuver. Mechanization allowed troops to
cross the deadly zone protected and at high speed. Large
units could dash great distances into the enemy’s rear.
Victory thus came from disintegrating the coherence of the
defense and collapsing the psychological will of the
defender. Through rapid maneuver supported by mobile
firepower, the offensive once again came to dominate
warfare.
In the postwar years, the United States and its NATO
allies applied microchip technology to develop precise,
long-range killing power in an effort to successfully defend
against a Soviet-style blitzkrieg. The cycle of warfare had
turned yet again in favor of the defense. By the mid-1980s,
technology had extended the tactical deadly zone to what
were once operational and possibly strategic distances. As
this trend continues, long-range, precision firepower
systems will maintain the defensive as the dominant form of
warfare.
To restore the advantage to the offensive, we believe that
the Army must devise the means to accelerate the speed of
movement across the deadly zone by an order of magnitude
or greater. The union of knowledge and speed will do more
than increase linear velocity; it will also quicken a
commander’s ability to divine and exploit an enemy’s
weaknesses and to offset the influence of chance and
uncertainty. The American method of war-making in the
future must rely on the offensive if this nation intends, as a
matter of policy, to retain the ability to strike rapidly, decide
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quickly, and finish wars cleanly with minimal loss of life to
all sides. Current AAN research is directed at this most vital
and pressing challenge.
THE RATIONALE FOR CHANGE
The historical record of military change is mixed. Some
changes, like the Navy’s development of carrier aviation in
the mid-1930s, Germany’s blitzkrieg, and the Army’s
development of airmobile operations in the 1960s, have
succeeded. Others, like France’s Maginot Line and the U.S.
Army’s Pentomic reorganization of the 1950s, have not.
Generally speaking, those that have failed reflected either
too narrow a view of warfare or else a faddish preoccupation
with untested theories. The AAN Project consequently
embraces a broad view of warfare, particularly since the
Army must win wars as well as battles. Accordingly, AAN
studies consider warfare in all its dimensions, beginning
with its most likely strategic conditions. Fundamental to
this perspective is the belief that even the smallest element
of the Army must reflect a common unifying thread,
beginning with the vital interests of the United States and
proceeding through national security policy, military
strategy, long-term operational objectives, and, ultimately,
the design and employment of every tactical unit.
Based on its broad study of future warfare, AAN
research to date indicates that the Army should expect
dramatic changes in the dynamics of battle in the period
beyond 2010. The remainder of this report discusses those
changes as we currently understand them. While many
aspects of the future remain indistinct, others have already
become discernible. The Army can and should begin now to
prepare for the future, even if our desired end state remains
only dimly perceived. We can adjust our glide path as our
vision of the future gains clarity. Inaction is a decision we
cannot afford. The Army must change soon for three
reasons:
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First, every revolution, whether political, economic, or
military unfolds in evolutionary steps. Generally, at least
half a generation, about 15 years, is required for vision and
ideas to mature into secure and irreversible change. It takes
about that long to grow a battalion commander or platoon
sergeant or to develop, test, and field major systems. It may
take even longer to truly alter the institutional culture
sufficiently to internalize revolutionary change. In addition,
the Army today finds itself very much a fellow traveler in a
grander societal revolution. Global institutions and
cultures are busily shifting from the Industrial to the
Information Age. The Army today has a foot firmly planted
in both ages. Materiel and structures developed in the era of
the recent past must now either be modified or replaced to
prepare for conflict in the Information Age. Central to this
decision is whether current and programmed systems will
satisfy the requirements of a 2025 battlefield. Since current
AAN research suggests that tomorrow’s battlefield will
differ from today’s in revolutionary ways, the Army’s leadership must soon determine how to apportion research and
development resources among a host of competing
technological alternatives. Also, it must determine how
much of the Army to modernize along current lines before
leapfrogging Army XXI systems with entirely new
technologies and significantly different operational and
organizational concepts.
Second, the United States currently enjoys unrivaled
military supremacy, but this condition may well erode after
the turn of the century, Many analysts see both China and a
recovered Russia as having the economic potential to
become major military competitors. Yet, any number of
military challengers might arise. Such challengers need not
seek to match the U.S. in every military category. Instead,
they merely need to acquire capabilities intended to counter
critical American advantages—in sensor technology, for
example—depriving U.S. forces of the assurance of rapid
battlefield dominance and raising the political costs of
military intervention. That approach would especially
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appeal to armies building or rebuilding from a relatively
small technology base, as the Germans did after World War
I. Such armies would have few sunk costs. Indeed, current
AAN research strongly suggests that any serious military
threat between now and the 2025 period will very likely
involve asymmetric forces designed specifically to threaten
U.S. superiority in areas requiring long development and
deployment lead times.
Third, if not corrected soon, the current emphasis on a
method of warfighting that emphasizes firepower at the
expense of maneuver may well result in a protracted war
characterized by stalemate, attrition, and unacceptable loss
of life to both sides. Recent experience in war and insights
from the AAN series of war games demonstrate that, even in
the age of precision warfare, the principal benefit to be
derived from firepower is the psychological paralysis of the
enemy, not his physical destruction. Unfortunately, this
benefit decreases over time as an enemy inures himself to
the shock of firepower and learns to “maneuver under

In war, the psychological dominates the physical.
Since the psychological effects of firepower erode
over time, decision should be sought quickly. To do
otherwise invites unnecessary risk.
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precision” through the use of deception, dispersion, and
maneuver by infiltration. Quite likely by 2025, a competent
enemy may also be able to counter American advantages in
precision firepower with a variety of precision and
counterprecision technologies of his own. If American
military forces are to win quickly and decisively at low cost,
they must have the means to conduct battle rapidly and to
end it clearly at the moment when the paralytic effect of
firepower is greatest. As the figure above demonstrates, to
delay beyond the high point of effect only prolongs the
killing and stiffens the enemy’s will to resist. Decisive
victory ultimately must be achieved by forces on the ground.
Psychological collapse—the breaking of an enemy’s will to
resist—results when an opponent finds himself challenged
and blocked wherever he turns. Restoration of the balance
between fire and maneuver will take time, at least a decade
or more, and the process must begin soon.
THE PACE OF CHANGE
Adapting to change is difficult for any army. At best,
changing a military organization too quickly may result in
acquisition of immature or inappropriate capabilities. At
worst, it can threaten the doctrinal and organizational
cohesion on which any fighting force depends. But as armies
throughout history have learned to their dismay, failure to
adapt is equally deadly. Sunk costs or budgetary penury
may preclude adoption of new technologies, while
institutional conservatism may prevent their effective
exploitation. In either case, failure to adapt ultimately
results in squandered lives and military defeat. Our
challenge today is to get the balance right. And with system
wear-out only about 12 years away, we have just enough
time to do it. The diagram below makes this point.
The steep axis of change is undesirable because too great
an angle encourages too rapid a lock on systems that might
be quickly outdated. Another risk on this axis—perhaps
even greater than premature materiel lock-in—is that of
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The challenge is to change the force without
putting it at risk.
disrupting the organization without achieving a real
increase in fighting capability; simply to be seen to outside
audiences as “doing something.” The Pentomic reorganization of the 1950s was perhaps the clearest recent example
of such a misplaced impulse.
The shallow axis is equally undesirable because too slow
a rate of change may miss the revolution altogether. For
years after World War I the tank was widely seen as an
infantry support weapon, though hindsight proved its value
as a primary instrument of maneuver. When the dynamics
of the battlefield change rapidly—and we believe such
change is occurring now—so also must the rate of
adaptation. Rapid military change is not unprecedented.
But too often in the past, its driving impulse has been prior
defeat. We believe effective adaptation is possible without
that unpleasant incentive.
As a general observation, near-term change tends to
focus on force structure and equipment. Planning for more
distant futures tends to concern capabilities and
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possibilities—the how rather than the who or what. While
pragmatic near-term planners try to improve existing
systems, longer-term visionaries can deal in theory and
emerging capabilities in a more abstract fashion. The
challenge is linking the two without allowing the present to
consume the future, or the vision to become intellectually
sterile. While focusing on capabilities, AAN seeks at the
same time to think through the organizational and human
changes that will be required to exploit those capabilities.
THE PROCESS OF CHANGE: MID- AND
LONG-RANGE
TRADOC’s commander once commented that the AAN
was about “ideas, not concepts.” That is a succinct
description of AAN’s orientation. The AAN Project has
become a laboratory—part technology-oriented, part
military science—in which the Army works with other
services and agencies of government, academic institutions,
and civilian industry to build ideas about the future. AAN
differs perhaps from the efforts of other futures groups in
that its participants take extra care to subject ideas to both
the considered experience of military history and the
analytical rigor of state-of-the-art gaming.
AAN is the flagship program among several studies
whose purpose is to assist the Army’s leaders to establish
priorities and earmark resources to maintain force
readiness today and in the future. The findings and
analyses developed by the AAN Project and provided to the
planners of the DCSOPS Office of Strategy, Plans, and
Policy help set the more distant parameters that will guide
Army long-range planning.
As a result of this year’s study, a more complete
understanding of the Army’s long-range process of change is
beginning to emerge. In general, the process divides into
three armies: the current force, the programmed force, and
the potential force.
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The current force is today’s Army in the field, ready to
fight. TRADOC’s obligation to this army is training and
doctrine. Pursuant to that obligation, TRADOC soon will
publish the newest edition of FM 100-5, Operations, the
Army’s keystone doctrinal manual, last revised in 1993.
The second force falls under TRADOC’s combat
developments responsibility. Roughly equivalent to the
programmed force, it is the army in near-term development,
which is undergoing upgrades to existing systems in order
to take advantage of new technologies and opportunities
immediately available for organizational improvement.
This force falls within the influence of the Program
Objective Memorandum, which tends to lock large
programs within a 5-to-7-year period to compete within the
budget process. The programmed force is aimed at the
midterm future. In 1940, this would have been the
Louisiana Maneuver force. Today, it is Army XXI.
TRADOC’s battle labs were established specifically to
extend as far as possible the period of experimentation
within the POM’s influence. Programmed force
development is guided by TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5 and
addresses the familiar TRADOC requirements: doctrine,
training, leaders, organizations, materiel, and soldiers.
The third or potential force is the one with which AAN is
primarily concerned. Here the focus shifts from
improvement of fielded capabilities to long-term research
and development programs; and from current and
programmed force structures to as-yet-unspecified
capabilities associated with our emerging vision of future
warfare. Implied is a similar shift from the sorts of Cold War
challenges that shaped the creation of today’s Army, to the
more ambiguous and variegated global military challenges
likely to confront America and her allies in the next century.
Hence, while some of the associated technologies may be
revolutionary, the potential force itself should be viewed
essentially as the next logical step in a continuing
adaptation of military capabilities to the changing
dynamics of war and requirements of national security.
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Next summer TRADOC will publish a new pamphlet, 525-6,
that will capture the emerging ideas of AAN in order to help
the senior leadership craft its vision of future warfighting.
The pamphlet will serve as the Army’s distant beacon to
guide the combat developments process for the mid- to
long-term future.
Because of this anticipatory function, AAN furnishes the
primary link to other DOD agencies engaged in long-term
development—for example, Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency projects and various Defense Science Board
studies. As with AAN, such efforts typically aim well beyond
DTLOMS and frequently push the outer bounds of
practicality. Moreover, because the potential force is not
hostage to the POM, it represents the most promising
opportunity for true integration with sister service
concepts, such as the Air Force’s ultra-high-altitude UAV
and the Marine Corps’ small-unit operations study.
The wellspring of AAN is the Army leadership’s vision of
the role and function of land power in the 30-year future and
beyond. AAN’s four broad areas of study all seek to clarify
developments in geopolitics, military art, human and
organizational issues, and technology that are today only
dimly perceived, and then integrate those insights with
those of other services into a cohesive joint view of future
warfare. At the same time, AAN is closely connected with
futures programs in DOD and other government agencies,
including partnerships with AAN franchise programs in the
U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command (SSDC),
U.S. Army Special Operations Command, and TRADOC’s
Combined Arms Support Command.
In sum, AAN’s objective is to provide the Army’s
leadership the raw materiel for a vision of war, and thus of
land-power’s role, in the 30-year future. To accomplish that
objective, the AAN process must be continuous, year after
year, so that the Army’s vision is always extended and
linked to developments in other services. Provided it
remains solidly connected to technological and
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organizational development, such a process is the Army’s
best assurance of a smooth and effective glide path to the
future.
A GEOSTRATEGIC VIEW OF 2025
The most difficult yet essential aspect of defining
land-power capabilities 30 years in the future is forecasting
the security requirements those capabilities must satisfy.
Clearly, we cannot predict with precision the future
geostrategic condition of a world that even today is changing
at an unprecedented pace. We can however recognize those
enduring national interests that any future land power
force must be able to support.
AMERICAN NATIONAL INTERESTS THROUGH
2025
For the purpose of AAN studies, interests subdivide into
vital and important. The boundary between these
categories is neither rigid nor immutable, particularly since
statesmen have a habit of transmuting important into vital
interests when the former are challenged. But the
categories at least help distinguish objectives for which the
nation is willing to risk unlimited liability from others
whose importance tends to be more circumstantial. Among
vital interests, AAN recognizes—

•

Deterrence and prevention of nuclear, biological, or
chemical attack on the United States and its allies,
and continuing reduction of the threat of such
attack. Implied is the maintenance of effective
control over formerly Soviet nuclear weapons and
weapons-usable materiel.

•

Prevention of the rise of a powerful, hostile
hegemony in Asia or Europe. Implied are the
continued safety, freedom, and prosperity of friendly
nations in both regions, maintenance and
improvement of effective alliances like NATO, and
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deterrence of hostile ambitions on the part of any
potential aggressor.

•

Continued unhindered access by the United States
and our allies to global resources—especially energy
resources—essential to our economic health.

In addition to these overriding interests, the United
States will continue to pursue objectives that are less vital,
but still important enough to justify the selective use of
force. Examples might include preventing the emergence of
a hostile regional hegemony in the Persian Gulf and maintaining the peace and security of the Korean peninsula, the
Taiwan Straits, and the South China Sea. The U.S. will also
continue current efforts to suppress and combat
international terrorism, drug trafficking, and transnational
crime.
Given these interests, the United States can be expected
to remain heavily involved in the world of 2025—a leader in
both multinational and bilateral defense arrangements and
an active promoter, as we are today, of democratic
principles, free market economies, and human rights. Were
the United States to renounce global leadership and turn
inward as we did in the 1930s, the effect would be felt
profoundly throughout the world, creating a power vacuum
almost certain to produce uncertainty and unrest—
historical precursors of global conflict.
There is, however, no reason today to suppose that the
United States will turn inward even if we could. On the
contrary, every indication is that we will continue to
maintain sufficient power to play a decisive international
role. Thus AAN assumes a world in which the United States
remains engaged, retaining the military power to support
regional alliances and to deter or defeat major military
competitors. In this year’s studies and war games, our
analytical focus was on hypothetical challenges to vital
interests in 2021. This summer, the study effort will expand
to include examination of potential conflicts involving
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America’s strategic challenge is to prepare for the
rise of a major military competitor.
less-than-vital interests. The following chart summarizes
the expected features of the threat spectrum associated
with pursuit of both vital and important national interests
during the next 30 years.
RISE OF A MAJOR MILITARY COMPETITOR
From the beginning, the AAN Project has found
problems with the term peer competitor. While a mirrorimage peer may serve DOD and service programmatic
objectives, AAN believes that the term major military
competitor better characterizes the military challenge to the
United States for the next 30 years.
Peer competitor implies the mirror-image, actionreaction stasis inherited from the Cold War. In fact, due to
disparities in disposable wealth and the competence of the
American technological base, current U.S. military
superiority will continue to discourage would-be aggressors
from engaging in head-to-head competition. Today, already
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seven years into the new millennium, evidence indicates
that many states concede U.S. technical dominance and
have sought alternative strategies to neutralize U.S.
strengths. These states do not seem particularly concerned
with the acquisition of sophisticated, state-of-the art
weaponry. They are inclined to purchase weapons that
provide relatively cheap counters against our air and sea
systems such as land and sea mines, distributed air defense,
coastal seacraft, submarines, inexpensive cruise and
ballistic missiles, and unsophisticated weapons of mass
destruction. Such strategies offer a less sophisticated
enemy the ability to dampen, delay, and disrupt the
high-tech offensive power of an advanced military force
without the inherent expense of purchasing battlefield
symmetry. These states will likely offset technological
inferiority with asymmetric approaches, which might well
include the ability to field mass armies, to incite popular
will, and to exploit the inherent strength of the strategic
defensive.
Control or deterrence of military hostilities will
undoubtedly remain an objective of future American
national defense policy. Furthermore, AAN believes that
there is a high probability that one or more major military
competitors will arise by 2025. For purposes of this study,
AAN defines major military competition as “first-tier state
with a modernized military establishment and cultural and
strategic predilections counter to the vital interests of the
United States or its allies.”
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY IN 2025
Ideally, the pursuit of national interests is translated
into action through a coherent national security strategy
that balances requirements against capabilities. AAN
assumes that U.S. national security strategy through 2025
will continue to exhibit a fundamental continuity. While
incorporating new capabilities and operational techniques,
U.S. military forces will continue to support allies, deter
potential adversaries, and respond as required to
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unforeseen military and humanitarian contingencies.
Forward-based forces will continue to play a vital role in
supporting these objectives, not only in terms of their
operational effectiveness, but even more importantly as the
clearest demonstration possible of U.S. national will and
commitment to the defense of its allies and interests. Yet, as
events in the recent past have shown, even the best
positioned and most potent military force can fail to deter,
particularly if an opponent misjudges American resolve
because of his own ignorance or cultural bias. Therefore,
actual or threatened military aggression will usually
require the deployment of major fighting forces from the
United States directly into threatened regions to resolve the
issue.
MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE IN 2025
The proliferation of precision weaponry by 2025 will
expand the battlespace enormously in terms of size and
lethality—conditions that will favor the defense.
Additionally, the ability to see the battlefield more clearly
through information technology will heighten the
defender’s advantage by making attacking forces easier to
detect and by allowing the defender to mass battlefield fires
and other effects more accurately. This year’s AAN war
games indicate that, unless the speed of movement
increases substantially, those improvements in detection
and the precision-fire delivery will make offensive action
infinitely more difficult.
Fortunately, knowledge—battlefield information—is a
two-edged sword. Mating superior knowledge with speed of
movement can provide the means to frustrate the defender’s
ability to acquire and mass fires and thus allow an attacker
to cross the deadly zone intact to accomplish an
operationally decisive maneuver. Since operational art, by
definition, entails employing tactical successes to achieve
strategic ends, increasing the speed of movement across all
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three levels of warfare must become the driving imperative
of future military development.
THE FY 1997 WAR GAME SERIES
During FY 97, AAN conducted a series of futuristic war
games to frame strategic and operational issues likely to
influence war against a major competitor in 2020. The three
TRADOC-organized war games consisted of operationallevel, force-on-force games at the TRADOC Analysis Center
at Fort Leavenworth (the Leavenworth Games), the Winter
War Game at Carlisle Barracks (WWG 97), and a series of
excursions derived from the WWG to provide a sensitivity
check of the WWG major events. All games were openended, free-play exercises with an active and unfettered
Red force. All services participated. The WWG included
world-class representatives from the executive branch,
industry, academia, the military, and other government
agencies.
The games played a 2020 Blue force capable of orderof-magnitude increases in speed, which we propose can only
be achieved by rotating the traditional two-dimensional
orientation of land forces upward into the atmosphere and
space. A more refined understanding of the character of this
force emerged during the course of the war-game series. An
independent contractor associated with the DOD
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) study effort
constructed a hypothetical Red force designed to present an
asymmetric threat to U.S. 2020 force structure.
THE LEAVENWORTH GAMES
The Leavenworth games explored force-on-force combat
between notional forces at the tactical and operational
levels. The principal objective was to develop a basis for
determining conflict resolution in the WWG. Four
subgames took place. The first pitted an Army XXI division
against a Red 2020 force. The second and third placed a Blue
2020 force in opposition to the Red force in two different
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combinations of terrain. The last evaluated enhanced
Marine Corps capabilities against the Red force. The games
involved four variables: terrain, including urbanized areas;
size and posture of the enemy force; support available but
located outside the engagement area; and the level and
quality of information dominance on both sides.
The principal finding of the Leavenworth games was
that mobility, characterized predominantly by speed of
maneuver, proved to be the most important factor
contributing to battlefield success. Further, battlefield
knowledge actually enabled speed, though the precise
relationship to date remains difficult to determine. To help
isolate the contribution of knowledge to combat outcomes,
the AAN staff defined three tiers of relative battlefield
knowledge. A tier-one force possessed limited knowledge of
the enemy plan and intent, but could achieve information
dominance for specific periods of time; this force could
exploit certain limited windows of opportunity. With
tier-two capabilities, a force could understand significant
aspects of the enemy’s plan, could recognize his intentions
at key decision points, and could react to take advantage of
those decisions. With tier-three capabilities, the force could
see the enemy as an organizational whole, including his
pattern of operations, task organization, phasing and
tempo; in short, Blue could understand Red’s intent and
could develop and execute a plan to counter that intent. The
introduction of a force capable of tier-three knowledge
superiority changed the time cycles and patterns of
maneuver between opposing forces fundamentally and
dramatically; Blue could enter the engagement more
quickly, achieve decisions more rapidly, finish the fight
faster, and reengage the enemy elsewhere. The
Leavenworth games offered the following insights.
Maneuver
A significant finding of the AAN war games was that
superior knowledge permits a commander to apply each
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discrete part of his force in a single simultaneous act of
overwhelming fire and maneuver. Knowledge dominance on
the battlefield will allow a dramatic increase in the speed of
maneuver. A relationship exists between knowledge and
precision that permits maneuver forces to employ an
ambush dynamic against opponents on an almost routine
basis. Precision in maneuver might take any number of
forms. One example is highly refined targeting and
maneuver directed against individual enemy elements by
small units moving at great speed under leaders following
mission orders. After several game turns, the Red
commander knew that a Blue force with knowledge
advantage and speed was unstoppable, and that his only
options were to hold in place and concede or execute a series
of disjointed, uncoordinated attacks and suffer defeat in
detail. In either case, the practical result on the battlefield
was always the same: immediate and dramatic disintegration.
Blue forces employed an air-ground tactical method of
maneuver that combined lighter surface fighting vehicles
with advanced airframes capable of transporting them at
speeds as great as 200 kilometers per hour over distances in
excess of 1500 kilometers. This method allowed, among
other things, a more extensive use of the vertical dimension
of the battlespace which, coupled with superior levels of
information dominance, permitted greater speed and
precision in maneuver. Terrain came to serve a protective
and concealing function without restricting mobility; and
the resultant ability to accelerate movement through the
battle zone enhanced force survivability by frustrating the
enemy’s capability to detect, track, and engage Blue forces.
Asymmetric Responses
Red’s learning curve rose sharply as the games
progressed. Confronted by overwhelming combat power, he
resorted to asymmetric responses in an effort to offset Blue’s
advantages. He recognized early on that Blue’s superiority,
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particularly in firepower and information dominance,
eroded over time. Any action that heightened ambiguity or
complexity, and thus increased the time Blue needed to gain
control of the situation, benefited Red. Therefore, Red
moved rapidly to complex terrain—urban, suburban, and,
in some cases, forests and mountains. He used his limited
information warfare capabilities to slow Blue maneuver
through electronic warfare and deception. Although Red
lost, his asymmetric responses partially succeeded: he
managed to degrade Blue’s precision, to slow his operational
tempo, and to significantly increase the damage to the Blue
force. The lesson is obvious. For the 2020 Blue forces, time is
the worst of enemies.
THE WINTER WAR GAME
The strategic, or winter, war game forms the capstone
event in the annual AAN cycle. This year’s WWG focused on
the whole realm of political, strategic, and operational
levels of a most vital war in 2020 to identify issues related to
the changing character of warfare in about 2025.
The Blue force employed in the WWG represented a
multifunctional total army concept. It consisted of Special
Operations Forces providing an essential global scout
function, forward-deployed Army XXI forces performing
deterrence and condition-setting roles, a global strike force
composed of AAN battle forces, and a force of decision
consisting of CONUS-based Army XXI units operating as a
consolidating force that insured the ability to fight
sustained combat should the campaign last longer than
expected or take an unexpected turn. In effect, the WWG
Blue force represented an army in transition, from the Army
XXI legacy force to the notional 2020 AAN battle force of the
Leavenworth games.
A portion of the legacy force was deployed in Europe, but
scattered in partnership-for-peace packets—so dispersed as
to offer the capacity for only limited resistance when Red
began threatening aggression. Modernized 2020 forces were
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concentrated in CONUS, with the exception of a 2020 force
deployed in Korea as part of the Army’s 2020 modernization
plan. Special Operations Forces were present in Europe
prior to hostilities. They established close and trusting
relationships with nontreaty states in the region and this
provided the glue that held together a quickly assembled
coalition of warfighting partners. They also provided the
first reliable theater-level eyes-on-target and helped
prepare for the arrival of Blue forces. In deployment into
battle, the Blue 2020 forces reached conflict termination
before the legacy systems could close on the theater. The
WWG offered significant insights on the influence that
speed and knowledge will have on a future battlefield.
Speed
Speed emerged once again as a dominant factor at the
strategic-political, strategic-military, and operational
levels of war. Technology’s impact on the speed of political
decision making during crisis complicates the National
Command Authorities’ problems of deterrence and response
and the always-difficult problems of forming coalitions of
willing allies and reluctant friends. Paradoxically, the very
capabilities that allow future forces to increase speed and
tempo may contribute to hesitation on the part of political
leaders.
Strategic speed—very rapid deployment directly into a
theater of operations—as played in the WWG allowed
political leaders and military commanders to accelerate
movement to a theater of war before the enemy can set or
make a preemptive move. In a subsequent war game
excursion, an earlier Blue deployment effectively deterred
Red’s aggression. Concerns emerged during the game over
an obvious disparity between the strategic speed of an AAN
force—arriving from CONUS ready to fight within 48
hours—and the follow-on CONUS-based Army XXI force.
To allow the ability both to preempt an enemy from setting
his force in a theater and to continue unrelenting sustained
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pressure over time, the projection schemes of both forces
should be seamless and firmly joined. It became clear
during the game that by 2020 a mature Army XXI force
must be much more projectable than heavy forces are today,
inferring perhaps the requirement to move globally from a
staging point to a distant battlefield in no less than two
weeks. Also the war game reinforced the observation that
most of the information technologies inherent in AAN
should be present in an Army XXI force to ensure that both
can act in harmony on the battlefield and collectively exploit
the advantages of a knowledge-based force.
The challenge of connecting the deployment of forces
with dramatically different strategic speeds was
exacerbated by the requirement that arose during the game
to approach the theater by infiltration rather than by
staging. During the Leavenworth games, it became
apparent that even when opposed by an enemy possessing
primitive weapons of mass destruction, the risk of mass
casualties prohibited the use of major ports and airfields.
The enemy quickly realized that his greatest opportunity
for success when facing a force of such enormous capability
was to defeat him before arrival in theater. Therefore,
early-arriving AAN forces were obliged to set down at
scattered locations deep inside the theater of war just
beyond the reach of the enemy’s operational forces.
Operationally, the WWG suggests that sequenced
operations, as understood today, should occur in a more
seamless and simultaneous manner at theater level,
melding the application of firepower and maneuver into a
single culminating act and thereby reducing the duration of
campaigns from months to days or hours.
The geostrategic position of the United States has
committed the Army in this century to rely on strategic
maneuver to win wars on the ground. The major difference
between General Marshall’s concepts of power projection in
1942 and the Army’s of 2025 is the speed with which forces
can be deployed and employed in a single, unrelenting,
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sustained act of global maneuver. Early discussions of
global force projection indicate that the worldwide structure
that will enable Army forces of 2025 to conduct high-tempo
strategic maneuver must be in place prior to deployment.
The early placement of logistics, communications, and
intelligence may play a more significant role in the pace and
effectiveness of strategic maneuver than the deployment of
the fighting force itself.
Logistics in the WWG, the Leavenworth games, and the
war-game excursions were played primarily as a function of
deployment. AAN’s hypotheses, which require further
testing in FY 98, posit that to achieve the speed necessary to
cross the deadly zone intact, operational-level forces require
a radically streamlined logistical tail. Second,
strategic-level deployment requires new technologies and
methods of projection that get a fighting force from its
CONUS base into combat in a few days. Current
deployment systems, based on an outmoded Cold War view
of strategic maneuver, will only present the enemy with
targets in a precision-rich theater of war.
Knowledge Sensitivity
In the WWG, Red reacted to Blue’s deployment by
immediately attacking the systems that Blue relied on for
knowledge dominance, especially space-based systems.
Reds all-out attack in space caused policy and warfighting
dilemmas for Blue. The erosion of Blue’s ability to use
space-based assets would have, over time, significantly
reduced Blue’s knowledge advantage. As it happened,
Blue’s war with Red ended before attrition of space assets
could influence events on the battlefield. Forces already in
contact mitigated the loss of satellites to some extent by
using organic means, such as high-altitude UAVs, to
maintain tactical knowledge dominance. Strategically and
at the theater level, however, the loss of specific systems
would have had a cumulatively harmful, though not
disastrous, effect. Blue’s Pacific campaign against Pink,
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just getting underway when the game ended, was partially
blinded by Red’s actions. The effect on global logistics would
have been felt immediately. A subsequent war-game
excursion that varied the nature of Red’s attack on
space-based assets did not materially affect the outcome of
the game. Nonetheless, in both war games Red commanders
understood how vital information dominance was to Blue
force effectiveness. Both aggressively sought to collapse
Blue’s protective shield of knowledge. The insights from the
games suggest a serious need to protect information flow
through robust, resilient, and redundant infrastructures
that can be reinforced with a bodyguard of deception and
disinformation and easily regenerated if damaged.
EMERGING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE FORCE
Thus far, AAN study results indicate that success on the
2025 battlefield will require force characteristics that
emphasize a robust surface-to-space continuum, split-based
operations, interdependence, hybrid forces, and mature
leaders leading cohesive units.
Surface-to-Space Continuum: The New High
Ground
In order to achieve the degree of knowledge dominance
and operational speed postulated in this paper, by 2025 the
Army must have shifted upward from its traditional
two-dimensional spatial orientation of land forces into the
vertical or third dimension. In particular, the deep-strike
operational maneuver function must be able to occupy the
third dimension from just above the surface through the
exosphere into space. Future land combat units will exploit
terrain by maneuvering for tactical advantage within the
folds and undulations of the earth’s surface without
suffering the restrictions imposed on mobility by contact
with the ground.
The vertical component should also include tactical
UAVs, exospheric long endurance UAVs, and space vehicles
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in various orbital configurations extending to
geosynchronous orbits. This constellation of aerial vehicles
should allow traditionally land-bound functions—
intelligence, all forms of communications, and fire support
delivered from unmanned platforms orbiting continuously
above close combat forces—to move upward. Many of the
elements in the continuum will come from other services
and from the civilian telecommunications industry.
Split-Based Operations
A robust surface-to-space continuum—consisting of a
constellation of UAVs and space-based telecommunications
satellites—will also permit an order-of-magnitude
reduction in the size of the tactical force arrayed in close
contact with the enemy. Reach-out communications,
intelligence, and fire support, combined with just-in-time
and just-what’s needed logistics, will eliminate all baggage
not directly related to closing with or gaining positional
advantage over the enemy. To achieve a relative degree of
protection and security, support units will operate from
separate locations, possibly hundreds of kilometers from
the theater, beyond the effective range of weapons of mass
destruction.
Interdependence
Time is the enemy of a force that depends on knowledge
and speed for effectiveness. The effect of time on the conduct
of battle is corrosive and gradual rather than dramatic. As
we learned in the Leavenworth games and subsequent
analyses, the shock effect upon which much of the
effectiveness of U.S. combat power depends dissipates as
the enemy becomes inured to the psychological impact of
precision fire and learns to lessen its destructive effects
through counteraction. Also, as the Red commander
demonstrated, even a tier-three knowledge advantage
inevitably erodes as the enemy learns our patterns of
operations and begins to predict our actions.
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Finally, the strategic game suggested that in a future era
of informal and ad hoc military relationships, coalitions
may become more difficult to create and harder to maintain
once combat begins. Lingering too long on the battlefield
opens the opportunity for an enemy to split an opposing
coalition. Saddam Hussein taught this lesson very well.
Therefore, in 2025 even more than today, U.S. forces will
not be able to afford linear, sequential campaigns that
require discrete staging and phasing. To defeat this
corrosive enemy of time, the operational level of war must be
pushed toward the execution of near-simultaneous
campaigns that, at the theater-operational level, will take
on the characteristic of a coup de main. Operational
acceleration of this magnitude can only be achieved by
moving beyond joint toward interdependent operations.
Interdependence suggests the need for a level of
interoperability between land, sea, and aerospace mediums
that will allow a near-simultaneous application of precision
fires and maneuver applied in a broad pattern of effects that
strike and check the enemy everywhere he can be seen and
engaged. Sequenced campaigns, depicted today by delivery
schedules and broad arrows on a map, will be replaced by an
expansive takedown operation where the enemy’s will to
resist collapses when he finds himself smothered by fire and
surrounded everywhere by maneuver forces occupying
positions of advantage.
Interdependence also has programmatic implications.
AAN believes force structures of the 2025 time period will
also need to be interdependent, that is, whole functions may
migrate from one service structure to another in favor of
speed, agility, and economy. For example, space-based
systems may well provide communications and other
functions now associated with land systems. If this model
holds up, quite possibly future land forces may require less
expense to field and operate than previous Army forces.
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Hybrid Forces
The U.S. Army has always gone to war as a hybrid force.
Traditionally, dissimilar forces—heavy and light, regular
and reserve, legacy and modern—have fought side by side.
The problem in the past has been to get the most out of such
a disparate force. In the Winter War Game, the total land
force that Blue employed consisted of a mix of Army XXI
units and AAN battle forces. In the environment postulated
for 2025, the capabilities of these forces complemented each
other very well. AAN battle forces executed rapid, strategic
maneuver, while Army XXI units functioned as a force of
decision, providing the total force with heft, flexibility, and a
hedge against uncertainty. The challenge in this scheme
will be to ensure a proper fit between the early-deploying
AAN force and the slower-deploying Army XXI forces. While
the former must arrive quickly to collapse the enemy, the
latter must possess enough strategic agility to follow
immediately behind to guarantee unrelenting long-term
pressure on the enemy and to limit risk to the early arriving
force.
The Human Dimension
Although discussed in greater detail further in this
report, the human dimension bears mentioning here as
well. AAN research indicates that battle leaders will have to
function in very compressed planning and operating cycles
and at very high tempos. Indications are that battlefields of
2020 will require cohesive units and leaders with higher
levels of maturity. This research does not necessarily mean
that the Army will require a higher leader-to-led ratio, only
that it needs a more mature, better-experienced leader and
soldier than is the norm today.
MODELING, SIMULATION, AND FUTURE GAMES
After a year of intense study, wargaming, and work with
the other services and agencies of government, it is
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becoming apparent that present-day tools and perceptions
only lead to more questions about the effects of technological
change, the human and organizational dimension of future
warfare, and the character of warfare itself.
Two-sided, open-ended war games continue to prove
their worth as research tools for framing issues in the
25-year future. Free play is essential to understanding
future warfare—even if Blue loses—because future success
at the strategic and theater levels will increasingly depend
on knowledge and other nonquantifiable advantages rather
than on the more familiar attrition models that tend to favor
bigger, more powerful forces. The key to gaming at strategic
and theater levels is to make interaction between models
and human experts as realistic as possible. WWG 1997
utilized an interactive global model with more advantages
than drawbacks, but as games increase in complexity and
focus, they will require more realistic models that
effectively stretch a combat environment from surface to
space. AAN will take this issue on as a major portion of its
1997 effort.
The Winter War Game this year postulated a war for
vital interests. Consequently, game play centered at the
most violent and intense end of the conventional scale of
warfare. The AAN study group recognizes that to meet the
needs of American defense policy in 2020, the Army must be
extraordinarily capable, to be sure, but it must also be
adaptable enough to be useful at the lower end of the conflict
spectrum. Intuitively, an AAN force built around knowledge
and speed would seem to possess characteristics essential to
prevail in a conflict for “less-than-vital interests.”
Exceptional mobility across inhospitable terrain, speed of
deployment, and the ability to observe with exceptional
clarity and to maneuver and strike with great precision all
give promise that the AAN battle force postulated here
would be decisive in stability and security operations
against a less sophisticated enemy. The Summer War Game
(SWG 1997) has been designed to test this hypothesis under
conditions differing markedly from AAN games to date. The
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Army Special Operations Command will play as equal
partners in this important exercise, and AAN will provide
an analysis of the game separately and in the June 1998
report.
SOLDIERS AND UNITS IN 2025
The war games demonstrated that Blue’s tactical
success depended to a great extent on his ability to execute
decentralized operations. His strategic and tactical speed
would have required an exceptional degree of mental agility
and psychological resilience. We believe that the
development of these qualities by 2025 will require nothing
less than a cultural change within the Army that embraces
a philosophy of decentralized action based upon a high
degree of professional trust and confidence between leaders
and led.
Situations changed quickly and sometimes dramatically
in the war games, which suggests that commanders will
have to make decisions at consistently faster rates.
Real-time battlefield knowledge may require AAN leaders
to rapidly digest and act upon an indeterminate and
ever-changing amount of information. In addition, the
heightened speed of AAN operations may generate higher
levels of physical and emotional stress, thereby creating a
greater risk of cognitive and psychological impairment.
AAN battle units employed a larger number of moving parts
functioning at higher rates of speed, which in the future
may force leaders at all levels to cope with increasing levels
of complexity. Even armed with the advantages of
sophisticated information aids, AAN leaders may find their
decision-making capacities quickly overwhelmed. To
execute the precise and dispersed maneuver that
characterized Blue operations in the tactical war games,
crews and teams will very likely be obliged to fight in a
degree of isolation far more psychologically demanding than
in past wars. The war games suggested that Blue forces
would also need a high level of mental agility and
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psychological resilience to operate effectively in discrete,
self-reliant, well-informed, autonomous small units.
EXPERIENCED LEADERS
One way the Army can achieve and maintain the mental
agility necessary for success on tomorrow’s battlefield is by
cultivating mature, highly experienced leaders. Such
leaders provide at least four benefits: 1) mastery of
increased skill sets; 2) greater experience in both command
positions and staffs; 3) a firm foundation from which to
exercise battlefield intuition; and 4) the ability to
successfully withstand higher levels of stress due to
psycholoical maturity and experience.
COHESIVE UNITS
Stable, cohesive units can provide the requisite
foundation for developing mental agility and psychological
resilience. Soldiers who train together for long periods tend
to adopt a shared view of the battlefield, to include their
environment and their unit’s ability to respond to specific
combat challenges. This shared view allows leaders, peers,
and subordinates to act effectively, with little or no
communication, even in rapidly changing situations.
Likewise, cohesive units offer the Army a greater reservoir
of psychological resilience—a safety net—that offsets, to a
great degree, battlefield fear, fatigue, stress, and isolation.
Such units remain mentally agile even under severe
circumstances. They require less supervision, handle
complex tasks effectively, and exhibit mutual trust,
confidence, and loyalty.
SOLDIER TRAINING AND EDUCATION
Synthetic training environments, in the form of virtual,
constructive, and live simulators, may allow highly effective
training under conditions both safe and, in some cases,
nearly indistinguishable from actual combat. In the future,
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newly formed units or staffs may build trust, confidence,
and a state of constant readiness by working through a
series of increasingly demanding exercises in a synthetic
environment. Live training will remain necessary in the
future to be sure. But, realistic simulators will allow live
training to be reserved for finishing exercises. The Army
should develop synthetic training to assist it in meeting the
demands of the 2025 battlefield.
AAN soldiers and their units will require higher levels of
mental agility and psychological resilience to successfully
meet tomorrow’s battlefield challenges. Experienced
leaders and cohesive units should serve as the foundation
for the Army’s effort to develop and maintain these
qualities. The goal of the AAN human and organizational
effort should be to build units capable of operating within
their optimal range while forcing the enemy to operate
beyond his own.
TECHNOLOGY: THE PATH TO KNOWLEDGE
AND SPEED
The Army of 2025 will probably differ from today’s Army
in two fundamental ways. It will achieve unprecedented
strategic and operational agility by exploiting information
technologies to create a knowledge-based Army. But to
know and see with greater clarity is not enough. The Army
must possess a complementary capacity to act on its
superior knowledge by building into its structure the
physical agility to move rapidly and adroitly across a larger
and more lethal battlefield. An essential body of
technologies is emerging that offers the potential to create a
knowledge-based army capable of strategic and operational
maneuver by 2025.
THE TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGE
The AAN study expresses tomorrow’s technological
challenges in terms of the need to achieve greater
knowledge and speed.
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Knowledge
Knowledge will proceed from a robust, redundant, and
flexible network of communications and intelligence
systems interwoven into a seamless surface-to-space
continuum. This continuum will feature nets of surface
sensors connected electronically to a series of interlinked
UAV fields, ranging from low to very high altitudes, covered
by an umbrella of space-based systems. This constellation of
systems will provide an unblinking eye capable of constant
surveillance over the battlespace and will connect the
combat force with its distant support and sustainment base.
It should serve as a living internet of connectivity
immediately responsive to soldiers on the ground.
However, as the WWG demonstrated, an adversary may
attack space systems immediately, and perhaps repeatedly,
to deny knowledge dominance. Work should therefore
continue in TRADOC and SSDC to identify specific
land-power requirements in terms of space systems and to
develop relationships that carry those needs into space
technology initiatives in other services and agencies. WWG
experience and follow-up research also indicate that low-,
mid-, and high-altitude UAVs will become essential to
maintaining knowledge dominance. Internetted UAVs
serve to thicken the communications infrastructure in the
event of a loss of space systems.
Mechanisms also must be established for both rapid
replacement of degraded systems and seamless
substitution of one information source for another. Finally,
doctrine and training must accommodate the possibility of a
degraded information environment; and soldiers, units, and
leaders must be deliberately conditioned to sustain
operational tempo notwithstanding system interruptions.
Speed
The AAN views speed in strategic, operational, and
tactical dimensions. The Army must pursue ways to
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accelerate pace of movement so that, in the tactical
dimensions, close combat forces can frustrate enemy
acquisition, targeting, and precision weaponry and, in the
operational and strategic dimensions, can rapidly counter,
check, and ultimately collapse enemy maneuver forces.
Technologies related to self-deploying tactical forces,
fast sealift, and airborne large-capacity lifting bodies
currently support the acceleration of strategic projection.
Although the Army does not develop new concepts or
vehicles for air and sealift, these capabilities will become
essential to the effective use of land power in 2025.
At the tactical and operational levels, three technologies
offer possibilities for shrinking the logistical tail of fighting
organizations. First, alternative power sources and
fuel-efficient ultrareliable fighting vehicles will allow
combat forces to operate longer and over greater distances
than today. Second, cheap precision warheads, long-range
fire support located outside the combat area, and
alternative propellants will allow reductions in the weight
and bulk of ammunition trains. Third, energy storage
systems and hybrid power systems can reduce fuel and
electrical power requirements and eliminate most of the
weight and bulk of today’s power generation and storage
systems.
In addition, future ground craft, composed of advanced,
lightweight materials, will enjoy greater firepower,
mobility, and speed. Advanced airframes will possess
increased capacities for heavy lift and tactical utility lift.
These greater lift capacities will allow a marriage of ground
and air systems that permits commanders to use the ground
tactically for cover and concealment without suffering a
degradation in mobility. Protection schemes for land power
will include a host of new active protection and signature
control systems. While the 2025 battle force will protect
itself primarily through knowledge and speed, several
emerging technologies promise to further enhance force
protection. Advances in antidotes and vaccines will reduce
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vulnerability to chemical and biological weapons. Speed
also includes rapid strategic deployment. All of the
lightening technologies already mentioned have the
potential to enhance deployability as well as battlefield
mobility. In addition, future technology must concentrate
on enhanced means of self-deployment, ultrafast sealift,
and improved high-capacity airlift. Although the Army is
not directly responsible for the last two, no service has a
greater interest in them.
THE AAN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
LINKAGES
Throughout the past year, AAN has established close
relationships with the science and technology community,
academia, and several DOD and non-DOD government
scientific agencies, most importantly, the Assistant
Secretary of the Army (RD&A), Army Materiel Command,
DARPA, HQDA DCSOPS, and members of the TRADOC
combat developments community. AAN operational
requirements influence the research efforts of the science
and technology community through these relationships.
Just as importantly, this collegial cooperation ensures that
AAN remains apprised of further emerging technologies
that might enhance its operational concepts and
requirements.
As the process matures, the AAN will become part of a
growing number of science and technology decision-making
teams. Through AAN, TRADOC has participated in the 6.1
basic research triennial review and has influenced the
direction of defense strategic resource objectives and the
creation of Army SROs. AAN has also provided a
perspective on 6.2 science and technology objectives and
advanced concepts technology demonstrations.
The Army must continue to develop partnerships within
the science and technology community to create a focused
set of technologies for future warfighting. Key among these
is DARPA, which is already working with the Army to
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explore innovative concepts and technologies that apply to
small-unit operations. As the pace of technological advance
continues to accelerate, perspicacity in acquisition will
become a strategic imperative for the Army.
THE ROAD AHEAD
Although the Army in the field is operating at a very high
tempo, the next few years will find the Army in a position of
unchallenged military superiority and with breathing space
to consider the next challenge. This window of opportunity
will not last long; perhaps by the end of the century the next
major military competitor will begin to show itself. In the
meantime, the Army can begin to reorder its house for the
challenges ahead.
Since the opportunity is fleeting, changes of the
magnitude tentatively envisioned in this report must begin
soon. Issues of force structuring and budget management
must be addressed within the tenure of this CSA if a new
force is to begin fielding around 2010. The AAN process and
its estimation of the future will continue to develop, but the
AAN staff is satisfied that the major issues outlined above
will remain valid. The challenge now is to begin to move
from ideas and vision into action.
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THE ARMY AFTER NEXT:
INTERTWINING MILITARY ART, SCIENCE,
AND TECHNOLOGY OUT TO THE YEAR 2025

Introduction
The Army After Next (AAN) Project Office at
Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) is conducting broad studies of future warfare for
the year 2025 timeframe. The purpose is to isolate the issues
vital to the development of the Army. The vision generated
from these studies will be integrated into future TRADOC
combat developments programs.
Several important dimensions motivate the focus on the
2025 timeframe for AAN. First, given our available lead
time and the rapid pace of economic development in a
number of evolving countries, it is likely that the United
States will encounter a major military competitor or, at the
very least, confront significant asymmetric threats in this
period.
Second, the year 2025 enables military art and
technology experts to divert their thinking from concepts
and capabilities associated with the programmed force of
Army 2010 to more novel approaches to achieve the AAN
vision. It also provides ample lead time to incorporate
innovative technologies and unanticipated revolutionary
discoveries into this vision.
Finally, it provides an opportunity to refocus Army basic
and applied research on efforts that have significant
potential for advancing critical AAN enabling technologies.
Thus, TRADOC’s AAN efforts will enable the Army to refine
its choices as a function of time and optimize its investment
decisions to achieve critical AAN warfighter capabilities.
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This article describes the assumptions, arguments, and
challenges that form the basis for conceptualizing the
Army’s warfighting capabilities out to the year 2025 and the
science and technology support and activities that will
enable the Army to eventually realize these capabilities.
Speed, Knowledge And The Lessons Of History
Cycles of change in warfare are particularly difficult to
comprehend and even more difficult to anticipate because,
unlike endeavors in finance, medicine, or law, active
experience in war is, thankfully, infrequent. Because
warfare is not frequently practiced, soldiers must rely on
the laboratory of past experiences to gain vicarious
experience in war. To be sure, the frenetic pace of
technological change in the modern world has compressed
the interval and stretched the amplitude of the cycles of
change. Nonetheless, undeniable cycles remain, and we
should be able to search the recent past to identify these new
cycles.
With the rise of industrial production and the
appearance of precision warmaking machinery such as
rifled weapons in the mid-19th century, technology began to
dominate patterns of change. Such weapons extended the
deadly zone, or the distance that soldiers had to cross to
engage a defender, from 150 meters in Napoleon’s day to
1,000 meters or more by the end of the American Civil War.
As the deadly zone increased by nearly a factor of 10, the
risks of crossing it were further multiplied by the lethality
induced through the precision and volume from the massive
proliferation of repeating arms. Thus, technology favored
the defender. Images of the terrible slaughter of World War
I remain as testimony to the cost in blood exacted by an
operational method that relied on a killing effect to achieve
decisive results.
The Germans first conceptualized the solution in 1918,
and it was deceptively simple: short, highly intense doses of
firepower to prepare the assault, small units to exploit the
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shock effect of firepower to infiltrate and bypass centers of
resistance, and operational formations to move through
exposed points of weakness and push deep into enemy lines.
After the war, the further development of the internal
combustion engine provided the means to translate the
theory into effective action and restore the dominance of the
offensive. Motorized armored vehicles allowed soldiers to
cross the deadly zone protected by enormously greater
speed while employing blitzkrieg to gain victory. This was
achieved through psychological paralysis induced by
movement, rather than through butchery induced by
massive application of firepower.
After World War II, the challenge was to halt a
Soviet-style blitzkrieg across the Northern German Plain.
Tactical forces needed defensive killing power to absorb the
initial Soviet-armored shock and hold their defensive
positions. This led to the defensive forces’ return to
dominance. The operational problem, however, was to
strike deep offensively below the rate of arrival of follow-on
armored forces at the front line. The resulting AirLand
Battle Doctrine of the 1980s suggested a swing of the
pendulum back toward offensive forces. Operation Desert
Storm added momentum to the pendulum swing with
ground and air forces overwhelming static defenses with
unprecedented speed and intensity. Nonetheless, even
Desert Storm produced troubling hints that evolving
defensive systems threaten to reimpose strategic and
operational paralysis. Iraq’s SCUD missile attacks on Saudi
Arabia and Israel, had they been more accurate or included
chemical or biological warheads, might have strengthened
Iraq’s defense considerably. The proliferation of such
systems will substantially raise the stakes of future
interventions.
Two key attributes of future U.S. Armed Forces, if
harmoniously developed, would firmly re-establish the
dominance of the offensive forces. The information
revolution will likely allow us to define and track the
elements of a force with exquisite clarity and detail, but
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knowledge of the enemy, alone, is not enough. We must
possess the means to act on what we know, and action
depends on speed. The combination of knowledge and speed
of movement will allow a future battle force to anticipate
enemy movement and turn costly force-on-force
engagements of past wars into surer and less costly
engagements by choice.
Much like the evolution of military and private sector
capabilities in the 20th century, an important physical
parameter influencing the Army After Next is the
compression of time. For the Army, this means taking
advantage of future advancements in information
technologies while concurrently increasing speed or
equivalently reducing the time required to strategically
deploy, tactically maneuver, traverse the killing zone,
deliver metal on target, and provide timely logistic support
to the battleforce. To that end, information technologies will
allow us to position outside the combat zone all but those
forces necessary to move, observe, and kill.
The imperative for speed in this new form of warfare
begins at home ports, airfields, and installations. A highly
lethal force, shorn of its Cold War impedimenta, will be able
to project itself from the homeland or from strategic points
overseas in days rather than weeks or months and arrive in
the operational theater ready to fight. Strategic speed will
allow theater war to take the form of a coup de main.
Our goal in applying firepower must be to exploit its
substantial paralytic effects to gain advantage. To win
quickly and decisively at low cost in the future, we must
have the means to conduct the battle quickly and end it
cleanly, preferably at the moment when the paralytic effect
of firepower is greatest. Victory is best guaranteed through
maneuver of forces on the ground. Psychological collapse,
the breaking of an enemy’s will to resist, comes when an
opponent is challenged and blocked at all points. A
commander with the dual advantage of speed of maneuver
and killing power will dominate the battlefield. If these two
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essential elements of combat power are orchestrated
skillfully, an unfettered battle force will be able to strike
multiple vital points simultaneously or in a sequence of
their choosing. In a very short time, perhaps only hours,
such a force would be able to quickly disintegrate an
enemy’s warfighting structures, producing an unequivocal
military decision with minimum cost.
The fourth cycle of war, therefore, should seek to exploit
the information age to increase the velocity of maneuver.
Speed must be the essential ingredient of a future
landpower force. Speed will be achieved by creating a highly
mobile force unimpeded by terrain and unburdened by an
agility sapping logistical yoke. To achieve the speed of
maneuver necessary to wage 21st Century knowledgebased warfare will require a new concept of mechanized
warfare that will free forces of maneuver inhibiting
restrictions. The exploitation of knowledge via increased air
and ground mobility will result in unprecedented tactical
and operational maneuverability.
Such “air mechanized” battle units would be mechanized
combined arms echelons of maneuver capable of air assault
to operational depths to attack regimental size units and
defend against division sized attacks. These units and the
personnel and systems they contain will combine extreme
speed with superior knowledge to provide precise
maneuverability that takes optimum advantage of deadly
accurate firepower. The employment of more maneuverable
air mechanized battle forces in advance of potent Army XXI
forces would create the capacity for 21st Century strategic
blitzkrieg. Once again, offensive forces would dominate
warfare.
Intertwining To The Year 2025 And Beyond.
The process for intertwining military art and technology
for the AAN is depicted in Figure 1. This process is
comprehensive, highly coordinated, and relies on
significant levels of cooperation among its participants. It
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Figure 1.
Science and technology support to the Army After
Next development process.
starts with the annual AAN strategic and tactical war
games that explore and assess novel concepts of operations
and capabilities and then pass through a number of
coordinated technology activities and eventually feed back
into the AAN war games. This nonlinear process continues
until the AAN military art innovations and proposed
supporting technologies and systems converge to a feasible,
affordable, and militarily significant set of AAN
capabilities.
One important output of each yearly cycle of this process
is a TRADOC-approved short list of critical AAN enabling
technologies that is used to establish new AAN Science and
Technology Objectives (STOs) that directly involve private
sector participation. This is designed to cultivate a growing
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private sector involvement in advancing technologies in
support of challenging AAN capabilities.
Very early in the AAN study process, the Army
recognized that team building among the military art and
technology experts was crucial to the overall success of the
AAN effort. This observation led to the concept of Integrated
Idea Teams (IITs). The objective of these teams is to assess,
from a technological perspective, the concepts, capabilities,
and notional systems, including tradeoffs, that support
AAN operational characteristics and ideas developed
through AAN war games. IITs are managed by the Army
Materiel Command (AMC) through the Army Research
Laboratory (ARL) and are composed of technical experts
from Army laboratories, National Laboratories, the private
sector, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) and the other Services, and academia, as well as
those more involved in the military art side of the AAN.
Once the IIT has developed such concepts, these notional
system concept designs are then played in
force-on-force/system-of-systems high resolution modeling
and simulation exercises conducted in collaboration with
Rand Corporation, the TRADOC Analysis Center (TRAC),
TRADOC, the IIT, and Office of the Assistant Secretary of
the Army for Research, Development and Acquisition
(OASARDA). The purpose of this is to assess the military
significance of these systems within a larger set of
warfighting systems and to determine system performance
parameters that make a difference on the battlefield. This
effort recognizes that maximizing individual system
performance does not necessarily result in a more capable
and affordable system.
The final step in this process is to assess the feasibility
and affordability of selected concepts through a team of
experts from the military laboratories, national
laboratories, the private sector, and academia. The
objective of this effort is to evaluate the IIT notional system
designs, in concert with the above force-on-force results,
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with respect to feasibility (laws of physics, maturity of
concept, and schedule) and affordability (development cost,
production cost, operations and support costs, and
leveraging with the private sector and the other Services
and agencies). This effort also provides positive feedback to
the IIT on their notional system concept designs. These
assessments are then forwarded to TRADOC for review and
assessment, and the results are used to decide on the role of
these notional system concept designs in the next round of
the AAN war games.
An example of an emerging insight from the AAN war
gaming that was fleshed out through the IIT process is the
concept of air mechanization, which was mentioned earlier.
To achieve the requisite speed and agility, 21st Century air
mechanization will have to derive from new combinations of
air and ground vehicles. A plausible option to provide the
tactical and operational maneuverability required for the
21st Century is to include an advanced airframe designed to
be both a lifting and fighting vehicle. It would be able to lift,
conformably, members of a family of light advanced ground
vehicles with long-range, lightweight, highly accurate
armaments. The advanced airframe would connect quickly
to an advanced ground vehicle while its crew remains
inside. The advanced airframe would transport the vehicle
anywhere on the battlefield out to a combat radius within
hours and deploy it combat ready. In addition to lifting
advanced ground vehicles, the advanced airframe would lift
or employ a variety of other mission modules.
All advanced ground vehicles would rarely be required to
face main battle tanks head-on, which makes it possible to
limit their weight by reducing the need for heavy armor.
They will survive through a combination of speed, agility,
active protection, signature management and control,
comprehensive situational understanding, terrain
masking, deception, and indirect fire. Greater ground speed
on and off roads will be possible because of advanced
suspension systems, power trains, and engines. Greater
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fuel economies will result from significant weight reduction
and advanced propulsion system designs.
Thus far, the AAN study has focused on the challenging
air mechanization concept involving a high-speed tiltrotor
and several versions of a lightweight, highly lethal, mobile
companion ground craft. This concept addresses the
following: the need to overcome the limitations of ground
vehicle speed by transporting the ground craft at high speed
via the tiltrotor within theater; the need for a lightweight
ground craft to limit the size of the tiltrotor; and the need to
overcome the possible absence of an airfield in theater
through the self-deployment of the tiltrotor and ground
craft combination from CONUS. This system approach to
the AAN air mechanization concept has not completed its
first cycle through the AAN process depicted in Figure 1.
However, the results so far are very encouraging. The first
complete assessment will occur sometime in the summer of
1998.
In addition to this process, a complementary set of
activities involving the Army Science Board (ASB) and the
National Research Council’s Board on Army Science and
Technology (BAST) are currently under way. The ASB is
investigating opportunities to advance strategic
deployment capabilities out to the year 2025, while the
BAST is constructing an investment roadmap for the Army
Basic and Applied Research Programs for the development
of technologies that will significantly reduce logistics
demand. Finally, OASARDA, in partnership with
TRADOC, is planning to initiate a series of technologybased war games that will assist in determining the most
productive investment options to support AAN capabilities.
Conclusions
We believe the Army has seized upon a highly
compelling vision of its future role in land warfare. It has
also carefully thought through a comprehensive process
that will determine the key science and technology
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investments enabling it to achieve this vision. The process
the Army has created to navigate into the future is working
very well. The future Army and the United States will be the
beneficiaries of this cooperative but challenging effort.1
ENDNOTE
1. The authors would like to acknowledge the contributions of Dr.
Douglas C. Lovelace of the U.S. Army War College and Dr. Tom Killion
of the Army Research Laboratory in the preparation of this article.
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THE INDIRECT APPROACH: HOW U.S.
MILITARY FORCES CAN AVOID
THE PITFALLS
OF FUTURE URBAN WARFARE

Author’s Introductory Note
The following article was published within the October
1998 issue of Armed Forces Journal International. Sixteen
months later, while the Russian Army was aggressively
destroying the city of Grozny, the editorial staff of AFJI
awarded the following accolade within their Journal’s
Darts and Laurels Section.1
A laurel to the Russian general staff—for adapting.
While the 1999-2000 battle for Grozny is a detestable
military action, its initial execution was a far cry from the
1996 debacle in the same location. Until mid-December,
when Russian forces were mauled during a probe into the
city under light armor cover, military analysts were
generally impressed by Russian field commander’s
absorption of lessons learned from the 1996 campaign.
Avoiding the close-in engagements which had proven so
disastrous during the earlier, failed attempt to seize
Grozny, Russian commanders waged a long-range
campaign against the city in tandem with an up-close
courtship of the media. As one observer noted, the initial,
successful campaign plan paralleled the thrust of an urban
warfare article by Major General Robert H. Scales Jr.,
Commandant of the U.S. Army War College, published in
the October 1998 issue of AFJI.

1. February 2000 Issue, Armed Forces Journal International, Volume 137,
Number 7, page 64.
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Urban warfare, fighting in cities, war in “complex
terrain.” To the casual observer, the words seem detached,
almost pristine. However, the words are starkingly real to
military professionals who have seen the images of great
destruction and excessive casualties in cities such as Berlin,
Stalingrad, Hue, and Beirut. Urban warfare, a subject that
many military professionals would prefer to avoid, is still
with us. Moreover, it may be the preferred approach of
future opponents.
Consider one of the key lessons that emerged from the
Spring 1998 Army 2025 wargame conducted at the U.S.
Army War College. The enemy (Red Force) conducted a
lightning assault to seize and control a web of complex
terrain (a large urban area). This enabled it to decapitate
the political leadership and control critical lodgment areas.
Designed to dismember coalition efforts and collapse
American resolve, the Red Force dispersed its army within
the cities and prepared to wage an attrition-based
campaign. Since the National Command Authority was
initially reluctant to turn to the military element of power,
the friendly Blue Force was unable to prevent Red from
occupying the urban areas. However, once Red moved into
the urban areas, the political fallout to regain control of the
lodgment area and reestablish a legitimate government left
Blue with little choice but to wage an urban warfare
campaign.
Although successful, the cost was excessive in terms of
battle casualties and time. In retrospect, the Blue approach
was exactly the opposite from what should have been taken.
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Why? Because by playing into the hands of the enemy, Blue
illustrated one of the key issues for 21st Century warfare.
How can the force of the future achieve success in complex
terrain?
A recent revival of interest in urban warfare has yielded
a rich outpouring of intellectual energy and fiscal
investment in an effort to exploit interest into a relatively
unfamiliar form of warfare. As is often the case in the
American inquiry style, there has been too quick a leap
beyond the more conceptual aspects of war in urban terrain
and into the weapons and tactics necessary to fight
street-to-street and door-to-door. I suggest a measured
approach to the study of urban warfare. Its premise is that
the time-tested tenets of warfare must be applied as
rigorously and with the same fidelity in urban warfare as
they are applied to other forms of warfare.
NEGATING AMERICAN MILITARY STRENGTHS
In the next century, a future enemy might look to his
urban masses as a possible refuge from overwhelming
American military power. Technological precision and,
more importantly, the will to carry out a strategic plan, may
enable him to pursue at least two possible options that
might lead to a favorable strategic outcome. Each would
seek to nullify American technological advantages of speed
and knowledge, while simultaneously pursuing a strategic
end state that focuses on the attainment of limited
objectives while avoiding defeat.
The first option combines the diplomatic, political, and
military elements of power into an operational concept that
seeks to delay and disrupt our arrival into a strategic
theater. Initially, an aggressor moves swiftly to seize
military objectives in a neighboring country. Then, through
skillful diplomatic efforts and political maneuvering, the
enemy disrupts coalition-forming efforts while
simultaneously offering a peace settlement. Central to the
enemy’s concept is the occupation of complex urban terrain
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that enables him to control key lodgment areas and national
centers of gravity.
If the first option fails, the enemy can burrow his force in
the urban terrain and prepare for combat operations. This
places the U.S. leadership on the horns of a dilemma. An
urban assault largely neutralizes American high-tech speed
and mobility advantages. With the added risk of excessive
casualties and prolonged campaign timelines, many would
question a decision to undertake such an operation.
Urban fighting has always been one of the most
destructive forms of warfare. During World War II, the
Russian army sustained over 300,000 casualties in their
epic struggle for Berlin. American casualties were equally
excessive: over 1,000 killed in action to regain Manila and
more than 3,000 in the battle for Aachen, Germany. In the
Vietnam War, the casualty rates for U.S. Marines who
fought in Hue exceeded those from Okinawa’s bloody
amphibious assault. More recently, the ill-fated Russian
attempt to seize Chechnya resulted in the deaths of
thousands of soldiers and non-combatants (August AFJI).
But urban warfare doesn’t happen all that often. Both
sides realize the destructive effects that street fighting may
cause. Only a desperate enemy, defending at great
disadvantage, willing to sacrifice initiatives, his cities, and
a large portion of his military force, has taken to defending
cities. A casual glance at the last 500 years of major war
history shows that as more of the world blankets itself in
urban sprawl, the incidents of actual street fighting have
declined.
THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT
A large urban center is multi-dimensional. Soldiers
must contend with subterranean and high-rise threats.
Every building could be a nest of fortified enemy positions
that would have to be dug out, one by one. Moreover, an
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experienced enemy could easily create connecting positions
between buildings.
With limited maneuver space, the urban environment
precludes mobility operations and largely negates the
effects of weapons, while minimizing engagement ranges.
The proximity of buildings plays havoc with communications, further adding to command and control difficulties.
Finally, the psychological effects of combat on soldiers are
magnified. While the array of threats from multiple
dimensions has a debilitating effect on soldiers, it further
hastens the disintegration process that haunts all military
units locked in close-combat operations.
The proliferating sprawl of urban centers and
populations make the challenge of future city fighting even
more pronounced. Some estimates indicate that between 60
to 70 percent of the world’s population will reside in urban
areas by the year 2025. If current global demographic
trends continue into the next millenium, we will see the
growth of huge urban masses, many exceeding ten million
inhabitants. The enormous problems of infrastructure and
the demand for social services that threaten to swamp
governing authorities in the urban centers of emerging
states will most likely worsen. Moreover, the proximity of
the disenfranchised to the ruling elite provides the spark for
further unrest and sporadic violence.
The future urban center will contain a mixed population,
ranging from the rich elite to the poor and disenfranchised.
Day-to-day existence for most of the urban poor will be
balanced tenuously on the edge of collapse. With social
conditions ripe for exploitation, the smallest tilt of
unfavorable circumstance might be enough to instigate
starvation, disease, social foment, cultural unrest, or other
forms of urban violence.
Military leaders who believe that future warfare will not
encompass this unpleasant environment are deluding
themselves. A little more than one-third of all deployments
by U.S. forces over the past 20 years have occurred in
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complex terrain. As urban areas continue to expand, they
will increasingly encompass regions of vital interest to the
United States. Representing geo-strategic centers of
gravity, these urban areas will contain all the vital
functions of government, commerce, communication, and
transportation activity.
While some future urban operations may be limited in
scope and capable of being controlled by special operations
forces and other operatives, others may take place in
strategic key terrain of vital interest. Such an operation
would require a major American investment of combat
forces.
A GREAT EQUALIZER
The dynamics of knowledge and speed that are ideal for
open warfare take on an additional dimension when an
enemy chooses to occupy key urban areas. An enemy
occupies cities to slow us down and avoid our strengths.
Rather than suffer the brunt of American military power,
where speed and precision technology can be brought to
bear, he understands that his intent must be not to seek a
clear victory but to avoid losing. The enemy’s only ally in
these circumstances is time. If he can delay, disrupt, and
diffuse our effort to achieve a quick decision, he might be
able to force a campaign of attrition in which
disproportionate casualties could induce us to grow weary of
the conflict. While he surrenders the tactical initiative, the
close terrain offers protection from firepower and
surveillance and allows further time to prepare a defense.
In open warfare, time is a disadvantage as the need to
achieve a rapid victory pushes commanders to attain
decisive results. In urban warfare, just the opposite is true.
A premature rush into the city works to our disadvantage
and plays to the strength of the defender.
History is full of examples of armies that tried and failed
to seize a city by coup de main. The Israeli army performed
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brilliantly in executing a lightning counterstroke across the
Suez Canal during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. However,
once Israel’s armored columns entered the streets of Suez,
the Egyptians were able to inflict a high number of
casualties while stopping the Israelis’ progress. The recent
Russian experience in Chechnya is equally illustrative.
There, a semi-trained and poorly-equipped force
successfully waged a war of attrition that eventually wore
down the larger, technologically superior Russian army.
While the different technology and tactical skills of
armies are a factor, defensive urban warfare is a great
equalizer for an under-modernized force. A vast body of
historical evidence reminds us that urban warfare is a great
casualty producer. Thus, in urban warfare, we must avoid
the enemy enticement that lures our forces into such an
environment and use time to our advantage.
COUNTERING THE URBAN OPTION
If we are patient, time will place our opponent at a
disadvantage. The time advantage reversal occurs due to
the enemy’s inability to continue to provide for the populace.
This will eventually lead to the displacement of the
government leadership or hostile action on the part of the
populace.
Picture for a moment a conflict against a future enemy
state similar to some of our more recent post-Cold War
adversaries. After a lightning campaign lasting only days,
the mobile formations of our future foe are decisively beaten
in open warfare. To avoid total defeat, the enemy rushes his
remaining forces into his capital city, a city of sprawling
dimensions with millions of people that house his political,
cultural, and financial centers of gravity.
As soon as the enemy loses on the open ground and elects
to occupy complex terrain, a fundamental shift of battlefield
dynamics occurs. He loses the initiative. Time is now solely
on the side of the intervening coalition.
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Without the capacity to maneuver, the enemy cannot
escape. Attacking would only result in his destruction.
Thus, he arrays his forces throughout the capital to avoid
creating lucrative targets for American precision weapons.
He impresses the local citizenry into national service and
appeals to the world to watch the impending slaughter of
non-combatants.
Assuming that Americans are leading a coalition effort,
how should the coalition respond? The best option is to
preempt the enemy from using complex terrain in the first
place. Recognizably, a preemptive approach requires the
political entity to build strong domestic and international
support, along with developing solid public underpinnings.
Moreover, preemptive measures could come in a variety of
forms. In the pre-hostilities phase, political and diplomatic
means could be used to discourage future aggressive
activity. The coalition could also selectively implement force
deployment options, such as increasing the presence of
naval or air forces and staging pre-positioned equipment.
Once hostilities begin, we could force the enemy to fight his
way into the urban areas by isolating his army, blocking the
key avenues of approach, and augmenting host-nation
forces that occupy friendly cities.
If, despite our best efforts, the enemy is able to fall back
on a major city, we must be mindful of the limiting factors of
using military power. Americans do not expect their
military to wage war in an unconstrained manner. It is
difficult to imagine fighting another World War II campaign
like Berlin or Dresden. In Berlin, between February and
May 1945, a third of the total tonnage of bombs was dropped
on the beleaguered city, resulting in the deaths of more than
100,000 people. In our struggle to seize Aachen, the city was
virtually destroyed.
With many of the major global cities experiencing a host
of infrastructure and overcrowding shortcomings, the likely
damage from unconstrained urban warfare would require a
total rebuilding effort. Such warfare could cause the total
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dismemberment of basic services and the deaths of
thousands of innocent people, along with great collateral
damage to homes, hospitals, and other structures, creating
a new mass of refugees. Rampant disease and starvation
would quickly overcome those lucky enough to survive
bombs and missiles.
As the moral beacon for international law, global
democracy, and respect for human rights, the United States
can ill-afford to undertake such costly operations. In all
likelihood, the American people would not tolerate the
casualties that an urban assault would produce, nor would
they tolerate the civilian casualties or extensive damage to
the captive city. The trend to exercise constraint is clear.
American-led coalitions and military operations must find a
better solution than physically destroying a city in order to
rescue it from a hostile force.
Another limiting factor is the desire for a short conflict.
One of the enduring legacies of the Gulf War was the
expectation for quick victory with few casualties. While the
American people have reluctantly tolerated high numbers
of casualties and prolonged military campaigns in the past,
events in Somalia and Bosnia indicate that the American
public has little stomach for excessive casualties in future
wars.
In our example, another viable option exists. If
preemptive measures fail, rather than initiating a
time-consuming, costly attack in complex terrain, I suggest
that an indirect approach would accomplish the strategic
end at a much lower cost in terms of human life and physical
destruction. Implementing an indirect approach leverages
the intrinsic instability of the urban mass to our own
advantage. By avoiding a direct assault on an entrenched
force, we do not engage the enemy on his terms. The indirect
approach enables us to maintain the initiative and employ
our technologically superior forces to their fullest potential,
leaving the enemy with little option.
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This option encompasses three fundamental concepts:
using an indirect approach, using time to our advantage,
and letting the city collapse on itself.
THE INDIRECT APPROACH
In his landmark book on strategy, Liddell Hart
contended that in most successful campaigns, the
dislocation of the enemy’s psychological and physical
balance was brought about through use of the indirect
approach. This also applies to urban warfare.
Instead of conducting a direct assault and massive
strike, coalition forces could establish a loose cordon around
the city and control of the surrounding countryside. The
cordon would eventually result in complete isolation of the
city from the outside world. All avenues, including air, sea,
and land arteries, would be blocked. Moreover, the coalition
would seek to control sources of food, power, water, and
sanitation services. Any vital natural resources would be
controlled. Finally, using technological means, all internal
information sources and commercial, financial, and
governmental nodes would be suppressed, and only
information emanating from the coalition would reach the
city’s population.
Throughout the cordon operation, coalition forces would
demonstrate their absolute mastery of the situation, using
knowledge and speed to seize, control, and strike selected
decisive points within the city. High-altitude unmanned
aerial vehicles orbiting miles above the city could maintain
unlimited surveillance with a minimum of manpower.
Ground-mounted cameras could observe areas susceptible
to infiltration. Unless the enemy attacked, coalition forces
would not engage in close combat, instead using greater
standoff advantages and technology to strike selected point
targets, key leadership, and weapons of mass destruction.
As history reminds us, a continued massive use of fire
power often has the opposite effect from what is intended.
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Thus, the coalition would not attempt to achieve complete
destruction of the enemy force, but only to destroy those
targets that have the greatest impact on the government,
the army, and the population. The purpose is two-fold: to
demonstrate the futility of further resistance, and to create
conditions that will lead to collapsing the enemy’s will to
continue the struggle.
USING TIME TO OUR ADVANTAGE
Through the use of psychological operations and control
of the media, the coalition could create an environment in
which the enemy army becomes an unwelcome force. The
underlying purpose is to shape the perception that the
enemy is a hostile occupying force. This perception
eventually turns the population against the enemy. In this
regard, the coalition could establish mechanisms to gauge
the prevailing moods of the population.
LET THE CITY COLLAPSE ON ITSELF
As the coalition achieves control of the surrounding
countryside, it could collect resources to support the
establishment of sanctuaries or safe havens around the city.
Humanitarian organizations, both governmental and
non-governmental, would be encouraged to construct
protected camps. The city’s population would be encouraged
to leave, and coalition forces would freely allow refugees
passage through the cordon to the relative security and
safety of the camps.
For those who stay, the isolation of the city, in time,
would create a refugee problem for the enemy. With the
steady depletion of resources, the remaining population
would eventually see the government as an impotent entity
that can’t provide basic services or security for the people.
Inevitably, the military forces and their leaders would be
seen as the real enemy, particularly among the dispossessed
within the city.
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Although this approach has its advantages, this is not to
suggest that it would always work. The following are key
considerations before this approach is undertaken. How
much popular support does the enemy have? How willing is
the enemy’s population to accept suffering? To what extent
is the city self-sustaining and for how long? Is there some
sanctuary nearby that allows forces to rest and recuperate
in safety? To what extent are we relying on a coalition and
how strong is the coalition? How coherent were the enemy’s
military forces when they occupied the city? How close was
the city to collapse before the initiation of military
operations?
Future conditions will force us to fight in complex
terrain. We can no longer fight the destructive campaigns of
World War II. The indirect approach enables us to use
knowledge and speed to their fullest potential to achieve our
strategic ends with the least cost in human life and
destruction of physical property.
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RUSSIA’S CLASH IN CHECHNYA:
IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE WAR

War does not belong in the realm of arts and sciences;
rather it is part of man’s social existence. War is a clash between major
1
interests, which is resolved by bloodshed.

Clausewitz

Historians recorded the dawn of the twentieth century
as a time when the Russian military found itself making an
end to a messy siege against a determined enemy on the
periphery of its crumbling empire. This military task was
made all the more challenging by the social and
technological upheavals of the times. As the conflict
escalated, Russian military leaders found themselves
powerless to overcome their country’s traditional political
conservatism and economic penury. Fighting during an era
of revolutionary change in military science, Russia’s
military was not able to take full advantage of the
opportunities new technologies promised to bring to the
battlefield. World opinion generally condemned their
military efforts without seeking to understand how vital a
Russian victory was to the short-term political health of the
Russian ruling elite and the long-term future stability of the
region.
Another century has passed, the geographic locations
have changed, but the above description of Russia’s 1904
Port Arthur siege could also be used to outline the recent
Russian siege of Grozny. Exactly nine decades stand
between the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War and the
December 1994 attack against the Chechen capital.
However, many political-military conditions and
observations remain just as relevant today as they were a
century ago.
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Few western military analysts in 1904 realized the
outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War and the battlefield
tactics used in Manchuria would become a frightful
metaphor for the horror of trench warfare to follow in less
than a decade. It has always been difficult to anticipate and
comprehend the cycles and pace of change in warfare
because, unlike endeavors in finance, medicine, or law,
active experience in war is, fortunately, episodic. During
periods of relative quiescence, however, it is imperative for
soldiers and statesmen to gain vicarious insights through
laboratory analysis of past experience, and, whenever
discontinuity or brief incidents of war erupt, avoid the
temptation to view them as historical anomalies.
THE AFTERMATH: A PRISM THAT REFRACTS
VALUABLE INSIGHTS
Even though shots are still being fired in Chechnya’s
rugged southern mountains, it is not too soon to begin
reflecting upon the long-range implications of this tragic
war. Across the western world, questions now abound
regarding the military implications of this deadly and costly
conflict. The aftermath of the war may well provide us with
a revealing window of opportunity to glimpse a few
guideposts that portend the direction, pace of change, and
perhaps even the nature of future warfare.
Russia’s first Chechen war was a disaster that almost
led to the full secession of Chechnya. The 1994-1996 conflict
was degrading for a Russian military already brought low
by the Afghan War and the humiliating loss of social
prestige and ensuing discomfort that followed the
withdrawal from the Soviet Army’s East European
garrisons. The failure of the first Chechen war revealed to
Russia’s military leadership profound strategic,
operational, and tactical defects. The Russian military
rightfully concluded that their civilian leaders never
understood the nature of this new style of cultural war.
Likewise, they realized that they had badly underestimated
the fighting resolve of the Chechen rebels. They were
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particularly frustrated by a civilian administration that
seemed totally incapable of establishing a coherent,
consistent policy towards the war.
The Russians also recognized their own unique military
shortcomings. Unity of command was never established
between the disparate assortment of deployed troops.
Senior commanders continued to employ tactics more
appropriate for open, mechanized warfare than strict
fighting against tenacious guerilla-like bands of Chechens
who were operating within restrictive terrain. Commanders
in the field never had enough troops for the task, nor were
the few units at their disposal sufficiently well trained to
fight on difficult urban and mountain battlefields.
Undisciplined solders and ineffective leaders eventually led
to episodes of corruption, brutality, and Dedovshchina
(hazing). In the end, Russia’s ill-prepared force was unable
to take Grozny by storm, nor could their poorly disciplined
armed forces win the hearts of the Chechen population.
The first Chechen war never gained popular support in
Russia. To most Russians, it appeared the Chechens were
winning both the propaganda war at home and the
information war abroad. To those outside the battle area, it
seemed as if Russian soldiers had become nothing more
than expendable commodities thrown mindlessly into a
senseless war of attrition. After two expensive years of
combat, Russia was forced to negotiate a settlement with
Chechen leaders in August 1996.
For the next few years, Chechnya remained a hotbed of
unrest with cross-border raids, kidnappings, destruction of
neighboring provinces, and efforts to organize a kind of
Pan-Islamic movement that promoted the secession of
neighboring provinces from Russia. Eventually, Moscow’s
military leaders resolved to take action. By 1998, they
devised and started to rehearse operational plans for a
second Chechen war—one they intended to win.
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SETTING THE CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS
Since the time of the Czars, Russia’s Army has practiced
a method of change and adaptation that reflects the
structured, autocratic, and hierarchical nature of the
Russian society. In contrast to western militaries, reform
within Russia’s military occurs more slowly, usually in fits
and starts and always under the direction and central
authority of the General Staff.2 In wars of this century,
Russian field commanders have learned to adhere to strict
regulations and tactical “norms” that dictate behavior in
combat to a level of specificity unheard of in the West.3 The
result is a rigid method of warfare that leaves little to
chance, uncertainty, inspiration, or serendipity.4
The path of change after the first Chechen war followed
this Russian pattern with remarkable fidelity. From the
beginning, the General Staff recognized the conflict could
not be resumed without first securing political and popular
support within the homeland. Fortunately for the Russian
side, the Chechens assisted by conducting an ill-conceived
domestic terror campaign of bombings and border raids that
served only to turn popular opinion in Russia squarely
against them.
Senior Russian leaders quickly seized the information
warfare initiative and aggressively organized a
comprehensive effort to gain popular support. Grisly
television footage was aired showing Chechen execution of
prisoners. The September 1999 unsolved bombings in
Moscow presented Russian leaders with an unexpected
opportunity to blame the Chechen rebels without any proof
of complicity. Additionally, Russia was able to conduct a
relatively successful information blockade around the city
of Grozny. This “cyberspace curtain” worked to the
advantage of Russia’s information warriors.
Simultaneously, they encouraged helpless civilians to leave
the city, and they attempted to win the hearts of the local
Chechen population by creating refugee relief centers
outside Grozny and in neighboring provinces. Wherever
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possible, Russian commanders attempted to coopt the
area’s local elite and tribal elders with the goal of leveraging
local support for Russia against the rebel’s defensive effort.
DEVELOPING A CAMPAIGN PLAN AND
TAILORING IT FOR THE SITUATION
Urban warfare historically has been both time and
people intensive, and therefore terribly lethal. During the
Second World War, for example, the Russian Army
sustained over 300,000 casualties taking Berlin. Stalingrad
cost the Russians even more. However, the Russians
learned from watching the West that the arrival of
democracy takes away from the military the traditional
authority to write blank checks on the lives of their soldiers,
particularly if they intend to prosecute the war by
maintaining popular support at home. To accommodate the
realities of this new “democratic” way of war, the Russian
Army customized their fighting tactics for mountain and
urban fighting by increasing the expenditures of firepower
as a means of decreasing expenditures of manpower. They
resolved to avoid door-to-door street fighting if at all
possible. Initially, the substitution seemed to work.
The Russians reorganized combat forces to overcome
their previous unity of command problems. The General
Staff clearly demonstrated their ability to learn and apply
several key principles of urban warfare based upon their
terrible 1994-1996 experience. They created new command
and control structures to streamline cooperation between
the regular army and the Vnutrennye Voiska (VVMVD), the
Ministry of Interior’s Internal troops. Since the VVMVD is a
less capable force, the General Staff ultimately imposed
unity of command under its consolidated leadership.
From experience, Russian commanders realized that,
even in a firepower-intensive style of urban warfare,
numbers of soldiers guaranteed overwhelming force. This
time the General Staff sent a total of 93,000 troops—three
times the number used during the first Chechen war. Many
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assorted police formations were committed to conduct
“mopping-up” operations once the back of Chechen
resistance was broken in the cities. The army grew into a
patchwork of military units consisting of a number of small,
elite “temporary operational groups” consisting principally
of airborne, air assault and special operations units, and the
Naval Infantry.
From the beginning the General Staff determined that
Grozny could only be taken by first securing, then
dominating the Chechen countryside. Instead of a
medieval-style siege, the plan was to establish a sort of loose
cordon around the city and then begin a series of cautious
probes preceded by ample doses of bombs, rockets, and
shells. Once control of this sort was established, the
Chechens would lose the initiative, and battlefield
advantage would shift to the Russians. If senior military
leaders could convince their political bosses of the need for
patience, time would eventually guarantee victory.
ANALYSIS OF THE RUSSIAN ART OF WAR
As so often happens, politics and the enemy interfere
with careful planning. In the beginning, the Russian
leadership failed to accurately assess the political resolve of
the Chechen rebels. Eventually, political impatience at
home caused them to lose the advantage of time and
patience. Russia’s senior civilian and military leaders failed
to maintain the city of Grozny merely as a military objective.
When it became apparent to Russia’s political leaders that
their future survival depended upon a rapid victory, Grozny
quickly evolved into a critical political center of gravity.
Suddenly the advantage of time shifted back to the
defenders.
The western press made much of Russian shortcomings
during the second Chechen war. To be sure, in typical
Russian fashion, it was a messy and tragically brutal affair.
But the Russians did achieve their military objectives, at
least for the near term. The Russian General Staff still
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appears to retain its ability to analyze failure, determine
what needs to be done and subsequently dictate corrective
actions to the field. While the brain of the army shows signs
of life, the Chechen war also seems to tell us that the body of
the Russian Army remains on the sick list. Field
Commanders simply lacked the resources, both human and
materiel, to effectively execute the intent of the General
Staff. Poorly trained and led solders will inevitably make a
mess of the best-laid plans.
Throughout both Chechen conflicts, the Russians still
seemed to be continually surprised by the steadfastness,
guile, stoicism, and tenacity of the Chechen fighters.
Without question, the Chechens taught the Russians a
lesson the United States painfully learned from the North
Vietnamese. Given time and a will to win, a determined
enemy learns to survive the onslaught from a firepower
intensive force. Soldiers become inured to the pyrotechnics
and blast of firepower weapons. They learn to disperse and
go-to-ground in order to present the smallest and least
lucrative targets. Eventually, after the shock wears off, they
learn to not only survive, but to remain effective in close
combat, even under the most severe bombardment. The
Russians in Chechnya relived our own experience in Hue.
The field army’s difficulty realizing the intent of the
General Staff was most evident by its inability to maintain
control of the countryside while attempting to isolate and
contain the Chechens inside Grozny. On several occasions
the Russians had to return to open warfare in order to push
the Chechens back inside their urban lair. The city’s
defenders were not cut off from their free access to supply
bases in the southern mountains until the very end of the
conflict.
The Russian plan to replace manpower with firepower
was proper for the circumstances. However, as the battle
progressed, the Russians found themselves obliged to drop
an ever-increasing tonnage of shells and bombs into the city
in order to kill Chechens while preserving the lives of their
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own soldiers. This firepower challenge was exacerbated by
the poor quality of materiel and training within the Russian
fire support system. Coordination between soldiers in
contact with supporting artillery was poorly executed.
Often close-in fires seemed to be delivered indiscriminately.
Hundreds of rockets, mortars, and artillery rounds were
dumped into portions of the city seemingly without purpose
or effect. Frustration, revenge, and the desire to cause terror
took over as the principal motives for delivering firepower.
The crude Russian firepower system remained woefully
imprecise, and their approach continued to display the
old-fashioned Soviet preference for mass over quality. The
lack of both technical and tactical discretion was clearly
evident. Had they been available, a few laser or Global
Positioning System (GPS) guided munitions would have
been much more effective as a method of striking point
targets within the city. While operationally well-grounded,
the plan nevertheless failed in large measure because the
lack of precision weapons, precision surveillance, and
proper battlefield coordination increasingly left the
Russians with no other option but to escalate the tonnage of
firepower in order to meet the intent of the General Staff.
Eventually this deadly escalation left them with no choice
but to destroy Grozny and many of its innocents in order to
save it.
Russian small unit tactics improved considerably from
the first Chechen war. Mounted troops no longer sought to
rush the center of the city only to be ambushed and
destroyed within smoking, bloody columns stretching down
Grozny’s inner thoroughfares. Instead commanders
followed bombardments by cautiously infiltrating the city,
block by block, leading with their best soldiers, using
smaller formations with usually either airborne or special
forces units. Green conscripts were kept out of the initial
movements to contact as much as possible in order to reduce
battlefield losses.
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But the Chechens learned quickly. After enduring
Russia’s firepower onslaught, they cautiously sought to
snipe the lead formations in order to slow their advance.
Simultaneously, they reserved their limited resources for
major engagements, usually ambushes at night, against the
less well-trained and ill-prepared conscripts in rear areas.
Eventually the Russian tactics of leading with fewer and
better quality infantry paid off, but the Chechens insured
that the cost of victory was very high indeed.
THINKING-IN-TIME: A FEW NUGGETS WITH
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS
Grozny has been turned into an urban wasteland.
Russia’s leadership now pretends that the barren,
desert-like landscape of Chechnya signals a victory. But
90,000-plus Russian troops will not be able to prevent
cross-border retaliation raids, and they most certainly will
experience continued guerrilla warfare in the area. Since
Russia will not be able to effect either political or economic
resolution to the fundamental problems in the North
Caucasus region, it should not expect peace anytime soon.
More importantly, the potential of a protracted,
post-imperial war on its periphery still remains Russia’s
worst nightmare, just as it did almost one hundred years
ago when Japanese forces marched into central Manchuria.
The aftermath of Chechnya seems to reinforce a few
insights on the changing nature of war garnered from other
post-Cold War battlefields. The Russians re-learned a
lesson NATO first taught them in Kosovo: a firepower
intensive style of war can reduce casualties. But the cost in
destruction and duration of the conflict will be too high
unless the firepower is delivered with precision and
followed with rapid occupation of the enemy’s territory.
Ground forces, using great caution, must exploit the effects
of firepower, particularly when fighting in difficult terrain
such as cities or against an enemy with the will to resist and
adapt. Increasingly, as the Russians learned, fewer soldiers
must be exposed to contact in order to avoid excessive
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casualties, and these soldiers should be of exceptional
quality, well led, and well equipped. The precise application
of firepower, maneuver, and cautious close combat offered
the Russians the only tactical scheme by which they could
win relatively quickly and with acceptable costs. This is the
key lesson of limited warfare: a commitment to limited ends
demands the judicious use of limited means. The Russians,
unfortunately, lacked the technical precision and tactical
means to effectively implement this new precision age
paradigm of air and land warfare.
After more than a decade of experience, we are
witnessing a geo-strategic shift in the motives for conflict.
The Chechen war conforms to a developing pattern that
started to emerge several years ago as evidenced by
Afghanistan, Lebanon, Bosnia, Somalia, Kosovo, and other
conflicts along the periphery of Eurasia. We should
anticipate the world beyond 2010 to be an era of rekindled
conflict where breakaway regimes will frequently define
themselves by their cultural-ethnic identities. Many of
these regimes will be radically fundamental in nature and
religiously motivated. And many will find warfare as the
surest means for defending their culture from outside
influences or for imposing their culture on less cultured
neighbors.
Explosions of long-simmering conflict, once held in check
during the Cold War, will be free to start again. Some of
these recently ignited conflicts have been smoldering for
generations and in some cases, such as Chechnya, for
centuries. As this trend continues, developed democracies
and their allies should anticipate future wars that will be
conducted within what the Russians habitually refer to as
“under-cultured theaters of operation.” Most of these
clashes between forces will be intractable or unruly. The
shooting portion of the conflict may very well end with no
decisive advantage to either opponent. Since this type of
war will be difficult to manage, the best an intervening
power can hope for may well be a truce, stalemate, or some
minimum level of sustained violence acceptable to the
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sensitivities of the world’s advanced democracies. The only
predictable aspects of this type of conflict, if it is allowed to
expand into open warfare, will be its bloody nature,
protracted duration, and inconclusive ending.
The recent Chechen saga helps us derive a number of
insights regarding Russia’s application of military power.
To be sure, the war in Chechnya will have a number of
implications for Russia and its military forces. As Russia’s
military leaders begin their inevitable process of
assessment and change, we must observe carefully to
determine how their Chechnya experience will alter their
approach and prosecution of warfare in the future.
The legacies from Chechnya could directly influence
Russia’s potential evolution into a future regional military
competitor. Currently, the average Russian citizen on the
street has a heightened regard for Russia’s military force,
and Russian military leaders will most likely enjoy a greater
voice within their government’s policy making process.
There seems to be an established realization among today’s
political elite that the future use of military force may be
necessary to maintain stability within the country’s
borders, and likewise, to guarantee the political longevity of
the political regime now in power. It would not be surprising
to see additional conflicts conducted in order to secure the
periphery of Russia’s remaining empire.
Senior Russian military leaders, moreover, must now
realize the need for additional reform. The timing may be
right for them to win both political support and financial
resources from the country’s political leadership. Military
leaders, most certainly, have a greater appreciation for
well-trained and more effectively led troops. The Chechnya
experience, in retrospect, may be the impetus to build a
smaller, more professional, long-serving army. Change
within Russia’s military will be two fold: heal the body and
sharpen the mind. The General Staff will orchestrate their
traditional path for reform after they have completed their
dialectical assessment of the conflict. And perhaps most
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importantly, it will not be surprising to see a major
commitment from the Russian military to join the unfolding
precision revolution.5
Finally, from a western perspective, Chechnya tells us
the Russians have now convincingly learned a tenet of
democratic warfare that will increasingly influence how we
in the West prosecute real, shooting wars. In every conflict
since the end of the Second World War, we have re-learned
the maxim that a political commitment to limited ends will
demand strict limits on the means that we are allowed to
commit to achieve those ends. For more than five decades,
developed militaries have been in search of a method of war
that will reduce friendly casualties by increasing the
expenditure of precision firepower delivered against
opponents. Unless its very existence is at stake, a modern
state no longer publicly tolerates the massive slaughter of
its soldiers. The Russians are the latest modern state to
have learned this lesson. The cost of learning has been too
high.
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TRUST, NOT TECHNOLOGY,
SUSTAINS COALITIONS

History testifies to the ineptitude of coalitions in waging war.
Allied failures have been so numerous and their inexcusable
blunders so common that professional soldiers had long
discounted the possibility of effective allied action unless
available resources were so great as to assure victory by
inundation. Even Napoleon’s reputation as a brilliant military
leader suffered when students . . . came to realize that he
always fought against coalitions—and therefore against
divided counsels and diverse political, economic, and military
interests.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe1

As Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary
Force in Europe during World War II, General Dwight
Eisenhower led one of the most successful coalitions in
history. By insisting on an integrated staff and demanding
an atmosphere of fairness and mutual respect, Eisenhower
transcended personalities and many political challenges to
his decisions. His success was in large measure attributable
to the cohesive—if sometimes contentious—environment at
Supreme Headquarters Allied Forces Europe.
Strategists predict that instability and conflict will
characterize the 21st century, due to cultural unrest and
regional wars engulfing bordering states or consuming
states from within. 2 Over the past decade Western
democracies and others, mindful of the need to contain the
spread of violence, have demonstrated increased
willingness to use military force to defuse internal or
regional political conflicts or to respond to humanitarian
crises.
But smaller and more expensive militaries as well as
pressing social needs confront decisionmakers with the
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need to find ways to contain the cost of such military
undertakings. For the foreseeable future the United States
will remain reluctant to intervene unilaterally in most
crises; as a consequence, the need for coalition partners will
shape American strategy.
In all its modern wars the United States has fought as a
member of a coalition.3 Thus, it is likely that U.S. military
leaders throughout their careers will confront the challenge
of organizing and leading coalitions. Any officer knows
intuitively, if not from experience, that interoperability of
equipment and compatibility of doctrine and operational
procedures pose significant challenges in any coalition.
Many also are aware of the costs of rationalizing
procurement, doctrine, and training within the NATO
alliance; few, however, could even speculate on how to reach
NATO’s levels of interoperability within a coalition.
Eisenhower’s success is instructive here: the
compatibility of leaders and staffs in a coalition is more
important than compatibility in doctrine or materiel. This
article considers technological capabilities, requirements
for coalition interoperability, and the need to revive a
concept with a long history—the liaison officer as “directed
telescope”—to form and manage coalitions.
Communicating In Coalitions
Coalition operations need two simultaneous methods of
communication. The first presumes the technical
connectivity required within coalitions to perform assigned
missions. The U.S. military needs to develope sufficient
compatibility in data and information to provide a
reasonable level of technical interoperability with
prospective coalition partners.
The second method relies on personal and professional
relationships with counterparts in other nations. It
recognizes the potential impediments of language, cultural
differences, and national perspectives when operating in a
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coalition. Compensating for such impediments requires
long-term investments in training select officers to function
autonomously under great stress within a multinational
environment. Sensitive to national or subnational issues
and skilled in building trust based on personal
relationships, such officers would help regional
commanders-in-chief “see” the complexities of strategic and
operational environments.
Alliances and Coalitions
While there are similarities between alliances and
coalitions, politically and structurally they are markedly
different. Created for collective defense or to cope with a
long-term threat, alliances usually rest on formal
agreements among nations with mutual interests and
(often) cultural ties. Sometimes referred to as “latent” war
communities, alliances require a formal structure,
agreed-upon rules, and protocols to manage the routine and
structure the rest.
For many years Washington’s Farewell Address shaped
U.S. perspectives on alliances: “Tis our true policy to steer
clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign
world.”4 By the end of World War II, however, the threat of
Soviet aggression proved more compelling than 150 years of
tradition. The role of the United States in developing NATO
as a barrier to Soviet aggression,5 and the Organization of
American States to improve relations in the Western
Hemisphere, needs no review. But alliances remain viable
only so long as the reason for their founding endures. The
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) dissolved
long before the Soviet Union did, and in 1986 the United
States suspended security obligations incurred with New
Zealand under the ANZUS Treaty (Australia, New Zealand,
and the United States).
In contrast, coalitions are transitory, emerging in
response to specific threats and dissolving once coalition
goals have been met. Politically fragile in nature, they
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develop out of necessity, sometimes uniting nations without
a history of harmonious relations. Since the end of the Cold
War, “coalitions of the willing” have been an increasing
factor within NATO in dealing with crises affecting the vital
interests of only a part of the Alliance. Italy’s leading role in
the 1997 intervention in Albania may be a harbinger of
NATO’s future in this respect.6
National military capabilities either increase or reduce
the coalition’s fighting power by their value relative to other
coalition members and the capabilities of the adversary. For
coalitions facing major operations, member nations with
large armies are important. Coalitions formed from roughly
equal militaries sharing qualitative characteristics offer
versatility. And some coalitions will include members
whose participation is symbolic. These states contribute
little in military capability; they serve primarily to increase
the number of flags at the command post and add
international legitimacy.
Technology in Coalitions
Technology is a two-edged sword in coalition operations.
Global communications systems enhance connectivity
among coalition members; emerging military technology
allows unprecedented surveillance. Moreover, information
technologies have the potential to accelerate deployments
and permit decisive operations.
The downside is that rapid and costly changes in
technology also create barriers to effective integration of
coalition forces. Thoughtful observers have already noted
that in a replay of the 1990-91 Gulf War, there could be
three and possibly four distinct levels of technology within
the coalition. The United States could be well in advance of
the second-tier militaries, such as the United Kingdom,
Germany, and France, with the rest of pre-enlargement
NATO forces at a third level. The fourth level could include
recent NATO accessions and the armed forces of other
states. Moreover, while the U.S. military might eventually
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be able to preempt adversary planning, those same
adversaries could limit or negate our ability to achieve
surprise by accessing similar technology. Finally, until
logistic capabilities improve ways and means for operating
in bare-base environments, Army theater requirements and
Title 10 responsibilities will pose substantial strategic and
operational challenges in either multilateral or unilateral
environments.
Attaining technological interoperability will be difficult
for coalitions in any case. Each Gulf War participant arrived
with its own level of technical sophistication. In some cases
participants had advanced systems that were not
compatible within the coalition. In others, military units
needed substantial assistance to communicate with
coalition partners. For example, it required approximately
70 soldiers, 27 tons of equipment, and 80 days of training
and coordination to create communication interoperability
for an average brigade from the Middle Eastern nations.7
The sheer number of potential coalition partners and the
cost of acquiring common or interoperable equipment may
make it impossible to guarantee interoperability in
similarly constituted coalitions over the next 5 to 10 years.8
To further complicate matters, the rate of change in
communications, automation, and other technologies is
such that equipment is often obsolete before military
organizations can establish and maintain interoperability
for coalition operations. In the meantime, availability of
off-the-shelf technology may allow potential adversaries to
procure the latest equipment even as potential coalition
members struggle with obsolete equipment. Technology
offers no panacea for conducting coalition operations,
regardless of who the members are.
Liaison Officers Can Help
The practice of using liaison officers as “directed
telescopes” to facilitate command and control is almost as
old as war itself. Beginning in antiquity and continuing into
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the modern era, ground commanders have relied on
carefully selected subordinates to serve as their eyes and
ears. These trusted agents, often with direct access to the
deliberations that produced the “commander’s intent,” have
provided invaluable information to the commander’s
immediate staff and others. And during the heat of battle,
they assisted commanders by communicating orders and
controlling units.9
A number of great captains developed communications
and information gathering systems that resemble the
directed telescope concept of the 19th and 20th centuries.
Alexander the Great detailed junior officers as couriers to
help control widely separated columns. Caesar’s staff
included aides who served as observers and couriers for
high-priority missions. Napoleon relied on liaison officers to
provide vital battlefield information and to clarify his intent
to subordinates, while Grant used liaison officers to help
form impressions of the morale and spirit of his Army.10
Field Marshal Montgomery was perhaps the most
creative user of such liaison officers in World War II. He
selected and integrated into his personal staff a small group
of young combat veterans. With the Field Marshal’s
authority to go anywhere and see anything, these liaison
officers traveled extensively, gathering and reporting
information via radio. Many returned at night to
Montgomery’s command post to provide firsthand accounts
of their insights. The responsibilities of Montgomery’s
officers extended beyond gathering information. They could
interrupt normal signal traffic with their reports, and they
routinely interacted with senior generals and politicians.
Moreover, Montgomery authorized them to ask pointed
questions of senior officers who appeared incapable of
executing their prescribed tasks.11 This system allowed him
to keep the pulse of British, American, Canadian, and
Polish formations under his command. 12 Churchill
delighted in hearing the nightly reports from Montgomery’s
“directed telescopes”; he considered the system invaluable
in the command of Montgomery’s forces.13 The question for
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us today is whether the average Army captain or major
could perform such tasks in a coalition environment. Are we
preparing such officers in our schools and training
institutions?
A Geostrategic Scout
One can expect that skilled junior officers will continue
to serve as liaison officers to allied tactical formations much
as they have in the past. But what of the strategic level,
where geopolitical issues and conflicting national interests
truly complicate coalitions and alliances? Until 1990 many
U.S. Army officers had experience in NATO, as well as in the
culture, economy, politics, and forces of other countries
around the world. This familiarity came about largely
through the Army’s Foreign Area Officer (FAO) program.
Prepared by study and assignment, such officers served as
high-level liaison officers in good times and bad.
Unfortunately, the Army has had to curtail that program
during the drawdown.
Recent experience indicates a clear requirement for a
cadre of officers whose skills and capabilities would
transcend the norms of the FAO program. In an era of
short-notice deployments, the Army and the other services
need to examine the requirement for sophisticated liaison
personnel—officers, noncommissioned officers, and
civilians—in the active and reserve components. Such
individuals would perform the tasks of the foreign area
specialist and more. As in the FAO program, their skills
would include language as well as cultural and historical
understanding of one or more countries in a region. But they
would set their sights much higher to include regional
geostrategic and geopolitical matters; knowledge of key
regional alliances; awareness of new and emerging
technologies affecting the ability of the United States to lead
or sustain a coalition; U.S. capabilities in strategic
communications, logistics, transportation, and
sustainment; the interagency process that determines U.S.
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involvement in peace support activities; and the international humanitarian support system, including the
principal private volunteer and nongovernmental
organizations through which most humanitarian and
developmental work occurs. This list of capabilities is
representative, not inclusive; it defines only part of the
challenge facing each regional commander-in-chief every
day.
Personnel with the desired attributes would be available
to regional commanders-in-chief and commanders of
combined and national joint task forces. They would assume
the role of advisor to the task force commander in matters as
important as those addressed by political advisors to
regional or theater commanders. The reported proliferation
of political advisors in the Balkans underscores the need for
such officers. Traditionally “reserved” for work at the
highest headquarters, individuals charged with keeping the
task force and other commanders apprised of local political,
social, and economic conditions have appeared at many
levels in Bosnia. This is a pragmatic solution to an
unprecedented requirement. With the FAO concept as the
foundation, the Army needs to draw on the Bosnia
experience and identify new skills and attributes required
at the headquarters of coalition partners in 2025. We can do
better than ad hoc solutions during crises.
What’s the Precedent?
In multinational operations, trust binds the coalition
together. “Patience, tolerance, frankness, absolute honesty
in all dealings, particularly with all persons of the opposite
nationality, and firmness are absolutely essential,”
Eisenhower wrote to Lord Louis Mountbatten as the latter
was preparing to assume command in Southeast Asia.14
Eisenhower’s perspective on coalitions, in large measure
shared later by General Norman Schwarzkopf, was that the
center of gravity in a coalition is often the coalition itself.

242

There are a number of historical examples that underline
this point.

•

Hitler aspired to duplicate Frederick the Great’s
ability to wear down the great alliance formed
against Prussia in the Seven Years War. So his
concept for the December 1944 offensive through
the Ardennes rested on the assumption that by
capturing Antwerp and encircling and destroying
British and American forces, the Allied coalition
would splinter and result in a peace offer.

•

During the Gulf War, Saddam Hussein applied
similar reasoning when he attempted to draw Israel
into the conflict. Israeli retaliation to the Scud
attacks might have unraveled the fragile ties
binding the coalition together.

Hitler’s offensive met a bitter end in the snows of the
Ardennes. Israel’s close relationship with the United States
enabled Israeli political leaders to exercise restraint, and
the anti-Iraq coalition held together, to a considerable
degree due to the part played by liaison teams. Trust was a
key ingredient in sustaining the 1990-91 coalition.
But trust requires time and a measured appraisal of one
another to emerge from personal relationships, particularly
those that cross cultures.

•

In 1981-83, as the Program Manager, Saudi Arabia
National Guard, General John Yeosock earned the
trust of the Saudi leadership. Years later, as the
United States began deploying forces to the region
during Desert Shield, Yeosock was granted access
and host nation support by Saudi officials.

•

The U.S. Army rediscovered the value of liaison
officers in the Gulf War. A group of carefully
selected liaison teams established communications
between Schwarzkopf and major coalition partners.
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The teams in turn reported to the Coalition
Coordination and Communications Integration
Center, which provided information and clarified
orders to coalition members. Later, the center
served as a directed telescope for Schwarzkopf.15 If
we intend to achieve a similar degree of success in
future coalition efforts, including peace operations,
the United States needs to establish programs to
educate and train a cadre capable of communicating
effectively with coalition partners. The time to begin
is now.
Conclusion
Although emerging technology offers promise for
applying precision firepower and swift maneuver through
enhanced information, it will not eliminate the fog and
friction of war. New and improved technologies may
enhance the 21st Century commander’s ability to
communicate with coalition partners, but coalition efforts
may still founder on the shoals of technical incompatibilities, language difficulties, cultural asymmetries, and
ignorance of key historical and geopolitical issues. The
antidote to the fog and friction of coalition warfare is not
technology; it lies in trusted subordinates who can deal
effectively with coalition counterparts.
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TRUST, MORE THAN TECHNOLOGY,
ENSURES INTEROPERABILITY

The intangible, human dimensions of trust, not technology,
will ensure NATO’s future position as the pre-eminent
security alliance during the 21st century.

As the 20th century draws to a close and NATO leaders
pause to celebrate the alliance’s past 50 years of success, it is
timely and appropriate to discuss NATO’s organisational
strategy for the next five decades. Without question, NATO
faces a midlife challenge as the alliance crosses the
threshold of a new millennium. If NATO hopes to step
boldly into the 21st century, it must strengthen its trust
building mechanisms while pursuing the quest for
technological interoperability. To be sure, this technical
interoperability is an important factor and must continue to
he a key organisational focus. Fostering the intangible
sense of trust, however, is more important than the
coordination of tangible technical connections. It is these
human relationships, ultimately, that will ensure NATO’s
continued political and military interoperability.
The primary focus
The organisational blueprint for a viable multinational
partnership must be primarily based upon trust and
subsequently facilitated by technological interoperability
as NATO prepares to resolutely enter the new millennium.
The impediments of technological connectivity pale as
secondary issues when attempting to communicate and
coordinate within a multinational relationship. Trust, not
technology or doctrine nor materiel binds and sustains a
successful alliance especially during times of crisis. Trust,
more than technology, makes its possible to develop
organisational consensus while designing a collective
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solution that may not require the application of standards
from the ‘lowest common denominator test.’
Building a sense of trust and shared interests is a
labour-intensive venture that requires a long-term
commitment of human resources. Professional rapport
between officers of various nations cannot be purchased,
garnered overnight or mandated. Rather, trust must be
nurtured and fostered over a period of time among
individuals who are sensitive to each other’s national or
sub-national concerns. Trust, fostered by regular
consultation, becomes the adhesive that binds a
multinational partnership despite individual national
differences. The foundation of trusting relationships must
be established earlier rather than later to ensure that it will
be available when it may he needed for the complexities of
future strategic and operational battlefield environments.
Allied solidarity
While there are similarities between alliances and
coalitions, politically and structurally they are markedly
different. However, both must achieve unity of effort in
order to he successful. This solidarity requires two
simultaneous methods of communication. The first
presumes a reasonable level of technical interoperability,
whereas the second relies on personal and professional
relationships with counterparts from other nations.
Overcoming the fog and friction of complex military
operations is not a new security challenge and professional
relationships were used long before the invention of the
microchip. Many great leaders from the past were
confronted with complex command and control
requirements and they relied extensively on a network of
trained liaison officers. In fact, the practice of using liaison
officers as ‘directed telescopes’ to facilitate command and
control is almost as old as war itself. Beginning during
antiquity and continuing into the modern era, commanders
have relied upon carefully selected subordinates to serve as
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their eyes, ears and military ambassadors. These trusted
agents, often with direct access to the deliberations that
produced the ‘commander’s intent,’ have provided
invaluable information to subordinate commands
throughout the theatre of many past military operations.
The chronicles of history document examples where a
number of great captains have used trusted liaison officers
to establish and maintain effective command, control and
communication functions. Alexander the Great detailed
junior officers as ambassadors to help control widely
separated columns. Caesar’s staff included aides who
served as observers and couriers for high-priority missions.
Napoleon relied on liaison officers to provide vital
battlefield information and to clarify his intent. Field
Marshal Montgomery was perhaps the most creative user of
such liaison officers during World War II. He selected and
integrated into his personal staff a small group of officers
who routinely interacted with other senior generals and
civilian political leaders1. I These historical examples raise
a central question for us today: are we preparing young
officers in our schools and training institutions to effectively
function within a composite multinational environment as
contemporary directed telescopes?
New and improved technologies will most certainly
improve the 21st century commander’s ability to
communicate with alliance partners, but operations may
still founder on the shoals of technical incompatibilities,
language difficulties, cultural asymmetries and ignorance
of key historical and geopolitical issues. The antidote for
this type of fog and fiction is not more technology; it lies in
trusted subordinates and liaison officers who can deal
effectively with military and civilian counterparts. In an
era of short-notice deployments with complex mission
requirements, we need to examine the anticipated demands
for sophisticated liaison personnel who would perform the
tasks of foreign area specialist with ambassador-like
responsibilities. Their skills should include not only
language proficiency but also an understanding of cultural
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and historical differences between one or more alliance
partners.
The technology solution
The quest for technological interoperability has a
number of inherent limitations. But, we can not ignore the
need to address this challenge; it must be a part of the
overall plan for the future. Increased attention must be
given to the accelerating pace of technological change and
the different rates of acquisition that will permit NATO
members to introduce these advanced capabilities into their
inventories. In reality, there is not enough money within
any of the defence budgets to attain and sustain
technological interoperability among the entire NATO
alliance and the states within its developing Partnership for
Peace effort. The growing number of nations and the sheer
cost of acquiring common or interoperable equipment most
certainly makes it impossible to always guarantee system
interoperibility.
Further complicating this matter is the rapid rate of
change within command, control, communication and
information links. In many instances, the technological
half-life of these systems is such that military equipment is
often obsolete before units can field and train with these
systems. In the meantime, availability of off-the-shelf
technology may allow potential adversaries the opportunity
to procure the most current equipment while alliance
members struggle to use obsolete equipment. There is no
‘technological silver bullet’ and even though technology will
always be a supporting dimension of multinational
operations, it will never become the panacea chat will
overcome the fog and friction of complex military
operations.
Enduring strategic solutions
The new century will most certainly bring a new form of
future warfare. We should expect the information age to
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alter the means of future warfare just as decisively as the
machine age altered the conduct of war during the 19th and
20th century. There is a historic and symbiotic relationship
between advancing technology and the evolving means of
warfare.2 The sense of relative stability, maintained
through the balance of power that existed during the Cold
War, will be more difficult to achieve during the next 20
years as long-standing, multi-polar tensions erupt and
competing hegemons attempt to dominate their respective
regions. Conflict will abound as some nations redress
historic grievances and others open old wounds that have
been festering for centuries.
During the past decade, Western democracies and
others, mindful of the social need to contain the spread of
violence, have demonstrated increased willingness to use
military force to defuse internal or regional political
conflicts or to respond to humanitarian crises. In many
instances, the need for synchronised NATO military action
may be greater than in the past. There are numerous vital
political and military outcomes that can only be achieved
through the actions of an alliance or coalition. The raison
d’être frequently involves more than the need to assemble
equal or compatible military partners. Alliances and
coalitions have historically provided military commanders
with the opportunity to achieve an overwhelming mass of
force on the battlefield They also provide the organisational
framework for demonstrating political consensus.3
In many cases, the political heft of multinational
partnerships may be the single most important commodity
as the ‘war of national resolve’ is waged. Moreover, this
solidarity may be the only way to achieve enduring,
strategic solutions within a complex web of international
security concerns.
The next frontier
NATO has five decades of remarkable achievement and
we anticipate this outstanding track record to continue well
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into the next century. As this multinational partnership
seeks to sustain regional peace and security throughout
Europe, we should expect complex future security
challenges that will require the commitment of military
capabilities. Planning these future NATO-sponsored
operations will require particular attention to the
challenges of technical interoperability. In fact, NATO’s
current membership action plan encourages aspirant
members to pursue interoperability upon accession into
NATO. The next two decades, most certainly, will place new
demands upon NATO’s command and control capabilities
and highlight the need for increased system
interoperability. This technical connectivity, however, is a
secondary issue when examined against the requirement
for human factors that promote multinational
‘interoperability.’ The organisation and efficiency of any
alliance or coalition operation will ultimately depend upon a
single, intangible characteristic-trust. The foundation for
this collaboration must be built upon a sense of mutual
respect, tolerance and a commitment to the shared values of
democracy. Our senior leaders must foster the military
education and staff exchange programmes that will develop
a generation of sophisticated liaison officers capable of
facilitating the challenging, multinational operations
alliance members will face in the next century.
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IN WAR, THE U.S. CAN’T GO IT ALONE

Are military coalitions political relics of the past or
viable instruments of modern political power? Some
analysts argue that coalition warfare, like the dinosaur, is
traveling a path toward extinction.
These commentators use the growing technological gap
between militaries as the primary rationale to suggest that
the United States will no longer be able to fight alongside a
less technically developed military. Moreover, fighting
doctrine, language, and other cultural differences seem to
impede rather than bond nations into a coalition that will be
able to fight for a common cause.
On the other hand, to envision the United States trying
to fight any future war without partners is inconceivable.
The United States has fought all its modern wars as a
member of a coalition, and we will find coalitions to be
militarily viable well into the 21st Century. Furthermore,
future coalitions will continue to provide America’s leaders
with the most reliable means of achieving successful,
enduring strategic results.
To be sure, America’s political leaders will always
reserve the option to apply military force unilaterally when
a nation-state or hostile state-like actor has violated our
interests or those of our allies. These tactical military
actions can be used either to destroy a capability surgically
or to administer punishment for an aggressor’s offending
actions.
The results of precision strikes are immediately
perceived, but rarely enduring. They provide us, without
question, a temporary national gratification or perhaps a
sense of moral victory. At best, they signal to rogue actors
our watchful commitment to international security and
regional stability.
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However,
long-lasting
strategic effects will only be
realized when the convergence of
mutual national interests
unleashes the international will
of a coalition.
There are various vital
political and military outcomes
that can only be achieved
through the actions of a
coalition. Its raison d’etre
frequently involves more than
the need to assemble equal or Reproduced with permission
from Martin Kozlowski.
compatible military partners.
Coalitions have historically
provided military commanders with the opportunity to
achieve an overwhelming mass of force on the battlefield.
Coalitions also provide the organizational framework for
developing and demonstrating political consensus.
War has always been a test of national wills. The conduct
of war involves more than the destruction of physical
resources. Beyond the boundaries of the battlefield, war
must ultimately influence public perception and public
opinion. Victory is only achieved when you break the
national determination of your opponent and persuade him
to accept your final terms and conditions for peace. The
political heft of a coalition becomes an invaluable
commodity as the “war of national resolve” is waged.
Ultimately, the formation of any coalition hinges upon a
single, intangible characteristic—trust. The impediments
of national and cultural differences pale as secondary issues
when attempting to communicate within a coalition. Trust,
not technology nor doctrine or materiel, binds and sustains
a successful coalition.
Building this sense of trust and shared interests is a
labor-intensive venture that requires a long-term commitment of resources. Professional rapport between officers of
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various nations cannot be purchased, garnered overnight,
or mandated. Rather, trust must be nurtured and fostered
over a period of time among individuals who are sensitive to
each other’s national or subnational concerns.
Trust becomes the adhesive that binds a coalition
despite individual national differences. The foundation of
trust must be established earlier rather than later to ensure
that it will be available when it may be needed for the
complexities of strategic and operational battlefield
environments.
The information age promises to change the nature of
21st Century warfare just as decisively as the machine age
altered the course of war in the 19th Century. But the need
to fight within a coalition will prevail as an urgent political
and military necessity. We should anticipate not only a
seismic shift in the character of technology, but also an
increasingly complex web of international security
concerns.
Global restraint, maintained through the balance of
power that existed during the Cold War, will be more
difficult to achieve as long-standing, multi-polar tensions
erupt, and competing hegemonies attempt to dominate
their regions. Conflicts will abound as some nations redress
historic grievances and others open old wounds that have
been festering for centuries.
In many instances, the need for military coalitions will
be greater than in the past because coalition warfare will be
the only way to achieve enduring, strategic solutions.
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EUROPE AS A STRATEGIC STAGING BASE
FOR 21st CENTURY STABILIZATION
OPERATIONS

Toward the end of 1995, I was privileged to launch and
then participate in, for some 2 and 1/2 years, the Army’s
so-called Army After Next (AAN) Project, which sought to
define the shape and character of landpower beyond the
year 2010 and to investigate two of the principal factors that
cause styles of war to change—technology and geostrategy.
We had some powerful tools to help us hypothesize what
conflict might look like out beyond 2010, including both
tactical and strategic war games and numerous
conferences. AAN war games were conducted at Fort
Leavenworth and Carlisle Barracks, and because of the
complexity were extremely difficult to do. The Army’s great
doctrinal revolution had occurred in the late 1970s and
early 1980s at the operational level, and that was difficult
enough. But now we were attempting to reestablish the
tenets of landpower during warfare at the next higher level.
We conducted a series of exercises using force on force in
free-play scenarios. It is really challenging to replicate
National Training Center exercises in the computer-based
simulations of Collins Hall at the Army War College, but we
did it four times.
Collaterally, in conducting a historical inquiry into the
changing cycles and patterns of war, we observed that war
has mutated from wars of religion to wars of kings to wars of
nations to wars of ideology, and so forth. Increasingly, it
became apparent that the fall of the Soviet empire might
foster a new era of wars characterized by ethnic and cultural
conflict. Accordingly, we postulated a clash in the year 2020
involving a newly emergent hegemonic power in central
Asia seeking to reestablish ethnic and cultural dominance
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over a small country in southeastern Europe. The
hegemonic power aimed to achieve its strategic and
operational objectives quickly—that is, to put forces on the
victim’s ground, disperse them, and then begin a process of
cultural transformation in that country before the United
States could project forces into the region and initiate an
effective response.
We also made a series of visits, an intellectual odyssey if
you will, to representatives of all the major armies around
the world island. For my part, I spent almost 2 years doing
this, enjoying an opportunity to conduct searching discourse
with the leaders of most of the armies in eastern and central
Asia. Based upon impressions gleaned from my visit and
similar visits by other AAN Project team members, we
formulated a general outline of what the nature of conflict
might be out to the year 2025 and beyond. It tended to
confirm our earlier suspicions, based upon historical
investigation, that the most likely causes for conflict during
that period would be ethnic and cultural in nature.
It seemed to us that such conflicts would arise along
those historical borders separating traditionally
antagonistic economic, religious, ethnic, national, or
cultural groupings. The territories of such disputants are
analogous to geological tectonic plates, colliding against and
ultimately riding over or sinking under adjacent plates in
an eternal friction of heat, strife, and violence. Such
collisions have been the occasion of major wars for the last
5,000 years. To borrow Samuel Huntington’s famous fault
line analogy (“The Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs,
Summer 1993), it seemed to us that the greatest potential
for serious combat during our time frame would occur along
these traditional fault lines.
History clearly shows that when the artificial caps that
suppress or sublimate ethnic and cultural conflict are
removed, the actors revert to this approach and conflict
resumes. Thus it seemed to us that the maintenance of
security and stability along these fault lines would depend
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on the ability of political structures to manage the
inevitable tensions by means short of war. In any event, we
were certain we knew where tensions were most likely to
flare into outright hostilities. That is why we chose
southeastern Europe as the setting for our first war game. It
happens that this particular region marks the intersection
of not two but three fault lines—Eastern Orthodox
Christianity, Islam, and Western Christianity.
In talking to the potential major actors, it seemed to us
that we were seeing an almost spontaneous process of
change well under way among many of the armies around
the world island. We observed, first of all, a shedding of Cold
War baggage and attitudes. I was struck particularly by
how quickly armies of the world are relinquishing major
weapon systems and readjusting their style of war to a light
force milieu. Even in large mass armies, such as those
around the Asian rim, we saw a process of streamlining and
lightening of the forces. Perhaps surprisingly, another
interesting phenomenon we observed was an attempt by the
officer corps in many of these armies to forego corruption
and doctrinaire ideological stances—thus producing a more
mature, professional, and better-educated officer class.
It was also somewhat of a shock to discover how
knowledgeable of American operational methods many of
these officers are. They also are intensely curious about how
Americans fight. More specifically, they are interested in
our doctrinal focus on the operational art. These armies in
many ways have moved into the era that we faced back in
the early 1970s. Much as we did, they moved from a tactical
focus to one more directed at operational art and
operational maneuver. Strategically, they seem bent on
deflecting the ability of major world powers to interfere with
their own hegemonic ambitions, principally by defeating
incursions from air and sea.
They are also turning their attention to information
technologies, but they come at it from a different vantage
point than we do. The last trip I made was to China. I had a
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chance to talk to my counterpart in that country. Many of
his questions and comments dealt with information
technology, information warfare, and so forth. His take was
quite interesting. He said,
General, the information age is neutral; you have your style of
war that is facilitated by information technology. It gives you
the ability to see with great clarity and to strike with great
speed and precision. But in our style of war, information
technology is also helpful because the Internet and cellular
communications allow us to do what we do best, which is to fight
wars of area control; to capitalize on the endurance of our
people; to exploit time and the inherent power of forces on the
defensive to disperse, to go to ground, to control wide areas of
territory, and still to maintain the ability to mass on demand.1

The only English term he used during our conversation was
“non-nodal Army,” as contained in the following sentence
delivered in Chinese:“ What we seek to build is a non-nodal
army.” He was saying that modern distributive
communications would permit control of massed armies
without the necessity of large, cumbersome, hierarchical
control headquarters.
Thus as the tectonic plates begin to collide in the
post-2010 time frame, they are going to bring with them the
possibility of collisions between different styles of warfare
along these critical lines of contact. It seems to us that the
war in Kosovo may very well have provided a foretaste of
how such warfare might play out in the future.
Beyond the year 2010, though we might not see the rise
of a true peer competitor, we may very well see the
emergence of what was referred to in our AAN study as a
“major competitor,” one that uses its inherent strengths to
counter our inherent weaknesses. In practically every
country I visited, when I asked the question, “What are
America’s military weaknesses?” the answer that came
back was “aversion to casualties and the political need to
end the war quickly.” Therefore, as one officer told me,
“Time is our friend and time is your enemy.” Another
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recalled to me the famous response of Ho Chi Minh in 1964
when a French journalist asked him how he could possibly
expect to beat the world’s most technologically advanced
country: “They will kill many of us, we will kill a few of them,
and they will tire first.”
Major competitors out beyond the year 2010 will not try
to re-create a bipolar world. They won’t try to match the
United States weapon system for weapon system. They will
focus on landpower and the ability to maintain an army in
being. Their object will not be to defeat the United States,
but rather to avoid losing. Meanwhile time will take its toll,
or so the thinking goes, on the American popular will, and
victory will accrue to our competitor by default. Remember
Vietnam?
Now what does all this have to do with America’s future
relation with Europe? To go back to the AAN war games
played in 1997 and 1998, in every one of those war games
the critical element in achieving success was the ability of
American forces to arrive early and position themselves so
as to prevent the enemy from settling in and establishing
control over the areas comprising his operational and
strategic objectives. And regardless of the site of actual
hostilities—in southeastern Europe, in Northeast Asia, or
in the Middle East—Europe remained the critical launch
platform.
Though we assumed initially that we would be able to
project forces from the continental United States early
enough to block the enemy on the ground and thwart his
operational design, we later found that expectation to be
totally unrealistic. Some form of forward stationing,
whether of materiel or forces in being, had to be available at
strategic intermediate staging bases in Europe. The forces
already in Europe were usually the ones that arrived in the
theater of hostilities first and applied the initial preemptive
counterstroke. This action was critical because if the enemy
succeeded in accomplishing his initial objectives, then
friction became a problem, time turned against us,
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casualties began to mount, resolve began to erode, and a
successful outcome became extremely problematic.
It thus seemed to us in the AAN business that Europe
would continue to have a vital role to play in the
maintenance of global security and stability. It sits astride
or near the intersection of three of the most active and
dangerous strategic tectonic plates. Thus, whether as a site
of conflict or solution for conflict, Europe remains critical on
proximity grounds alone. Moreover, it represents a secure
intermediate staging base that proved decisive in all our
war scenarios.
Does that mean that the nature of our forces in Europe
should remain immutable? While our games did not answer
that question specifically, they seemed to suggest that tasks
like humanitarian support, force projection support, C4ISR,
forward intelligence support, and forward logistics basing
are becoming increasingly important.2 The possession of a
forward logistics base will become particularly essential. It
may therefore be that over the next 15 to 20 years the nature
and character of forces in the region will change to reflect
these growing support priorities. Whatever the precise
nature of the forces in Europe, however, the AAN studies,
exercises, and war games led me to conclude that Europe
will continue to be a critical arena for the maintenance of
global security, and that the United States can most
efficiently and effectively contribute to such security by
retaining appropriate forces in Europe.
ENDNOTES
1.Conversation with PLA senior leaders at the Nanjing Army
Command College, Nanjing, China, August 21, 1998.
2.The acronym C4ISR encompasses command, control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance.
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Adaptive Enemies: Achieving Victory By
Avoiding Defeat

Authors Introductory Note
This article was developed immediately after the war in
Kosovo. It is an adaptation of Chapter Four, which was
written after a trip to Asia in1998. In the original article
that was published by STRATEGIC REVIEW, I suggessted
that foreign militaries were beginning to perceive our
fixation on a firepower-centered way of war as an
exploitable weakness. In fact, some states, armed with
experience gained against us in real war, had already begun
to evolve a doctrine to counter our superiority in precision.
These potential adversaries have concluded that dispersion,
deception, patience and a willingness to absorb punishment
offers the means to endure precision strike long enough to
outlast a technologically superior foe. Subsequent practical
experience in Kosovo caused me to modify this argument
somewhat, but not much. This essay also introduces my
Newton Corollary thesis that suggests the chronicles of
military history clearly indicate each dominant military
advantage eventually yields to a countervailing response.
This battlefield trend is very discernable. Adaptive
opponents, moreover, have been learning faster and we
must aniticpate a future military challenge that will
attempt to defeat our preoccupation with precision strike.
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ADAPTIVE ENEMIES: ACHIEVING VICTORY
BY AVOIDING DEFEAT

Once the dogs of war are unleashed, and the shooting
begins in earnest, conflicts tend to follow unpredictable
courses. As Clausewitz warned many times in his military
classic,1 wars are contests between two active, willing
opponents both of whom expect to win. Thus an action by
one side to gain advantage precipitates a response by the
opponent to counter it. Once begun, war with its neatly
crafted plans and comforting expectations quickly devolves
into a series of stratagems and counter stratagems by both
sides as each seeks to retain advantage on the battlefield
long enough to gain a decisive end by collapsing the enemy’s
will to resist.2
In spite of its video game image, NATO’s war against the
Serbs proved to be no exception to the classic Clausewitzian
construct. The Serbs sought to overcome a tremendous
materiel and techno- logical disadvantage by capitalizing on
their own strengths: the ability to gain operational
objectives quickly and then disperse in order to avoid the
inevitable aerial assault they knew would follow. The Serbs
trusted that patience, tenacity, guile and the ability to
sequester ground forces throughout the countryside would
give them the interval they needed to out wait the resolve of
the NATO coalition. This plan, however, did not work. The
political will of the NATO coalition proved to be stronger in
the end than that of the Serbs. But the skill and
1. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard
and Peter Paret, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976.
2. This Adaptive Enemy thesis was originally published within the Winter
1999 issue of Strategic Review. Major portions of this JFQ essay are
reproduced with permission granted by Strategic Review.
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perseverance of the Serbian army, in the face of an
overwhelming onslaught by a thousand or more NATO
aircraft armed with precision weapons, present us with a
compelling demonstration of a thinking, creative, and
adaptive opponent who can foil the best prepared plans of a
superior opponent simply by capitalizing on his own
inherent strengths while minimizing those of the
opposition.
For the last fifty years the militaries of the Western
powers, and particularly the United States, have been
remarkably consistent in how they have chosen to go to war.
We have inherited the remarkable ability to translate
technological innovation, industrial capacity and national
wealth into effective battlefield advantages because of our
enormous defense expenditures during the Cold War.
However, in this new era of limited wars, our commitment
to limited ends now demands the use of limited means.
Therefore, the lives of our soldiers have become our most
precious resource and we increasingly seek to develop a
method of war that will replace manpower expenditures
with an ever multiplying expenditure of firepower.
But as we have seen in Kosovo, our future enemies are
watching. They understand our preoccupation with
firepower. Therefore, we should not be surprised when we
encounter a future opponent who has learned how to nullify
our firepower advantage. We have consistently been slow to
perceive the growing effectiveness of the opposition in part
because of a characteristic Western arrogance that
presumes that, to be a challenge, non-Western militaries
must either symmetrically challenge us or mimic Western
ways of war. As a result, the growing skill among
non-Western militaries at countering our firepower
centered method of war has remained shrouded in the
shadows of unfamiliar military cultures. Thus, U.S.
military analysts have missed much of the discourse and
experimentation occurring among thinking military
institutions outside the West due in part to the cultural
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schism that divides the world’s advanced industrial
democracies from the other four-fifths of the planet.
The Serbs were certainly not the first opponent to
demonstrate adaptive strategies against our Western way
of war. More than five decades ago, the Japanese
demonstrated their analytical ability to survive America’s
firepower intensive attacks during the closing months of the
Pacific campaign in World War II. During the battles of
1943 and 1944, the Americans won a series of quick and
decisive victories by using the mobility and firepower of
their amphibious forces. But the Japanese carefully
observed this method of attack and by the end of 1944 they
had entirely revamped their defensive plans for the islands
that guarded the approaches to their Homeland.
In Okinawa, the Japanese abandoned their failed
doctrine of beach defense and buried their force under a vast
array of pillboxes, switch lines, and deep bunkers to carry
out an extended defensive scheme centered in the southern
portion of Okinawa. The Japanese recognized that they
could never match American firepower, but they maximized
what little firepower they had by using mortars and
artillery in sufficient numbers and with enough deadly
effect so as not to completely cede the firepower advantage
to the Americans. Fighting their way through deep
defensive lines, the Marines and Soldiers eventually took
the island and destroyed the Japanese Tenth Army—with
approximately 70,000 Japanese soldiers and 70,000
Japanese civilians killed. But the U.S. casualty bill for the
island fighting was horrendous: 65,631 killed or wounded.
The Chinese Civil War:
Soon thereafter, another effort to redefine and codify an
Eastern approach to defeating the Western way of war
began in the mountain fastness of Manchuria immediately
after the end of the Pacific war. Mao Tse-tung and his
marshals developed a body of doctrine adapted from their
successful wartime guerrilla campaigns and modified their
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concepts to fit the demands of a conventional war fought
against an enemy superior in technology and materiel.3 Mao
perfected his new way of war against the nationalists
during the Chinese Civil War fought between 1946 and
1949. His concepts were simple and centered around three
tenets, the first and most important of which was “area
control.” To be successful Mao’s army first needed to survive
in the midst of a larger, better-equipped enemy.4 To ensure
survival he divided his army into small units and scattered
them across a broad expanse of territory. Controlling and
maintaining cohesion among such a disparate and scattered
force was and remained his greatest challenge.
Once his force was supportable and stable, Mao
proceeded to apply the second tenet, which was to “isolate
and compartmentalize” Nationalist forces. The challenge of
this phase was to leverage control of the countryside to such
a degree that the enemy gradually retreated into urban
areas and along major rail and road lines of
communications.5 The final act of the campaign demanded
an ability to find the enemy’s weakest points in order to
collect and mass overwhelming force against each point
sequentially, much as one might take apart a string of
pearls, one pearl at a time. Mao’s new style of conventional
war, while effective, demanded an extraordinary degree of
discipline and patience to persevere under extreme
hardships. It also demanded the ability to transition quickly
from an area control force to a force capable of fighting a war
of movement.

3. Mao Zedong, “On the International Front Against Fascism,” Selected
Works of Mao Tse-Tung, Vol. III, Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1967;
William H. Whitson, The Chinese High Command: A History of
Communist Politics, 1927-1971, New York: Praeger Press, 1973.
4. Mao Zedong, Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, Vol. I and Vol. III, Beijing:
Foreign Language Press, 1967.
5. Frederick Fu (F.F.) Liu, A Military History of Modern China: 1924-1949,
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956.
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From China to Korea:
Within a year of the end of the Chinese Civil War, the
Americans severely tested Mao’s methods in Korea. During
the early days of the Chinese intervention—beginning in
October 1950—the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) badly
misjudged the killing effect of American artillery and
tactical air power. Pushed too quickly into maneuver
warfare, the Chinese massed in the open, often in daylight,
to expand their control over the northern portions of the
Korean Peninsula.6 They extended their narrow lines of
communications farther down the mountainous spine of
Korea as they advanced.7 But they soon found their logistic
support exposed to the terrible effects of American air
power. The Chinese paid a horrific price for their haste.
Their spring 1951 offensive sputtered to a halt as U.S.
artillery and aerial firepower slaughtered Chinese soldiers
in masses, while air interdiction cut their supply lines and
forced a retreat back across the Han.
Brutal experiences led quickly to sober lessons relearned
from the Chinese Civil War. As a highly skilled complex
adaptive system, the Chinese Army quickly adjusted to the
actual conditions of this new war. Over the next two years,
subsequent Chinese attacks remained limited and
controlled. The Chinese high command learned to hold
most key logistic facilities north of the Yalu River well out of
reach of U.S. air attacks. South of the river the Chinese
dispersed and hid their forces while they massed only in the
period immediately before launching an attack. PLA
soldiers moved at night and chiseled their front lines of
resistance deep into hard, granite mountains. American
casualties soon mounted, while the Chinese stabilized their

6. Bin Yu, “What China Learned from Its Forgotten War in Korea,” Strategic
Review, Summer 1998.
7.

Russell Spurr, Enter the Dragon: China’s Undeclared War Against the
U.S. in Korea, 1950-51, New York: Newmarket Press, 1987.
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casualties at a rate acceptable to their political
leadership. Far more Americans died in combat during this
“stability phase” of the war than during the earlier period of
fluid warfare. A cost acceptable to the Chinese became too
costly to the Americans. The result was an operational and
strategic stalemate. To the Chinese, stalemate equaled
victory.8
From Korea To Vietnam:
Over the next two decades the Vietnamese borrowed
extensively from the Chinese experience and found creative
ways to lessen the killing effect of firepower, first against
the French and then against the Americans. The
Vietnamese also proved highly skilled in adapting to the
new challenges posed by their Western opponents. The Viet
Minh based their tactical and operational approach on
Mao’s unconventional methods. Their conduct of the battle
was remarkably reminiscent of siege operations conducted
by the PLA during the Chinese Civil War. In both cases the
secret of success proved to be dispersion and careful
preparation of the battlefield. The Viet Minh remained
scattered in small units whenever possible to offer smaller,
and thus less detectable and less lucrative targets, and to
allow their troops to live off the land. Fewer supply lines and
logistic sites offered even fewer opportunities for
interdiction fires.
To win, the Chinese, and eventually the Viet Minh,
needed to attack. Successful attacks demanded the ability
to mass, at least temporarily. The Viet Minh needed to
exercise great care in massing under the enemy’s umbrella
of protective firepower. Superior intelligence provided
sufficient information to select the right time and place.
Their ability to collect and orchestrate the movement of tens
8. T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, New York: The Macmillan Company,
1963.
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of thousands of soldiers at just the right moment allowed
attacking forces to collapse the enemy’s defenses before
French firepower could regain the advantage. This
remarkable ability to “maneuver under fire” perfected
against the Nationalist Chinese and the French, reached
new levels of refinement during the second Indo-China War
against the United States.
General Giap learned quickly to accommodate his
strategic plans to the new realities imposed by American
firepower. The North Vietnamese relearned the importance
of dispersion and patience. They redistributed their forces
to keep their most vulnerable units outside the range of
American artillery while they moved their logistic system
away from battle areas into sanctuaries relatively safe from
aerial detection and strikes. Thus, the VC and NVA dusted
off and applied many of the same methods that had proven
useful in previous Asian wars against Western style armies.
From Vietnam to Afghanistan:
Half a decade later, and half a continent away in
Afghanistan, the Soviets learned the same harsh, firsthand
lessons of overconfidence when first-world military
organizations confront third-world militaries which have
the will, tenacity, and skill to remain effective in the field
despite complete firepower inferiority. Year after year, the
Soviets arrayed themselves for conventional combat and
pushed methodically up the Panjir Valley only to be
expelled a few months later by a seemingly endless and
psychologically debilitating series of methodical and
well-placed ambuscades and minor skirmishes. Borrowing
a page from the American textbook in Vietnam, the Soviets
tried to exploit the firepower, speed, and intimidating
potential of armed helicopters. They employed helicopters
principally as convoy escorts and to provide fire support. At
times, Hind helicopters proved enormously lethal and
effective, particularly early in the war, when the
Mujahideen were psychologically unprepared. But the
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Mujahideen eventually borrowed a page from the
Vietnamese textbook. They first learned to employ heavy
antiaircraft machine guns and later Stinger shoulder-fired
missiles to shoot the gunships down in increasing numbers.
The result of military frustration and defeat in Afghanistan
presaged the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Israel and the Middle East:
Beginning in 1982, after nearly three decades of failure
in open warfare, an alliance of Arab state and non-state
actors pushed Israeli mechanized forces out of Beirut. Back
streets, tall buildings, and other forms of urban clutter
provided the Arabs just enough respite from the firepower
intensive methods of the Israelis to wear away Israeli
morale both in the field and at home. Unable to bring the full
force of their superior maneuverability and shock effect to
bear, the Israelis paused just short of their operational
objectives. Excessive casualties and the public images of
bloody excesses on both sides eventually resulted in an
Israeli withdrawal from Beirut. This success in Beirut soon
provided Israel’s enemies in the region with a new and
promising method to offset the Israeli superiority in open
mechanized combat. Now a spectrum of low-tech threats,
that run the gamut from weapons of mass destruction
delivered by crude ballistic missiles, to random acts of
terrorism, to children throwing rocks at soldiers, confront
an increasingly frustrated Israeli military and public.
One of the more curious ironies of the recent wars in the
Middle East has been the fact that Western style militaries
have had great success when fighting against non-Western
enemies who mimic Western firepower doctrines. The Gulf
War is the most recent example of failed efforts by Arab
states stretching back through the conflicts in the Middle
East to 1948. In 1973, Arab armies enjoyed some measure of
success while employing Western methods, but their
success was as much due to Israeli overconfidence as to the
limited aims the Arabs sought.
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Operation Desert Storm:
During the Gulf War, despite an extraordinary level of
incompetence at the highest level of the Iraqi leadership,
the Iraqi Army displayed considerable capacity to adapt on
the battlefield. As the American air campaign began to
focus on the destruction of the Iraqi ground forces in the
Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO) in early February, the
Iraqis almost immediately began to adapt in order to limit
their losses.9 By constructing berms around their tanks and
by scattering them widely across the desert, the Iraqis
insured that an aircraft dropping precision-guided bombs
would only be able, at best, to destroy a single vehicle with
each pass. By burning tires next to operational vehicles they
spoofed their tormentors into missing the real targets; and
finally by using antiaircraft effectively they kept a
substantial portion of coalition aircraft at an altitude where
they were unable to do substantial damage.
The best trained Iraqi units endured several weeks of
allied air bombardment with unbroken will and their
combat capability essentially intact. The most impressive
indication of the Iraqi ability to adapt came in the
operational movement of a substantial portion of the
Republican Guard during the first hours of Desert Storm.
Elements of two divisions shifted from a southeastern
defensive orientation to defensive positions facing to the
southwest along the Wadi al-Batin. In those positions the
Tawakalna Republican Guard Division and the 50th and
37th Armored Brigades would be destroyed by the U.S. VII
Corps.10 Nevertheless, sacrifice by these units provided
time for the remainder of the Republican Guard to escape.
Significantly, the Republican Guard carried out this
movement in terrain and weather conditions ideally suited
9.

Robert H. Scales, Certain Victory: The U.S. Army in the Gulf War,
Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff United States Army, 1993.

10. Scales, op. cit.
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to interdiction and despite the overwhelming superiority of
coalition air power.
NATO and Kosovo:
Placed in suitable historical context, the Serbian
response to the NATO onslaught is nothing more than
another data point along a continuum of progressive,
predictable adaptation by technologically dispossessed
militaries who are willing to challenge Western militaries
armed with superior precision firepower. Like their fellow
Asian travelers, the Serbs sought victory by avoiding defeat.
In a similar fashion, the Serbs conceded the vertical
dimension of the battlespace to NATO. They were content
with an approach that only hoped to shoot down a few allied
aircraft using ground mounted guns and missiles. This hope
was underscored with the expectation that a few dead or
captured allied airmen would contribute to the gradual
degradation of NATO’s resolve. Even if a shoot down was
not possible, the Serbian force sought to keep their
antiaircraft assets sufficiently viable because they knew
ground targets would be difficult to spot from high altitudes.
The surest way for the Serbians to avoid defeat was to
keep their army in the field viable — both to act as a defiant
symbol of national resolve and to be the legitimate Serbian
guarantor of sovereignty over the occupied territory. To
maintain an effective “army in being,” the Serbs likewise
borrowed from successful past precedents. Units quickly
went to ground, and dispersed across a broad expanse of
territory. They quickly computed the pace at which the
allies could find, target, and strike uncovered targets and
then devised the means to relocate mobile targets inside the
allied sensor-to-shooter envelope. Camouflage, decoys and
spoofing techniques proven so effective by Asian armies
were repeated with varying degrees of success by the Serbs.
As the allies became more proficient at spotting troops, the
Serbs sought even greater dispersal and went deeper to
ground.
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Toward the end of the conflict, significant success from
the air came with the appearance of an infant ground
presence in Kosovo in the form of the Kosovo Liberation
Army. The KLA was not terribly effective in open combat
against the better armed Serbs but the presence of large
scale KLA units amongst them forced the Serbs to come out
of protective cover and mass. The results were predictable
and remarkably consistent with past experiences in combat
against the Chinese and NVA. Troops moving, massed, and
in the open present the most lucrative targets for
destruction by fire from the air. Yet the Serbian army was
never severely damaged because it was simply too large and
well protected to be completely destroyed from the air.
Since total destruction was not feasible, as in all battles of
attrition, the contest in Kosovo soon devolved into a test of
time and will. Ultimate victory would be achieved by the
side that could endure the longest without collapsing their
national resolve. Once it became evident to Milosevic that
NATO’s political resolve would not be broken before a
threatened ground assault could materialize, he chose, as
always, the most expedient path. Seeking to ensure his own
political survival, the Serbian leader ceded Kosovo to the
Allies.
Implications for the Future:
The example of Kosovo again reinforces the conclusion
that non-Western militaries are increasingly internalizing
the lessons of recent wars against technologically superior
foes. Recent thoughts and writings concerning the
operational and tactical problems confronting them in a
fight against Western style military organizations suggest
some clear warnings for the future.
First, non-Western militaries understand that the West
does possess vulnerabilities: an aversion to casualties and
excessive collateral damage, a sensitivity to domestic and
world opinion, and an apparent lack of commitment to
prepare for and fight wars that are measured in years
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rather than months. They also perceive that Americans, in
particular, still remain committed to a style of war focused
primarily on the single offensive dimension of precision
strike. Moreover, they are already thinking about how to
target Western vulnerabilities while capitalizing on their
three intrinsic advantages: time, will, and the inherent
power of the defensive. Taking a page from Mao and Giap’s
strategy, our potential future opponents have learned the
value of time and patience. From their perspective, swift
success is not essential to achieve ultimate victory.
Future adversaries have also discovered the apparent
advantages that can be gained when they interfere with an
intruding power’s intention to end the conflict quickly and
at minimum cost. Thus, the logic of their strategy will lead
to efforts that impede rather than prevent the intrusion of a
Western opponent. In recent wars, non-Western armies
have learned to limit the damage and duration of air
campaigns by dispersing their forces in the field and by
distributing telecommunications, logistics, and
transportation infrastructures as widely as possible.
Moreover, they understand that sophisticated air defense
networks, whose effectiveness depends on airfields, surface
to air missile sites, and complicated and vulnerable
command and control nodes, have become more of a liability
than an asset.
Once conflict on the ground begins, potential opponents
understand they must capitalize on their superior mass to
offset the lethal firepower and precision technology of
Western armies. They will capitalize on the positional
advantages of being on the defensive in or near their own
territory. As they gain confidence, they will search for
opportunities to mass sufficient force to achieve local
successes. As in the air campaign, the enemy will seek to
frustrate Western ground forces by employing just enough
modern weaponry to extend the campaign indefinitely. A
few precision cruise missiles against major logistic bases
will add to the casualty bill that Western militaries must
explain to their civilian populations back home. The object
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will not be decisive victory, but rather stalemate. More
importantly, a stalemate arrangement will inevitably
result in the erosion of Western political support for the
conflict, especially if it is sustained for any prolonged period
of time.
Early Signals of Change:
As non-Western militaries develop concepts for
defeating the American firepower-centered method of war,
the character and composition of their forces will slowly
change. The impulse that existed during the Cold War to
mimic Western force structures is rapidly disappearing.
Foreign militaries that were once Cold War clones are
taking on identities unique to their own culture and
societies. The mountains of metal, consisting of expensive
yet often second-rate air, sea, and ground machines of war
that today serve as potentially lucrative targets in a conflict
against modern Western militaries are rapidly disappearing. Non-Western armies, in particular, are getting
lighter. The need to survive and remain effective against the
threat of overwhelming Western killing power is forcing
them to develop means to disperse, hide, or if possible
eliminate the vulnerable logistics, transportation, and
telecommunications facilities that now characterize the
Western way of war.
Evidence of this trend lies in the shopping lists of many
wealthier non-Western militaries. Instead of investing in
sophisticated aircraft and blue water fleets, most are
purchasing or developing cheap weapons of mass
destruction and methods of delivering those weapons.
Mines, both sea and land, as well as distributed air defense
weapons add credence to the conclusion that the intent of
these militaries is to use such weapons as a means to keep
potential enemies at bay. Most defense expenditures and
attention are going toward land forces because armies
provide political legitimacy in non-democratic states. They
are also the most useful instrument for regional wars of
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aggression, as well as the surest means for suppressing
internal dissent and thwarting troublesome outsiders.

The Information Age Is Neutral:
At present there are too many in the U.S. and other
Western military organizations who believe that they can
best address the appearance of a major competitor in the
next century by exploring the technologies of the
information age to develop ever more effective means of
finding the enemy and killing him from a distance. There
are, unfortunately, a number of troubling concerns with this
premise. The most obvious is that the information
revolution will be neutral in this looming competition; in
fact it may favor the competition more than it favors
Western militaries because potential enemies will be able to
tailor new technologies to their particular style of war
without becoming information-dependent. On one hand, the
increasing flow of information is quite literally drowning
commanders, staffs, and intelligence organizations. This
information overload challenge is one of the crucial
by-products of the information age—one that we have yet to
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solve. The evidence is already clear that information
technology will not simplify the decision-making process,
but in fact makes it more complex. Our future opponents,
however, given their expectations and aims, will require
much less information to strike effectively—particularly
since their aim is not to win a decisive victory. They will be,
moreover, less dependent upon the microchip to conduct
their method of warfare. A thinking opponent will quickly
realize that our intensive reliance on information age
technologies becomes a weakness that can become an
asymmetric target.
A reading of current military writing from abroad,
particularly Asia, reveals that many armies are already
placing extraordinary emphasis on information operations
and information warfare. At present, American analysts
are taking considerable comfort in the observation that few
have made serious investment toward either information
warfare or precision systems similar to those possessed by
Western military organizations. What, however, they fail to
see is that Asian armies already understand that advances
in information technologies will favor their style of warfare
just as much as it does the western style. In particular, the
Internet and wireless, non-nodal communications will allow
dispersed armies to mass rapidly. As information becomes
more secure and information centers more dispersed and
less vulnerable, potential opponents will wield more flexible
and agile land forces. Moreover, they will be able to divide
their forces into smaller and thus less detectable
increments. In perhaps one of the strangest potential
ironies of the future, Western information technology may
well provide non-Western armies solutions to two vexing
problems. First, cellular technology and the Internet may
allow them to maintain a concert of action for long periods
among widely dispersed units. Second, these same
technologies will allow them to orchestrate the rapid
massing of dispersed units when opportunities arise to
transition onto the offensive.
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The result may well be a technological foot race that
either side could win. As we develop the technologies to find
and kill an enemy, our potential opponents will develop the
technologies to become even more difficult to find. The
prospect becomes even more sobering when one considers
the fact that the commercial sector is now in the process of
providing future competitors with the tools they need, as
our research centers continue to perfect non-nodal,
distributed, and netcentric global information technologies
for paying customers on a world-wide basis. Moreover,
potential U.S. opponents do not have to spend a dime for the
development of any of these systems. And again we must
remember that such opponents have a very different
strategy in mind for the next war. They have only to create a
stalemate and inflict sufficient casualties on Western forces
to raise political difficulties for the political leaders who
decided to intervene —in the words of Neville Chamberlain
— in “a quarrel in a far away country between people of
whom we know nothing.”
Defeating the Adaptive Enemy:
Clausewitz provides us with a harsh and accurate
warning about the fundamental nature of war:
War, however, is not the action of a living force upon a lifeless
mass (total nonresistance would be no war at all), but always
the collision of two living forces. The ultimate aim of waging war
… must be taken as applying to both sides. Once again, there is
interaction. So long as I have not overthrown my opponent I am
bound to fear he may overthrow me. Thus, I am not in control: he
dictates to me as much as I dictate to him.11

It is this fundamental Clausewitzian point that Western,
and American military organizations in particular, are in

11. Carl Von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard
and Peter Paret, p. 77.
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danger of forgetting. Our potential opponents in the next
century will have thought long and hard about how to attack
our weaknesses.

To be sure, firepower can be paralytic in its effect. But
paralytic effects by fire are always fleeting. Armies have
shown time and again that they can become inured to the
paralytic effects of firepower and can even learn creative
ways to lessen its destructive effects. Add to this factor the
ability of non-Western armies to utilize the advantages of
time, mass, will and the power of the defensive, and the
single American advantage of superior killing power
becomes much less persuasive as an instrument of war than
it appears on first consideration.
The corollary to Newton’s fundamental law of physics
echoes with a sense of urgency: every successful technical or
tactical innovation that provides a dominant military
advantage eventually yields to a countervailing response
that shifts the advantage to the opposing force. America’s
military dominance in firepower and attrition warfare has
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been on display for almost five decades. We must anticipate
a future military challenge that will attempt to defeat our
preoccupation with precision strike. We must use the time
we have in the decade ahead to restore balance in our future
method of war. Our future arsenal of military capabilities
must include a 21st Century sword with two equally
compelling edges: precision maneuver as well as precision
firepower. Without these two applied in balance and
harmony, future conflicts might well devolve into massive
wars of attrition. Let’s begin now to take on the challenge of
a future adaptive enemy and begin now to build a balanced
force to defeat him.
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